De-Shalit’s Desideratum
by Sam VonMizener
In chapter two of Why Posterity Matters de-Shalit claims that the reader will learn how to apply his theory of intergenerational justice; that is, we will learn "how to" go about allocating goods and benefits between present and future generations (unfortunately, the allocation of goods and benefits is foisted upon the politicians and the policy makers—de-Shalit remains curiously silent here). Moreover, and more importantly, we will be instructed as to how to determine the rough cut-off point of our duties and obligations to more remote future generations. Indeed, the first section of chapter two is subtitled "The principle of fading away of obligations" (My emphasis, p.51). Purportedly, this chapter is applied philosophy par excellence. Is de-Shalit successful?
The Problem
Certainly de-Shalit is correct in thinking that a method is needed to determine not only how to settle conflicting obligations to present and future generations, but to providing a way to measure (again roughly) how much is owed to distant generations. There’s nothing counter-intuitive about the idea that we owe more to those persons currently living than to persons who will be living two thousand years from now. Less intuitive is the idea that we owe more to those living five hundred years from now than those persons living two thousand years from now- but it is not that wacky of an idea. So a means of determining how to rank (roughly) the strength and number of our obligations to near and not so near future generations would be welcome.
His ‘Method’
De-Shalit claims ("argues" may be too generous—there should be a fallacy called over-weaning sympathy. I don’t think I am in danger of committing it here.) that a feature which is coincident with the passage of time is diminishing "moral similarity". "Moral similarity" expresses a relation between two or more generations that share the same (or very similar) values and norms. According to de-Shalit, values and norms that have value (or are good or ‘true’) are those that have been ‘tested’ by reflection and discussion; they should not simply be accepted. This, of course, is the "ideal" way in which values and norms are kept by a particular society; they aren’t simply blindly adhered to. Anyway, the passage of time is directly proportional to diminishing moral similarity. De-Shalit claims that as our moral common ground diminishes with distant generations so to do our obligations and duties to distant future generations. The more distant the generation the less we owe them.
The "Crucial" Role Moral Similarity Plays
In several places he writes about having a "sense of community" (pp. 52, 58) and suggests that aside from our sentiments and emotions (which are "historical" and unreflective—what he calls the "first stage" in a society), we have a transgenerational sense of community which is based on moral similarity. The farther away we get from having norms and values in common with a future generation the more our sense of community decreases. Another interesting claim. The trouble is locating the argument for this claim. I shall now argue that not only is the role of moral similarity not crucial in establishing that we owe less to future generations, but that it is not even relevant as a moral ‘argument’.
Moral Similarity: Psychologically Persuasive?
It may well be the case that for many people the idea that we owe distant future generations less is appealing psychologically. After all, they are so different from us. They are remote, alien…the other. But this cannot be an idea that de-Shalit would find attractive since this is an unreflective, knee-jerk reaction. His view is that we have considered and debated our own values and the values of the "other" (that is, the values of past and contemporaneous generations. See pp. 61-62) to the point where we admit that we could be wrong and they could be right. Hence, this is hardly compatible with thinking of distant future generations as not really worthy of consideration because they are, ex hypothesi, so different from us. Moreover, this view is anathema to his view that we do owe distant future generations some stuff: clean water, food, safe disposal of toxic nuclear waste (is there any other kind of nuclear waste?). And the fact that we do owe them some things points to another difficulty in his theory; namely, the problem of explaining why we owe remote future generations anything at all. Finally, to any reflective person it seems that lack of moral similarity will have little motivational force because of its apparent chauvinism (which is, incidentally, an objection that de-Shalit claims his view escapes).
Moral Similarity: Morally Persuasive?
Hardly. As an argument which purports to give some reasons as to why we ought to have fewer obligations to distant future generations it is, at best, implausible, and, at worst, irrelevant. Of course, if we knew that in two thousand years the fourth Reich would be in full swing we might have some reason to use up all our natural resources and throw toxic waste around like so much confetti. Such a society would be morally dissimilar in a bad way. But we aren’t in this position. Moreover, I say some reason only because we might well think that such a society won’t last long (people get upset with totalitarian regimes) and we have good reasons not to harm the society that replaces it. Finally, it is not at all clear that we have no obligations to a future society simply because it is cruel and tyrannical. It is implausible to think that the reason why we should not regard our obligations to future generations as important and pressing as our duties to near future generations is because they might have a different value system than ours. For example, let’s grant de-Shalit that we believe that it is a good thing to preserve the smoky mountains for more immediate posterity largely because we value the beauty and splendor of nature and think that the next five (?) generations will do so as well. Question: what reason do we have for thinking that in two thousand years time people will no longer value the beauty of nature? Of course, they might not share this value with us, but a mere possibility is not a good reason for claiming that we do not owe distant future generations the benefit of the doubt. There’s no moral oomph here. The truth is that I cannot see how moral similarity is at all relevant here, especially when we are considering the conservation of natural resources, preserving parks and wetlands, and generally looking after the earth as best we can. Sure there will be tensions, and more immediate one’s at that. Do we build low-cost housing for currently homeless people in an area designated for a park that future generations will enjoy? Here the homeless might trump or perhaps a compromise can be worked out. But the main point is this: it’s simply not at all clear as to why the building of the park is an obligation we have only to the next three generations and not to the eighth or ninth. To point to lack of moral similarity as the criterion for marking the cut-off of such an obligation is irrelevant. Enjoying nature and the outdoors seems to be an inherently human value. Even if I am wrong here, and I might be, still we cannot say that "the third and fourth generations will probably enjoy parks, but it is really doubtful that the ninth generation will. So we needn’t really concern ourselves with them". This is absurd. Finally, the tougher "moral" cases are ignored by de-Shalit. Instead, he focuses on issues such as taxing the next four or five generations for a space program. Here his point is that we needn’t concern ourselves with remote future generations since we cannot be sure if they will be keen on space travel—they don’t value it as we do. Also, perhaps technology will be so far advanced that space ships won’t even be necessary (he doesn’t say this, but this is the kind if thing he has in mind). Well and good. Again, perhaps this will be so and perhaps not. But more importantly, this substantive policy has little to do with core environmental issues such as conserving natural resources, preserving forests, and so forth. He needs to bring the issue back down to earth where it belongs.
Conclusion
Environmental "ethics" is conspicuously absent from de-Shalit’s model. The things that we regard as core environmental issues (the core values) have to do with keeping pollution at a minimum, preserving parks and wetlands, conserving natural resources, and disposing of nuclear waste safely. The fact that distant future generations might well have very different values seems to have little to do with why we are (or ought to be) less obligated (if in fact we are or ought to be) to them.
Comments by John Nolt
Sam's criticisms of de-Shalit seem generally on the mark, but his summary omits some points.
The definition of moral similarity that he attributes to de-Shalit is incomplete, I think. Moral similarity is not for de-Shalit simply the sharing of values and norms; rather, there is a sense of devotion to these ideals that unites the members and partially constitutes their identities.
Sam writes of de-Shalit's claims that "we have a transgenerational sense of community which is based on moral similarity" and "the farther away we get from having norms and values in common with a future generation the more our sense of community decreases," that, "the trouble is locating the argument for this claim." I believe that de-Shalit does give an argument. It is just this:
2 This moral similarity (and perhaps also the cultural interaction??) decreases with each new generation.
3 We have strong obligations to contemporaries.
So 4 We have strong obligations to present and near future generations but lesser obligations to those in the distant future. (1,2,3)
Sam doesn’t mention de-Shalit's discussion of the conditions for community membership. De-Shalit considers four possible answers to the question "When do I cease being a member of my community?":
Also, something more should be made, I think, of de-Shalit's claim that we do have obligations to remote future generations, though they are not derived from communitarian relationships but are, rather, matters of "humanity" (we should avoid harm). Such matters are to be understood on analogy to our treatment of strangers. Maybe he sees himself as giving a communitarian theory of justice only, ignoring questions of beneficence (for which his word, I think, is "humanity"), and that questions of our relationship to individuals outside our community (strangers) are questions of beneficence.