CAN VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY CAPITALIZE ON JTB’S APPEAL?

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Even Gettier (1963) can agree that the traditional Justified True Belief analysis of knowledge (JTB) has many appealing qualities, prominent among which is that it “analyzes knowledge in terms of a short list of simple and significant features” (Weatherson 2003: 11). Alas, some of the cases that theorists have deemed decisive counterexamples to JTB really are such. Of the various approaches to knowledge that have emerged post-Gettier, a group of related virtue-theoretic accounts are among the most prominent and promising. What unifies these accounts—due to Greco (2003, 2010), Riggs (2007, 2009), Sosa (2007, 2009, 2011), Turri (2011, 2012a), and Zagzebski (1996, 1999, 2009), among others—is their commitment to the following basic ideas about epistemically justified belief and knowledge (cf. Turri 2011: 7–8; 2012a: 257–258):

S’s belief that P is epistemically justified iff the belief is the product (or, results from the exercise) of S’s intellectual powers (virtues, competences, abilities, dispositions).

S knows that P iff S’s true belief that P manifests (and so, is the product of) S’s intellectual powers (virtues, competences, abilities, dispositions).

Call the conjunction of these basic ideas that animate the more detailed virtue-theoretic accounts of knowledge just mentioned Core Virtue Epistemology (CVE). According to CVE’s advocates, what distinguishes knowledge from mere justified true belief is that the former manifests its subject’s intellectual powers, whereas the latter merely results from the exercise of those powers. Turri vividly illustrates the pertinent distinction with a pair of simple cases:
(BOIL) You place a cup of water in the microwave and press start. The magnetron generates microwaves that travel into the central compartment, penetrate the water and excite its molecules. Soon the water boils.

(FIRE) You place a cup of water in the microwave and press start. The magnetron generates microwaves that cause an insufficiently insulated wire in the control circuit to catch fire, which fire deactivates the magnetron and spreads to the central compartment. Soon the water boils.

Both outcomes are in some way due to the microwave's boiling power. But . . . we all recognize an important difference. The outcome in BOIL manifests the microwave's boiling power, whereas the outcome in FIRE does not. We have a plain way to mark the distinction in ordinary language: in the former case, but not the latter, the microwave boils the water. (2012a: 256)

The “commonsense” concept of power-manifestation that Turri’s cases highlight will loom large in what follows.

Here’s an intriguing meta-epistemological question about JTB and CVE:

“Are Core Virtue Epistemologists especially well positioned to capitalize on JTB’s appeal?”

Turri (2012a) has recently argued in the affirmative. In this paper, I’ll develop and defend the following dilemma for any (Turri-style) “JTB-based” argument for CVE:

There are two kinds of CVE, distinguished by their different conceptions of an outcome's manifesting a power. Environmentally sensitive CVE (e.g., Greco 2010) employs a relatively strong power-manifestation concept that supervenes on environment-dependent counterfactual properties. This notion requires, for an outcome's manifesting a power, that the outcome would still have occurred had the power's host been situated somewhat differently in its environment. By contrast, environmentally insensitive CVE (e.g., Sosa 2011) employs a relatively weak power-manifestation concept, on which an outcome can manifest a power even though the outcome would not have occurred had the power’s host been somewhat differently situated in its environment. Any JTB-based argument for environmentally sensitive CVE will have a false premise to the effect that the kind of CVE it aims to bolster closely resembles JTB. On the other hand, any JTB-based argument for environmentally insensitive CVE will be otiose because it backs a clear loser: unlike its environmentally sensitive cousin, environmentally insensitive CVE mistakenly ascribes knowledge to subjects in “fake barn” cases (Goldman 1976: 772–773). So, for any JTB-based argument for CVE, either it has a false premise or it’s an exercise in futility. No such argument can achieve its advocate’s aim of contributing significantly to the justification of CVE.
If sound, this dilemma is important, for what we might call the “standard cumulative case” for CVE has not emerged from recent criticism unscathed. Accordingly, CVE’s defenders should reckon Turri’s new JTB-driven strategy for bolstering CVE a welcome supplement to the standard cumulative case for their position. If the overall argument of this paper succeeds, however, Turri’s strategy cannot ultimately realize such promise.

In §1, I explain Turri’s JTB-based argument for environmentally sensitive CVE. I press this objection: because the (relatively “externalistic”) kind of CVE that Turri’s argument aims to support comprises an account of warrant—whatever “fills the gap” between mere true belief and knowledge—that differs significantly from the account of warrant that (the relatively “internalistic”) JTB comprises, the former cannot imply even the approximate truth of the latter, and so Turri’s argument fails due to a false premise. This is the first horn of my dilemma for JTB-based arguments for CVE.

In §2, I bring out a tension in Turri’s discussion of the kind of CVE that his JTB-based argument aims to support. The relatively strong, environmentally sensitive concept of power-manifestation, in whose terms Turri formulates his favored version of CVE, differs importantly from the relatively weak, environmentally insensitive power-manifestation concept that Turri highlights when introducing CVE. Sosa (2011: 81) helpfully describes the weaker, “commonsense” power-manifestation concept in this passage:

In general, the manifestation of a commonsense disposition does not require [that the manifestation’s triggering conditions would trigger its resultant manifestation not only at the very place and time where the host of the disposition is located, but also throughout some wider neighborhood of places and times]. Thus, consider fragility and solubility. If a wine glass is dropped on a hard counter, its shattering can manifest its fragility even if all nearby horizontal surfaces are outfitted with cushions. If a sugar cube is inserted in hot coffee, its dissolving can manifest its solubility even if someone would prevent dissolving in any nearby liquid by freezing the liquid upon the cube’s entry.

The same goes generally for dispositions that constitute abilities. An athlete’s successful shot can manifest her competence even if issuing such a shot in any relevant nearby venue would fail. Nearby tennis courts or basketball courts may all be outdoors and swept by winds so strong that the player’s shot would have a miniscule chance of success. But this need not preclude her successful shot within the indoor venue from manifesting her competence.

Again, it’s this environmentally insensitive, “commonsense” concept of power-manifestation that Turri highlights when introducing CVE (via, e.g., the BOIL and FIRE cases above). However, the power-manifestation concept that Turri ultimately employs in his favored kind of CVE is environmentally sensitive—i.e., it requires, for an outcome’s manifesting a power, that the
outcome would *still* have occurred had the power’s host been situated somewhat differently in its environment.

There’s an obvious way for Turri to resolve this alleged equivocation, and thereby *completely avoid* my objection to his JTB-based argument for CVE: recast the argument explicitly in terms of the environmentally *insensitive* concept of power-manifestation, and on its basis take up the corresponding kind of CVE. Notably, environmentally insensitive CVE is about as well supported by what I earlier called the “standard cumulative case” as is its environmentally sensitive cousin (cf. Turri 2012b). Unfortunately, environmentally insensitive CVE has what many theorists will deem a fatal flaw: the view mistakenly ascribes knowledge to subjects in fake barn cases. This is the second horn of my dilemma for JTB-based arguments for CVE.

In §3, I defend the second horn of my dilemma for JTB-based arguments for CVE against another recent argument from Turri (2011: 8–9), this one for the conclusion that the subject in a fake barn case knows s/he is facing a barn after all. If this argument succeeds, then the proponent of a JTB-based argument for environmentally *insensitive* CVE can successfully grasp my dilemma’s second horn: while accepting that her favored virtue-theoretic account ascribes knowledge in fake barn country, s/he’ll credibly *deny* that such an ascription is mistaken.

Turri’s argument for knowledge in fake barn country invokes a prima facie plausible, and independently interesting, thesis about *acting knowingly*—viz., that you knowingly perform an act of type A only if you know that you’re A-ing. Call this the Knowledge Requirement on Acting Knowingly (KRAK). After proposing and evaluating an attempted counterexample to KRAK, I’ll argue that the indicated case—even if not itself a successful counterexample to KRAK—can be parlayed into a decisive “self-defeat” objection to Turri’s argument for knowledge in fake barn country. With the relevant example in hand, we can establish that one of Turri’s argument’s basic premises is true *only if* another one is false. Turri’s argument for knowledge in fake barn country thus fails to enable proponents of JTB-based arguments for CVE to successfully grasp my dilemma’s second horn. The dilemma for such argumentation stands.

1. **Turri’s JTB-Based Argument for Core Virtue Epistemology (and the First Horn of the Dilemma for It)**

Turri (2012a: 258) sets out his JTB-based argument for CVE in this passage:

Assume that a person’s intellectual powers or abilities are the source of epistemic justification for her. Given that assumption, to say that ‘knowledge is true belief manifesting intellectual power’ is basically to say ‘\(K = J \rightarrow TB\)’, where the arrow
represents the relation of manifestation. This addition constitutes a small but crucial improvement on the traditional view, relying only on an intuitive and independently plausible metaphysical distinction [between an outcome happening merely because of a disposition and an outcome manifesting a disposition] to supplement the traditional components.

I think this speaks greatly in favor of the assumption that intellectual powers are the source of epistemic justification. That is, the fact that the assumption reveals JTB to be almost right counts in its favor. There’s a reason why so many smart people found JTB so attractive for so long. Once we’re convinced that JTB is false, the next most plausible explanation for the attraction is that JTB is close to being true. And if my analysis here is correct, then JTB hit very close to the mark indeed.

We can state Turri’s argument more formally as follows:

Turri’s JTB-based Argument for Core Virtue Epistemology

(1) If CVE is true, then knowledge is justified true belief which manifests its subject’s intellectual powers.
(2) If knowledge is justified true belief which manifests its subject’s intellectual powers, then JTB is at least approximately true.

Therefore,

(3) If CVE is true, then JTB is at least approximately true.
(4) If an epistemological theory implies the approximate truth of JTB, then this “speaks greatly in favor of” the theory in question.

Therefore,

(5) CVE’s implication of the approximate truth of JTB “speaks greatly in favor of” CVE.

This argument’s basic premises are (1), (2), and (4). (1) is a definitional truth, and I’m happy to concede (4). I can’t judge Turri’s argument a success, though, for I deny (2): the environmentally sensitive kind of CVE, in whose terms Turri formulates his argument, does not imply that JTB is approximately true. Invoking the notion of warrant—whatever “fills the gap” between mere true belief and knowledge—will help us see why (2) is false.

JTB and (environmentally sensitive3) CVE are different approaches to knowledge because they comprise different accounts of warrant—i.e., they give different answers to the question what makes the difference between mere true belief and knowledge. JTB identifies warrant with being epistemically justified. CVE identifies warrant with (the more demanding,
“environmentally sensitive” concept of) being a manifestation of intellectual powers. Since the nature of warrant is the primary point of disagreement between JTB and CVE, (2) is true only if the property that (Turri’s preferred kind of) CVE identifies with warrant closely resembles the property that JTB identifies with warrant.

Are these epistemic properties closely similar?

I say “No,” for the following reason. Start by considering Goldman’s (1976: 772–773) (in)famous “fake barn” case:

Henry is driving in the countryside with his son. For the boy’s edification Henry identifies various objects on the landscape as they come into view. “That’s a cow,” says Henry, “That’s a tractor,” “That’s a silo,” “That’s a barn,” etc. Each of the identified objects has features characteristic of its type . . . [U]nknown to Henry, the district he has just entered is full of papier-mâché facsimiles of barns. These facsimiles look from the road exactly like barns, but are really just facades, without back walls or interiors, quite incapable of being used as barns. They are so cleverly constructed that travelers invariably mistake them for barns. Having just entered the district, Henry has not encountered any facsimiles; the object he sees is a genuine barn.

According to (Turri’s favored kind of) CVE, Henry’s true “barn” belief, B, does not constitute knowledge (Turri 2012a: 255ff.). Whatever else it may be, then, B is not a manifestation of Henry’s intellectual powers. But B is epistemically justified (Turri 2012a: 248). So, something about Henry’s local physical environment—specifically, the presence of all those fake barns—permits B to have epistemic justification, but keeps B from qualifying as a manifestation of Henry’s intellectual powers. Upshot: the concept of power-manifestation at play in Turri’s favored kind of CVE, and the corresponding JTB-based argument on its behalf, must be the more demanding, “environmentally sensitive” one.

With the above points in place, I can now argue against (2):

(6) CVE implies that JTB is “close to being true” only if the two approaches comprise closely similar accounts of warrant.

(7) CVE and JTB comprise closely similar accounts of warrant only if (the environmentally sensitive concept of) being a manifestation of intellectual powers closely resembles being epistemically justified.

Therefore,

(8) CVE implies that JTB is “close to being true” only if being a manifestation of intellectual powers closely resembles being epistemically justified. [(6), (7)]
(9) If an epistemic property E’s exemplification (by belief B, held by subject S) requires the absence of (certain kinds of) counterfeit/misleading objects in S’s surroundings but epistemic property E*’s exemplification does not also carry this requirement; then E and E* do not closely resemble each other.

(10) Being a manifestation of intellectual powers requires the absence of (certain kinds of) counterfeit/misleading objects in a thinker’s surroundings, but being epistemically justified does not also carry that requirement.

Therefore,

(11) Being a manifestation of intellectual powers and being epistemically justified do not closely resemble each other. [(9), (10)]

Therefore,

(12) CVE does not imply that JTB is “close to being true”. [(8), (11)]

(9) is the argument’s shakiest step; I’ll wrap up this section by saying something on its behalf.

(9) follows from the conjunction of two claims, one trivial and one substantive:

**The Trivial Claim:** If an epistemic property E’s exemplification requirements differ significantly from epistemic property E*’s exemplification requirements, then E and E* do not closely resemble each other.

**The Substantive Claim:** An epistemic property whose exemplification requires the absence of (certain kinds of) counterfeit/misleading objects in a thinker’s surroundings has significantly different exemplification requirements from an epistemic property whose exemplification does not require the absence of such items.

Why believe the Substantive Claim? Here’s the thinking: An epistemic property that carries a “no nearby counterfeit/misleading objects” requirement will be significantly more truth-conducive—and thus, significantly better from an epistemic perspective—than will an epistemic property that does not carry such a requirement, and whose exemplification is thus compatible with the presence of nearby counterfeit/misleading objects. So, among epistemic (i.e., truth-conducive/knowledge-relevant) properties, the difference between those that carry a “no nearby counterfeit/misleading objects” requirement, and those that don’t, is indeed significant.
On the basis of the above argument (8)-(12), I conclude that Turri’s JTB-based argument for (environmentally sensitive) CVE stumbles at step (2). This is the first horn of my dilemma for any (Turri-style) JTB-based argument for CVE: if the argument is formulated in terms of environmentally sensitive CVE, then it will have a false premise to the effect that the (relatively “externalistic”) virtue-theoretic account it aims to support closely resembles the (relatively “internalistic”) JTB account.

My objection to Turri’s argument raises the question why he mistakenly endorses (2). Why does Turri think that his favored kind of CVE “constitutes a small [my emphasis] . . . improvement on the traditional view”? The next section answers this question, then uses the answer to present the second horn of my dilemma for JTB-based arguments for CVE.

2. Two Notions of Power-Manifestation (and the Second Horn of the Dilemma for JTB-based Arguments for Core Virtue Epistemology)

Turri’s mistaken endorsement of (2) stems, I believe, from a conflation of the environmentally sensitive and environmentally insensitive concepts of power-manifestation, both of which are in play at different stages of his discussion.

As we’ve seen, the power-manifestation concept that Turri ultimately employs in his favored kind of CVE (a) is sensitive to such “environmental” facts as whether there are any fake barns around, and so (b) yields an account of knowledge that differs considerably from JTB: the theories issue conflicting verdicts about fake barn cases. Whereas JTB implies that Henry’s true “barn” belief has warrant and so constitutes knowledge, Turri’s favored kind of CVE implies that Henry’s true belief falls short of knowledge and thus lacks warrant. So, the “environmentally sensitive” power-manifestation concept that Turri ultimately utilizes yields an epistemological theory that improves on JTB, relative to fake barn cases at least, but does not closely resemble JTB.

By contrast, the power-manifestation concept that Turri (2012a: 255–256) seems focused on at earlier stages of his discussion (a) is insensitive to the relevant kinds of environmental facts, and so (b) yields an analysis similar to JTB: the theories issue the same verdicts about fake barn cases (both accounts ascribe knowledge to subjects in such examples). This environmentally insensitive power-manifestation concept is the one most clearly illustrated by the simple cases that Turri (2012a: 256) initially describes to help focus our attention on power-manifestation: a glass object’s shattering upon impact with the floor manifests the object’s fragility; a liquid’s boiling inside a properly functioning microwave manifests the appliance’s heating power. Notably, Turri’s examples make no stipulations whatsoever regarding the
broader physical environments wherein their subjects are embedded. It’s perfectly consistent with his examples’ details that the relevant outcomes—the glass object’s shattering, the liquid’s boiling—would not have occurred had their subjects been somewhat differently situated in their respective environments. Turri’s “shattering” case is compatible with (e.g.) the additional detail that “all nearby horizontal surfaces have been outfitted with cushions” (Sosa 2011: 81), so that the glass object would not have shattered had it been dropped at various different nearby locations. And Turri’s “boiling” case is compatible with (e.g.) the additional detail that every nearby power outlet is defective, so that the microwave would not have boiled the water had it been situated at various different nearby locations. The absence of stipulations ruling out the possibility of such “environmental pollution” in Turri’s simple examples indicates that the power-manifestation concept he intends those cases to illustrate is the environmentally insensitive, “commonsense” one that does not supervene on the relevant kinds of environment-dependent counterfactual properties—e.g., would have shattered had it been dropped at any nearby location, would have boiled the water had it been plugged into any nearby outlet, would have produced a true belief had the subject been looking at any nearby apparent barn.

So, there are two concepts of power-manifestation at play in Turri’s discussion: the weaker, environmentally insensitive concept most clearly illustrated by the simple cases he appeals to initially; and the stronger, environmentally sensitive concept he ultimately employs in his preferred kind of CVE. I suspect that, over the course of introducing and then more carefully formulating CVE, Turri slides imperceptibly from the less demanding, environmentally insensitive power-manifestation concept with which he starts to the more demanding, environmentally sensitive one with which he ends. Such an inadvertent slide would explain why Turri mistakenly thinks that his preferred kind of CVE “constitutes a small [my emphasis] . . . improvement on the traditional view.” A virtue-theoretic account of warrant employing the environmentally insensitive power-manifestation concept that Turri initially focuses on would not constitute a striking departure from JTB’s account of warrant. Unfortunately for his JTB-based argument for CVE, however, the environmentally sensitive power-manifestation concept to which Turri inadvertently slides—aided, I suspect, by thinking about fake barn cases—yields an account of warrant that departs rather dramatically from that comprised by JTB.

At this point, many readers will recognize that Turri could resolve the equivocation I’m alleging—and in a way that completely avoids my objection to (2)—by recasting his JTB-based argument for CVE explicitly in terms of the environmentally insensitive concept of power-manifestation. Of course, most theorists would then deem Turri’s JTB-based argument otiose, for the reason that it backs a clear loser. Unlike its environmentally sensitive
cousin, environmentally insensitive CVE ascribes knowledge to subjects in fake barn cases: clearly, the environmentally insensitive approach will allow that Henry’s true “barn” belief could manifest his relevant intellectual powers—and thus constitute knowledge—despite the fact that those powers would not have had a true outcome had Henry occupied any of a wide range of nearby locations (e.g., ones facing fake barns). Most theorists would judge this ascription of knowledge to subjects in fake barn cases a fatal flaw. The claim that this mistaken knowledge ascription is indeed lethal to environmentally insensitive CVE constitutes the second horn of my dilemma for JTB-based arguments for CVE.

I’ll devote the rest of this paper to defending the second horn of my dilemma against another recent argument from Turri (2011: 8–9), this one for the conclusion that a subject in fake barn country knows s/he’s facing a barn after all. If this argument succeeds, then the proponent of JTB-based argumentation for environmentally insensitive CVE can successfully grasp my dilemma’s second horn: while accepting that her preferred virtue-theoretic account ascribes knowledge in fake barn country, s/he can credibly deny that such an ascription is mistaken. Turri’s argument for knowledge in fake barn country invokes a prima facie plausible, and independently interesting, thesis about acting knowingly—viz., that you knowingly perform an act of type A only if you know that you’re A-ing. Earlier, I called this the Knowledge Requirement on Acting Knowingly (KRAK). After proposing and assessing an attempted counterexample to KRAK, I’ll argue that the indicated case—even if not itself a successful counterexample to KRAK—nevertheless forms the basis of a decisive “self-defeat” objection to Turri’s argument for knowledge in fake barn country: with the indicated case in hand, we can show that one of his argument’s basic premises is true only if another is false.5

3. Knowledge in Fake Barn Country?: Defending the Dilemma’s Second Horn (from Bad Henry)

Turri’s (2012a: 8–9) argument for ascribing knowledge to subjects in fake barn cases takes off from an example he dubs Hooligan:

Bad Henry is a hooligan who does bad things. He wants to destroy a barn. He will destroy a barn. He drives out into the country to find one. He pulls over after an hour, retrieves his bazooka, and takes aim with unerring accuracy at the roadside barn he sees. Calm, cool, and collected as he pulls the trigger, he thinks, “That sure is a nice barn . . . now was a nice barn—ha!” He destroyed the barn. He feels no remorse. He is forever after known as “Bad Henry, bane of barns.” He is bad—very bad.
Bad Henry knowingly destroyed a barn. He knew he was destroying a barn as he pulled the trigger. To know that, he had to know it was a barn as he took aim. So he did know it was a barn.

Now we add the twist: Bad Henry was in Fake Barn Country and just happened to shoot at the only barn around... Nevertheless, the intuition remains: Bad Henry knew he was destroying a barn. So he did know it was a barn as he took aim.

I submit that Bad Henry knows it's a barn only if Good Henry [ = the subject in the original fake barn case] knows it's a barn. Bad Henry does know it's a barn. So Good Henry knows too.

We can state the argument of this passage more formally as follows:

The Bad Henry Argument

(13) In *Hooligan*, Bad Henry knowingly destroys a barn.\(^6\)

**(KRAK)** One knowingly performs an act of type A only if one knows that one is A-ing.\(^7\)

Therefore,

(14) Bad Henry knows that he is destroying a barn.

(15) Bad Henry knows that he is destroying a barn only if Good Henry knows that he is facing a barn.

Therefore,

(16) Good Henry knows that he is facing a barn.\(^8\)

If successful, the Bad Henry Argument will enable environmentally insensitive Core Virtue Epistemologists to credibly defend their view from the charge that it *mistakenly* ascribes knowledge in fake barn country—and so, to grasp the second horn of my dilemma for JTB-based arguments for CVE.

Does the Bad Henry Argument succeed?

The argument's basic premises are (13), KRAK, and (15). (15) is extremely plausible; I'm happy to concede it. Nevertheless, I've become convinced that we should deem the Bad Henry Argument a failure, for this potentially surprising reason: the Bad Henry Argument *defeats itself*, in that (13) is true only if KRAK is false. With the following case, I begin working toward a presentation and defense of this “self-defeat” objection to the Bad Henry Argument:
**Live Round**: Gunnar, a sharpshooter, brandishes a (rather large) revolver with (let’s say) one hundred chambers. Gunnar knows that every chamber contains a live round *save one*, which contains a blank. Given the similarities between firing a live round and firing a blank one, Gunnar isn’t in a position to know that he’s fired a live round *unless* he can see what happens to his intended target. Gunnar aims his revolver into a small, dark room where his sworn enemy, Ridley, is chained tightly to a wall. In light of his skill and circumstances, Gunnar knows that Ridley will die if he simply fires a live round in the direction he’s presently aiming. So Gunnar gleefully pulls the trigger. Sure enough, the round is live, and Ridley dies instantly.

*Live Round* holds some promise of countering KRAK: initially at least, it seems arguable both that Gunnar knowingly killed Ridley, and also that Gunnar doesn’t (yet) know that he killed Ridley. Starting with the latter claim, consider the following structurally similar case:

**Losing Ticket**: The winning number in a lottery with one hundred tickets has been drawn, but won’t be announced till later tonight. Lottery tickets are still on sale. Gunnar knows (somehow) that simply buying a losing lottery ticket would (somehow) suffice to instantly cause the death of his sworn enemy, Ridley. So Gunnar gleefully buys a ticket. Sure enough, the ticket is a loser, and Ridley dies instantly.

Intuitively, Gunnar doesn’t (yet) know that his ticket is a loser. And given the obvious structural similarities between *Live Round* and *Losing Ticket*, it seems that Gunnar knows that he fired a live round only if he knows that he bought a losing ticket. So, we should conclude that Gunnar doesn’t know that he fired a live round. But if he doesn’t know that he fired a live round, then he doesn’t know that he killed Ridley.

That solidifies one of the two claims required to deem *Live Round* a counterexample to KRAK. What can we say on behalf of the other required claim—viz., that Gunnar knowingly killed Ridley? Aside from emphasizing whatever prima facie intuitive appeal the claim may enjoy, there are at least two lines of reasoning to try out. Here’s the first:

**Argument 1 (for Gunnar’s knowingly killing Ridley)**

(I) If you performed an act of type A and did not do so unwittingly, then you A-ed knowingly.10 (II) Gunnar killed Ridley, and did not do so unwittingly. Therefore, (III) Gunnar knowingly killed Ridley.

(II) is right, but (I) is wrong.11 An act of type A’s not being done unwittingly doesn’t suffice for its being done knowingly. Just as there seems to be a middle
ground between A-ing intentionally and A-ing unintentionally—occupied by, e.g., clearly foreseen negative side-effects of intentional actions\(^\text{12}\) (cf. Mele and Moser 1994: 45)—, so also there seems to be a middle ground between acting knowingly and acting unwittingly. The following example, adapted from one due to Hanfling (2003: 262–263), describes an act that seems to occupy such middle ground:

**Stolen Merchandise:** On the basis of a text message from your new manager, you have pretty good reason to believe that certain items for sale in the store where you work were stolen from a competitor. Your evidence for thinking the items are “hot” is not quite strong enough to justify flat-out believing the items are stolen—epistemically speaking, you should presently suspend judgment on that question—but your evidence that they’re “hot” is nevertheless pretty strong. Here’s how you react to the new evidence about the relevant items: your degree of confidence that the goods are stolen rises significantly, so as to match the degree to which your evidence now supports that proposition; you refrain from taking the suspect items off the shelf; and, eventually, you sell those items to your own customers. Now for some wrinkles: unbeknownst to you, your new manager is in fact “a thoroughly unreliable person who makes a practice of sending false warnings, apparently for amusement” (262). On this occasion, your manager mistakenly thought that the items in question were “clean”, and was trying to mislead you into thinking they were stolen. It turns out, however, that the relevant items really were stolen from a competitor, and placed on your store’s shelves, by one of your kleptomaniacal colleagues.

You sold stolen merchandise to your own customers. Did you do so unwittingly?

Well, given that you had fairly strong evidence—on whose basis you were justifiedly fairly confident—that the items were stolen, it seems wrong to say you unwittingly sold your customers stolen goods. But given that your evidence’s source is objectively unreliable, and completely unconnected to your kleptomaniacal colleague’s behavior; that the evidence itself doesn’t (quite) justify believing that the goods are stolen; and that your degree of confidence that the goods are stolen matches the degree to which your evidence supports that proposition, so that you don’t (quite) count as believing the items were stolen; in light of all these details, it seems that you didn’t knowingly sell your customers stolen goods. So, while you sold your customers stolen goods and did not do so unwittingly, you also don’t count as having knowingly sold your customers stolen merchandise. I conclude, then, that *Stolen Merchandise* is a genuine counterexample to (I).

So Argument 1 above fails; it cannot help to counter KRAK by solidifying the claim that Gunnar knowingly killed Ridley (in *Live Round*). But there’s another argument for that claim worth considering:
Argument 2 (for Gunnar's knowingly killing Ridley)

(i) If you performed an act of type A intentionally, then you A-ed knowingly.  
(ii) Gunnar intentionally killed Ridley. Therefore, (iii) Gunnar knowingly killed Ridley.

What should we make of this argument? Can it, together with the above argument that Gunnar doesn’t know he killed Ridley, justify deeming *Live Round* a counterexample to KRAK? Consider first an objection to (ii):

If Gunnar intentionally killed Ridley, then Gunnar intentionally fired a live round at Ridley. Now, if Gunnar intentionally fired a live round at Ridley, then (in *Losing Ticket*) Gunnar intentionally bought a losing ticket. But probable outcomes in fair games of pure chance cannot qualify as intentional acts, their high likelihood of occurrence notwithstanding. So, Gunnar did not lose the lottery intentionally, and therefore did not intentionally buy a losing lottery ticket. We should conclude, then, that Gunnar did not intentionally kill Ridley after all.

I’m willing to grant the first step of this objection. As it stands, though, the objection falters at its second step. Start with a common, plausible thought about intentional action: anything done intentionally must manifest some relevant skill its agent possesses. More precisely: you perform an act of type A intentionally only if your A-ing manifests some (natural or acquired) skill you possess, which in turn affords you “suitably reliable control over whether, given that [you act] with A-ing as a goal, [you succeed] in A-ing” (Mele and Moser 1994: 62). If acting intentionally requires manifestation of relevant skill, then the above objection’s second step is false. Suppose that any intentional action manifests some relevant skill its agent has. Then, since firing a live round at a target can manifest relevant skill whereas outcomes in fair games of pure chance cannot, it’s possible that Gunnar intentionally fired a live round at Ridley but impossible that he intentionally bought a losing lottery ticket. Thus, contrary to what the objector claimed, Gunnar’s intentionally firing a live round at Ridley does not, after all, entail that he also intentionally bought a losing ticket.

Reply: Here’s a different, more promising objection to (ii) that also takes off from the first premise of my above reasoning (which you’ve kindly granted). Add to that premise this new reasoning: if Gunnar intentionally fired a live round at Ridley, then he intentionally fired a live round period; but Gunnar did not intentionally fire a live round: his doing so was too lucky to have been done intentionally; and so, by the new reasoning together with the premise you’ve already granted, Gunnar did not intentionally kill Ridley.
Rejoinder: The objector’s claim that Gunnar did not intentionally fire a live round will lead to an unacceptable under-ascription of intentional action. Let’s start by asking: in what sense was Gunnar’s firing a live round “lucky”? Which aspects of the case is the objector focusing on? Presumably, the objector is fixed on this fact: metaphysically speaking, it could easily have happened that the chamber containing the blank round was aligned with the barrel. Accordingly, it could easily have happened that, just before the time at which Gunnar actually fired a live round, he was not then in a position to fire a live round. We can now excavate the hidden assumption underlying the objector’s claim that Gunnar didn’t intentionally fire a live round (where \( t \) is a time just prior to \( t^* \)):

If it could easily have happened that you were not at \( t \) in a position to perform an act of type A at \( t^* \), then it’s false that you A intentionally at \( t^* \).

This principle yields an unacceptable under-ascription of intentional action. Counterexamples to it abound; here comes one now:

Our department meeting ends early for once. As a result, I’m early to pick up Evan from school. Upon arriving, I spot him playing in the street. A car—whose inattentive driver is texting on her cell phone—speeds toward Evan. I’m free to push Evan out of harm’s way; I exercise this freedom. It (metaphysically speaking) could easily have happened that, just before the time at which I actually saved Evan from being struck by the car, I was not then in a position to save Evan: the department meeting could easily have lasted somewhat longer than it actually did; I could easily have missed a stoplight that I actually made; . . . .

By the objector’s hidden assumption, I did not intentionally save Evan. Surely, though, it’s at least possible—indeed, it’s extremely natural—to understand the above case in such a way that I did intentionally save Evan. So the objector’s hidden assumption is false, and (ii) again escapes unscathed.

Here’s a second objection to Argument 2, which—unlike its predecessor—targets premise (i) (=if you A intentionally, then you A knowingly) and stands a strong chance of success. Consider this case:

Deceived Pitcher: Nolan, a naturally gifted athlete, has set out to become a major league pitcher. He can already throw a regular fastball, and now very much wants to learn how to throw a cut fastball (for short, a “cutter”). Although he’s heard enough about cutters to know that they can be extremely challenging to hit, Nolan doesn’t know the first thing about throwing one—indeed, he’s never even seen someone throw a cutter. However, Nolan knows that his friend, Mike, is a first-rate pitching coach, and so he promptly asks him how to throw a cutter. Years of experience have taught Mike that beginning pitchers are much better off developing a hard slider before attempting the (somewhat similar) cutter. But Mike doesn’t want to disappoint Nolan (who, recall, very much wants to acquire
a cutter... now!). So Mike comes up with this compromise: he pretends that he's teaching Nolan how to throw a cutter, but really gives him the recipe for throwing a hard slider. Now for the twist: unbeknownst to all (Nolan included), Nolan has a neurological abnormality that sometimes makes him act in ways somewhat different from how he thinks he's acting. As a result, whenever Nolan enacts Mike's misleading recipe for throwing a cutter, Nolan actually succeeds in throwing perfect cutters. Finally, neither Mike nor anyone else (e.g., Nolan's catcher) ever gives Nolan any reason to think he's throwing cutters. When Nolan delivers a perfect cutter, all parties present remain completely straight-faced and flatly say “Again”—that’s all the feedback Nolan ever gets.

The envisaged critic of (i) will claim, first, that we can understand this case so that Nolan sometimes throws a cutter intentionally; but, second, that given Nolan’s misconceptions about how to throw a cutter plus his lack of relevant feedback about the results of his attempts to do so, Nolan never knowingly throws a cutter. If both claims are correct, then (i) is false and Argument 2 fails. Are both claims correct?

I can say the following with confidence: the claims in question are plausible enough to cast a degree of doubt on (i) sufficient to defeat Argument 2, at least as currently formulated. Of course, we might try strengthening (i)'s antecedent in an effort to find an overall weaker conditional claim that can take (i)'s place in Argument 2. But it will clearly be a challenge to find a suitable replacement for (i) that is both counterexample-free and not ad hoc. So I'm willing to agree with the objector that Argument 2, as currently stated at least, fails to establish that Gunnar knowingly killed Ridley.

I've now considered, and ultimately rejected, two different arguments for the claim that Gunnar knowingly killed Ridley. So far as I can presently see, whether Live Round constitutes a genuine counterexample to KRAK depends crucially on whether the aforementioned claim can retain, on deeper reflection, whatever intuitive plausibility it may enjoy initially. The following argument is worth considering in this connection:

If Gunnar knowingly killed Ridley, then he knowingly fired a live round at him. And if Gunnar knowingly fired a live round at Ridley, then (in Losing Ticket) he knowingly bought a losing ticket. But Gunnar didn't knowingly buy a losing ticket: for if Gunnar knowingly bought a losing ticket, then typical lottery players also knowingly buy losing tickets, which would make their ticket purchases significantly less intelligible than they actually are. Therefore, Gunnar did not knowingly kill Ridley.

This argument seeks (minimally) to counterbalance whatever intuitive plausibility the target claim may initially enjoy, thereby defending KRAK from Live Round. Does it succeed?
Arguably, it doesn’t. The problem is its first premise (= if Gunnar knowingly killed Ridley, then he knowingly fired a live round at Ridley), which seems dependent on this more general principle:

If you knowingly performed an act of type A and have a justified true belief that you A-ed by performing an act of type A*, then you knowingly A*-ed.

We can counter this principle by amplifying Deceived Pitcher as follows. Suppose Nolan, still laboring under his (Mike-induced) misconceptions about how to throw a cutter and lack of relevant feedback about the results of his attempts to do so, nevertheless becomes a good enough pitcher to play competitively. Surely, Nolan could knowingly strike out a batter, in the justified true belief that he’s doing so by throwing a cutter \(^{20}\); but, as we said above, Nolan’s (justified yet) false beliefs about how to throw cutters and lack of relevant feedback about the results of his attempts to do so keep him from knowingly throwing cutters.

Let’s pause briefly to take stock. We’ve been exploring the question whether Live Round qualifies as a genuine counterexample to KRAK, and so defeats the Bad Henry Argument. Live Round counters KRAK if—but only if—the claim that Gunnar knowingly killed Ridley remains plausible on deeper reflection. I presented, and ultimately rejected, two different arguments for that claim; I’ve also defended it from an argument for its denial. For what it’s worth, I still find the claim plausible enough for Live Round to count as a genuine counterexample to KRAK. However, I’m also sufficiently unsure about this issue to want a stronger, less controversial objection to the Bad Henry Argument. And that is what I’ll close with: a stronger—indeed, I believe decisive—objection to the Bad Henry Argument that does not depend on the claim that Gunnar knowingly killed Ridley. The objection is an argument to the conclusion that the Bad Henry Argument defeats itself: it turns out that (13) (=Bad Henry knowingly destroys a barn) is true only if KRAK is false. After presenting my argument for this “fatal” conditional, I’ll anticipate a challenging reply.

The “self-defeat” objection to the Bad Henry Argument goes like this:

\[(17) \text{ If (13) is true (=in Hooligan, Bad Henry knowingly destroys a barn), then Gunnar knowingly kills Ridley (in Live Round).}\]

I find (17) prima facie plausible: Gunnar’s killing Ridley seems at least as strong a candidate for act done knowingly as Bad Henry’s destroying a barn. We can confirm (17) by noting that, with respect to purported criteria for doing an act knowingly that are less controversial than KRAK, Bad Henry’s destroying a barn does not have any clear advantages over Gunnar’s killing Ridley. For example, that Gunnar justifiedly believed he was killing Ridley as he did so is as plausible as the claim that Bad Henry justifiedly believed he...
was destroying a barn as he did so. Moreover, Gunnar’s conception of the process constitutive of his killing Ridley was as justified and accurate as was Bad Henry’s conception of the process constitutive of his destroying a barn.

In light of (17)’s initial intuitive plausibility and the above (admittedly brief) comparison of Gunnar’s killing Ridley with Bad Henry’s destroying a barn relative to some plausible criteria for acting knowingly, (17) seems solid enough to play a key role in a successful objection to the Bad Henry Argument (at least for the moment; I’ll consider a relevant objection below). Let’s turn, then, to my second and final basic premise, which I’ve already argued for above:

(18) Gunnar doesn’t know that he’s killed Ridley (in Live Round).

(18) of course implies

(19) If Gunnar knowingly killed Ridley, then KRAK is false.

And finally, (17) and (19) together imply

(20) If (13) is true, then KRAK is false.

If I’ve reasoned rightly, then one of the Bad Henry Argument’s two basic premises must be false, and the argument accordingly is unsound. I’ll close by anticipating an objection that targets (17), the less secure of my “self-defeat” argument’s two basic premises.

Objection: Your “self-defeat” argument (17)-(20) harbors a nested argument against KRAK, making it viciously circular and thus useless. To see this, consider the following Comparative Claim:

Bad Henry’s belief that he’s destroying a barn is a better candidate for knowledge than Gunnar’s belief that he’s killing Ridley.

This claim is plausible, for Bad Henry’s belief has at least two positive epistemic properties that Gunnar’s belief lacks. First, Bad Henry’s belief is causally related to the fact that makes it true (viz., the destruction of the barn). Second, Bad Henry’s belief would amount to knowledge were it held in an environment free of counterfeit/misleading objects. By contrast, Gunnar’s belief that he’s killed Ridley isn’t similarly causally related to Ridley’s death; and since Gunnar’s belief doesn’t amount to knowledge despite the absence of counterfeit/misleading objects, his belief isn’t such that it would amount to knowledge were such items absent. Moreover, the Comparative Claim entails the denial of KRAK when combined with (17). Here’s the reasoning:
Suppose that both (17) and the Comparative Claim are true. Now assume, for reductio, that KRAK is true. It follows that Bad Henry's destroying the barn is a better candidate for act done knowingly than Gunnar's killing Ridley. Since that runs contrary to (17), KRAK is false.

What's really driving your "self-defeat" objection to the Bad Henry Argument is this hidden argument against KRAK from (17) and the Comparative Claim. So, the question whether your "self-defeat" objection succeeds boils down to this: which is more plausible, KRAK or (17)? I myself am inclined to accept KRAK and reject (17), given the former's initial plausibility and your failure to find a clear counterexample to it. At a minimum, this reasoning should suffice to defeat your earlier claim, on behalf of your "self-defeat" argument, that it constitutes a "decisive" objection to the Bad Henry Argument.

Reply: Whoa, tough objection! Fortunately, however, it's not in the end a successful objection. First off, the Comparative Claim (concerning Bad Henry's and Gunnar's pertinent beliefs) is dubious, since there are at least two positive epistemic properties that Gunnar's belief has but Bad Henry's belief lacks. Gunnar's belief is much “safer” than Bad Henry's belief: roughly, given the comparative abnormality of Bad Henry's environment and the kinds of evidence on which our agents formed their respective beliefs, the objective risk of Bad Henry's forming a false belief as to whether he's destroying a barn is much greater than the objective risk of Gunnar's forming a false belief as to whether he's killing Ridley.23 And while Gunnar's belief enjoys so called “undefeated” justification (cf. Klein 1971), Bad Henry's belief does not: roughly, there are facts obtaining in Bad Henry's situation—e.g., that he's in fake barn country—such that if he learned of them, he'd no longer be justified in believing that he's destroying a barn; by contrast, no such “defeating facts” obtain in Gunnar's situation.

So the envisaged objector's claim that Bad Henry's belief is a better candidate for knowledge than Gunnar's is dubious. But even if we concede the dubious Comparative Claim, the objection still fails, at least as currently developed. For the conjunction of the Comparative Claim and KRAK does not entail that Bad Henry's destroying the barn is a better candidate for act done knowingly than Gunnar's killing Ridley. At most, what follows from that conjunction is this:

If Gunnar's killing Ridley does no better than Bad Henry's destroying a barn on any of the other (than KRAK) purported criteria for acting knowingly, then Bad Henry's destroying the barn is a better candidate for act done knowingly than Gunnar's killing Ridley.

Arguing cogently to the denial of KRAK from the Comparative Claim and (17) requires adding the antecedent of the conditional just above—viz., that,
bracketing KRAK, Bad Henry’s destroying the barn is at least as good a candidate for act done knowingly as is Gunnar’s killing Ridley. But the antecedent of that conditional is not obviously correct. For starters, notice that Gunnar’s conception of the environment wherein he acts is much more accurate than is Bad Henry’s. This may well be a respect in which Gunnar’s killing Ridley is a better candidate for act done knowingly than is Bad Henry’s destroying the barn.

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I remain persuaded by the “self-defeat” objection to the Bad Henry Argument: the Bad Henry Argument does not provide good reason to believe the persistently counterintuitive claim that a subject in fake barn country knows s/he’s facing a barn. And so that argument cannot help proponents of a JTB-based argument for Core Virtue Epistemology grasp the second horn of my dilemma for such arguments—viz., that if a JTB-based argument aims to support environmentally insensitive CVE, then the argument backs a clear loser and is for that reason otiose. Moreover, as we found in §2, if a JTB-based argument aims to support environmentally sensitive CVE, it will have a false premise to the effect that the (relatively “externalistic”) kind of virtue-theoretic account in question closely resembles the (relatively “internalistic”) JTB analysis.

Perhaps it will turn out that no one is especially well positioned to capitalize on JTB’s appeal. On the basis of this paper’s overall argument, I am confident of at least this: advocates of Core Virtue Epistemology are not particularly well positioned to so capitalize.24

Notes

1. I hasten to add that this usage of ‘Core Virtue Epistemology’ is largely stipulative. The expression is closely enough associated with the indicated ideas outside this context to serve as a handy referential device here; but, in defining the expression exclusively in terms of those ideas, I don’t mean to incur any substantive commitments as to the proper boundaries of, or the relative importance of the various projects comprised by, the broader virtue epistemology movement. For recent overviews of this movement, see Baehr (2004), Battaly (2008), and Greco and Turri (2011).

2. For helpful presentations of what I’m calling the “standard cumulative case” for CVE, see Greco (2002, 2010). This case comprises four main claims: (i) CVE helpfully locates justified belief and knowledge within a broader, relatively familiar and intelligible category of normative agency; (ii) CVE elegantly explains the superior value of knowledge to that of mere true belief; (iii) CVE nicely explains why “gettierized” beliefs don’t constitute knowledge; (iv) CVE yields plausible solutions to key skeptical problems.
Worries have been raised about each of (i)-(iv). On (i): Classifying justified belief and knowledge as instances of normative agency conflicts with the claim that belief isn’t an action but instead a state, which enjoys support from both intuitive and empirical sources (cf. Chrisman 2012). On (ii): CVE’s explanation of knowledge’s superior value to that of mere true belief depends on the claim that knowledge is a kind of achievement, and so depends on the outcome of the aforementioned debate over (i); moreover, given the great extent to which even achievements are subject to luck, it’s unclear whether simply classifying knowledge as an achievement can fully explain the great width of the “value gap” between knowledge and mere true belief. On (iii): arguably, CVE explains why “gettierized” beliefs fall short of knowledge only at the steep price of tacit commitment to an implausible skepticism about testimonial knowledge (cf. Lackey 2007, 2009). And finally, on (iv): various non-virtue-theoretic approaches to knowledge yield solutions to the relevant skeptical problems that are at least roughly equal in plausibility to those CVE enables, so that reflection on the indicated problems doesn’t provide uniquely strong support to CVE.

3. For readability, I’ll sometimes suppress such qualifiers throughout the remainder of this section. Context should make clear when such a qualifier is in force.

4. In the first full paragraph on p.257, Turri commits himself to the claim that a belief constitutes knowledge only if its truth manifests its subject’s intellectual powers. In the next paragraph, Turri commits himself to the claim that the “double luck” structure displayed by Gettier cases generally—including fake barn cases specifically—prevents the relevant true beliefs from counting as manifestations of the subject’s intellectual powers. (For discussion of the “double luck” structure of Gettier cases, see Zagzebski 1994.) We can thus attribute the following claims to Turri: (i) a belief constitutes knowledge only if its truth manifests its subject’s intellectual powers; (ii) the “double luck” structure of Gettier cases generally—and fake barn cases specifically—prevents the relevant true beliefs from counting as manifestations of the subject’s intellectual powers. Together, (i) and (ii) imply that subjects in fake barn cases lack knowledge.

5. For a different kind of attempted defense of the thesis that a subject in fake barn country knows s/he’s facing a barn, see Sosa (2011: 90–95). While I won’t have the space here to responsibly engage Sosa’s defense, we can at least say this about it: if I’m right that Turri’s argument for knowledge in fake barn country fails, then environmentally insensitive CVE is more dependent on Sosa’s different defense of the relevant knowledge ascription than it would be otherwise.

6. As the first sentence of the above quotation’s second paragraph indicates, the claim that Bad Henry knowingly destroys a barn must play a key role in this argument. If we dropped that claim from the argument and started instead with the basic premise that Bad Henry knows he’s destroying a barn, the argument would verge on dialectical impropriety, due to a vanishingly small gap between basic premise and conclusion.

7. Compare Bratman (1984: 387): “Further, on a natural reading of ‘knowingly’, you did not hit target 1 knowingly; for you did not know that it was target 1, rather than target 2, that you were hitting.” But contrast Gross (1979: 84–85): “A routine fumigation might have been carried on for the purpose of ridding the ship of rats, with knowledge that a sailor was sleeping below, or at least with good reason to believe [my emphasis] that he was. Death, we would then
say, is caused *knowingly* . . . ”. Assuming you can have good reason to believe P without knowing P, the sufficient condition that Gross suggests for acting knowingly conflicts with KRAK.

8. Readers familiar with both Turri (2011) and Turri (2012a) will know that, in the latter, a line of reasoning similar to (what we’re here calling) the Bad Henry Argument is put to somewhat different dialectical purposes. The similar argument in Turri (2012a: 253–255) differs from the Bad Henry Argument in that the former does not employ claims like (13) and KRAK, but instead moves directly from the relevant case’s stipulated details to the basic premise that Bad Henry knows that he’s destroying a barn (and so, has the dialectical defect mentioned in footnote 7 above). Moreover, in his (2012a), Turri does not put the similar reasoning to the same dialectical purpose to which he puts the Bad Henry Argument in his (2011: 8–9)—viz., defending environmentally insensitive CVE from the charge that it mistakenly ascribes knowledge in fake barn country. Rather, in his (2012a), Turri uses the similar reasoning to defend JTB from Gettier cases—though, as we know from earlier sections of this paper, Turri eventually rejects JTB in his (2012a) in favor of environmentally sensitive CVE.

9. Two notes in one: (i) Thanks to Tim McIlrath for helpful discussion that led me to this case. (ii) I pilfered the case’s main characters from van Inwagen (1983: 162).

10. Cf. Sher (2009), where ‘knowingly’ and ‘unwittingly’ are treated throughout as “contradictories” rather than as “contraries”.

11. The rest of this paragraph owes much to comments from Nathan Ballantyne.

12. Prominent examples: alerting enemy forces to your presence by intentionally firing on one of their soldiers (Harman 1976: 433); wearing down your expensive sneakers by intentionally running a marathon in them (Bratman 1984: 399–400).


16. More precisely: no matter how far the “blank” chamber actually was from the barrel, we can “obtain” a world in which the “blank” chamber is aligned with the barrel by making no more than a small change to the actual world. For accounts of easy possibility/modal distance in terms of small change, see Sainsbury (1997) and van Inwagen (1997).

17. In my (2009), I develop the following story into a counterexample to what I there call the ‘Luck Infection Thesis’ (endorsed by, e.g., Lackey 2008): if you were lucky to be free to A and you A-ed, then you’re lucky that you A-ed.

18. The following example blends cases described by Poston (2009: 745) and Bengson, Moffett, and Wright (2009: 397). Notably, these authors use their similar cases to establish points about procedural knowledge (“know how”), which concept is surely related to but also distinct from acting knowingly.


20. N.B.: this claim is consistent with KRAK, since we can safely assume that Nolan knows that he is striking out the particular batter at the plate.


22. N.B.: even adherents of (14) can—indeed, they obviously should—claim that Bad Henry’s belief would (still) amount to knowledge were it held in
“epistemically friendly” circumstances and thus not subject to “environmental bad luck”.


24. Thanks to Nathan Ballantyne, Georgi Gardiner, Tim McIlrath, Ernest Sosa, John Turri, and participants in the University of Tennessee Philosophy Department Research Seminar, especially: Ayca Boylu, Adam Cureton, Jon Garthoff, Markus Kohl, David Palmer, and David Reidy.

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