I recently spent a few moments considering whether we are realizing a genuinely behavioristic psychology as effectively as we might, given that there are probably now a greater number of interbehaviorists and radical behaviorists active than ever before. I reluctantly reached the conclusion that we are not.
I would like to take this opportunity to share my thoughts on this important matter in the context of an answer to the following question: What factors seem to be inhibiting the interaction between interbehaviorists and radical behaviorists in pursuit of the common goal of a truly effective science of behavior?
It seems to me that there are factors on both sides (indeed, according to an integrated field analysis, how could it be otherwise?). Let me speak frankly to two matters that in my experience have been of concern to radical behaviorists about interbehaviorists. First, radical behaviorists often express concern about the apparent absence of a "research program" among interbehaviorists, and not finding what they seek, turn away from what interbehaviorists actually have to offer (for further discussion of this issue, see Verplanck, 1983). For my part, I do not feel that this sort of concern is valid, and the loss is the radical behaviorists'. Any systematic enterprise in which stimuli are manipulated, and responses measured, counted, or recorded, with the aim of describing the constituent factors of things and their participation in events, is a research program. A research program does not have to conform to a particular style, technique, or even employ an idiosyncratic piece of apparatus; indeed, Kantor would probably argue that it would be inappropriate for experimentation to be so constrained. Moreover, much of interbehavioral scientific effort is interpretive in nature, and it is ironic that radical behaviorists, who place much value in the interpretive work found in Skinner's Verbal Behavior, criticize interbehavioral interpretive work.
There is, however, a second concern that is perhaps more substantive. It seems to me that all too frequently, interbehaviorists end up including Skinner among the traditional figures whose approaches they reject, with the result that interbehaviorists inadvertantly end up endorsing alternative approaches to doing science, particularly those that they take as emphasizing the psychological, constructional processes of the scientist. Although anyone's approach to doing science is worthy of inspection, it seems to me that interbehaviorists then run the risk of becoming quickly trapped up by mentalistic formulations of the behavior of the scientist, a risk that Skinner has repeatedly tried to bring to everyone's attention in the context of criticisms of "the operationism of Boring and Stevens." Kantor himself warns against confusing statements about events with the events themselves; his injunction focuses upon Berkeleyian constructionism and attendant attempts to define a phenomenon that was held to be from a "subjective" dimension in ostensibly "objective" ways. For example, conventional operationism may be unmasked as a rather explicit endorsement of dualism, and presumably may be rejected on that basis (see discussion in Kantor, 1945, p. 145). The point is that irrespective of any claim of objectivity, a statement of rating scales or observational technique that is somehow advocated as being valid simply because it accommodates the "subjective" constructional processes of the observer/scientist is simply adding to the problem of dualism, rather than relieving it. Recall Kantor (1938): "Why the term subjective in psychology? We are passing ... back to medieval times of dividing the universe..." (p. 17). In brief, interbehaviorists must be somewhat more selective as to what approaches they reject and endorse as leading to legitimate formulations of events. In particular, they must take care not to endorse the orientations that are the very source of the problems standing in the way of a genuinely behavioristic psychology.
Let me now speak to what seems justifiably of concern to interbehaviorists about radical behaviorists. It seems to me that most radical behaviorists have a rather mechanistic view of causation, concerned with identifying either the billiard ball effect of a prior stimulus or the supposedly retroactive effect of reinforcement. That is, most radical behaviorists seem to inappropriately fractionate behavioral events into neat little parcels, just so that they can assign causal power to some factor external to the behaving organism. This practice, it could be contended, is just as much in error as trying to assign causal power to some factor internal to the behaving organism. In my experience, radical behaviorists do not seem cognizant of integrated field approaches, and although Skinner himself does not use the term or principle, his own conceptions seem entirely consistent with event fields of integrated factors: "An operant is a class, of which a response is an instance or a member.... A set of contingencies defines an operant.... The role of stimuli in defining contingencies is perhaps even more important.... Only by surveying many instances can we identify properties of stimuli and responses which enter into the contingencies," (Skinner, 1969, pp. 131-132). Most Skinnerians do not appreciate Skinner's concepts, let alone the elegance of Kantor's approach, and a renewed emphasis on scholarly understanding of Kantor's position would be most profitable. Indeed, an integrated field perspective, which emphasizes relations among and specificity of factors involved, might go a long way toward preventing such errors as assuming that "the animal comes to the laboratory as a virtual tabula rasa, that species differences are insignificant, and that all responses are about equally conditionable to all stimuli" (see Breland & Breland, 1961, p. 684). Granted that Skinner himself does not subscribe to the view expressed in the quote above, and never did, there are nevertheless enough who do subscribe to such a view to cause plenty of problems.
The foregoing, as Kantor once said, is only the simplest kind of sketch, with the omission of many details and citations, with the inclusion of only the most abstract contour lines to frame the issue. Perhaps it will be of interest to some readers. If only one researcher re-examines the way he or she does science, then perhaps some good will have come of it.
Breland, K., & Breland, M. (1961). The misbehavior of organisms. American Psychologist, 16, 681-684.
Kantor, J. R. (1938). The operational principle in the physical and psychological sciences. Psychological Record , 2, 3-32.
Kantor, J. R. (1945). Psychology and Logic. Bloomington: Principia Press.
Verplanck, W. S. (1983). Preface. In N. W. Smith, P. T., Mountjoy, & D. H. Ruben, Reassessment in Psychology: The Interbehavioral Alternative. Washington, D. C.: University Press.
Reprints may be obtained from the author at the following address:
Dept. of Psychology
University of Wisconsin--Milwaukee
Milwaukee, WI 53201