Lara Winner

Environmental Ethics

March 30, 2001

Reading Summary

Having given his argument for the biocentric outlook and the attitude of respect for nature in the previous two chapters, Paul Taylor spends chapter 4 of Respect for Nature: A Theory of Environmental Ethics outlining four normative principles which he claims embody both rules of conduct and standards of character that he believes logically following from adopting said outlook and attitude. This is where the rubber meets the road for his theory of environmental ethics; these are the practical day-to-day implications of adopting his view.

Taylor begins by listing and explaining the four rules of conduct which he thinks follow from adopting the biocentric outlook and the attitude of respect for nature. He actually uses the words "rule" and "principle" somewhat interchangeably to refer to these four duties; in the latter half of the chapter he links particular virtues to each of these duties. These are general principles designed to guide our actions; they will not tell us what to do in any specific situation—this requires good judgment on the part of the individual. Each duty is also only prima facie binding; as with any system of ethics that has more than one principle, the principles may occasionally come into conflict with each other. After explicating each of the four rules, Taylor gives a system of prioritizing the rules in cases of conflict. (In this chapter, he only covers conflicts between various principles of environmental ethics; conflicts between human ethics and environmental ethics are saved for chapter 6.)

The first and most important rule in Taylor’s system of environmental ethics is the Rule of Nonmaleficence, i.e., "the duty not to do harm to any entity in the natural environment that has a good of its own." This duty applies to all moral subjects and agents, be they individuals, species-populations, or biotic communities. The duty is only a negative one; it does not entail any positive obligation to prevent harm or alleviate suffering. If a person witnesses a wildebeest being taken down by a group of hyenas, for example, Taylor thinks it would only be irrational prejudice on our part to favor prey over predator. After all, animals are not moral agents, but rather moral subjects; the hyenas are just trying to get a meal.

Taylor’s second duty is the Rule of Noninterference. This is a two-pronged duty, involving both an obligation not to constrain the freedom of any individual creature and an obligation to follow a general "hands-off" policy toward individuals and ecosystems. As discussed in more detail in the previous chapter, Taylor views the freedom referred to in the first duty as the absence of constraints, both positive and negative as well as internal and external. He spends more time discussing the second aspect of the Rule of Noninterference, the duty to be "hands-off" or, as he calls it, "the duty to let wild creatures live out their lives in freedom." To live in accordance with this rule, one must avoid domesticating or capturing wild organisms, no matter how much such an activity might improve their lives. To act ethically on this view is to act in accordance with duty, not to attempt to maximize happiness or benefit. Taylor argues that suffering and death, even extinction, are a regular part of nature unfettered, and to leave wild creatures alone is to show respect for the integrity of natural systems. Like the Rule of Nonmaleficence, this is a negative, rather than a positive, duty. Taylor also claims that a second ethical principle, the principle of species-impartiality, is implied by and logically connected to the Rule of Noninterference. The objective contemplation of nature, free of our own personal interests and preferences, leads to and provides support for our duty of noninterference in the lives of wild creatures.

The Rule of Fidelity, Taylor’s third duty, is more limited in scope than the first two duties; it applies to only those animals with enough mental or rational ability to be able to form trusting relationships with others, and thus to be deceived. The duty is violated so routinely, however, that Taylor believes it deserves special mention. The Rule of Fidelity has four parts: 1) the obligation not to break a trust that a wild animal has placed in us; 2) the obligation not to deceive or mislead any animal capable of being deceived or misled; 3) the obligation to uphold an animal’s expectations that have been formed on the basis of past interactions with us; and 4) the obligation to be true to one’s intentions as made known to an animal. This duty is violated every time a person goes recreational hunting, fishing, or trapping, as for example when a duck hunter sets out decoys to attract birds. Taylor rejects the argument put forward by some hunters & fishermen that they do indeed have respect for their quarry, probably more respect than the average person. This is "appraisal respect," Taylor says, which the animal gains by being difficult to kill; it differs from the idea of inherent worth because it must be earned rather than applying equally to all. If one is only lobbying for conservation in order to maintain hunting and fishing opportunities, this is not consistent with an attitude of respect for nature. This is a principle which I found rather redundant; no acts are forbidden here that would not be forbidden by one or both of the first two rules. It seems to be inserted here only to provide an excuse to discuss the wrongness of hunting and fishing.

The Rule of Restitutive Justice is the fourth and final duty in this system of environmental ethics; it applies when one of the first three rules has been violated (either flagrantly or unavoidably). As moral agents, humans have "the duty to restore the balance of justice between a moral agent and a moral subject when the subject has been wronged by the agent." This principle can at best be very general, says Taylor, since the specifics of each situation are very important in deciding on a course of action, but cases of restitutive justice can be divided into three kinds by the subject wronged: individual, species-population, or biotic community. If an individual is harmed, one should either restore it to its former condition, or, this being impossible, further its good in some other way. If the individual has been killed and no restitution can be made to that creature itself, one should benefit its species-population or life community.

If a species-population has been harmed, for example by overhunting, Taylor argues the remaining members of the species should be given permanent protection. Finally, if an entire biotic community has been harmed, one obviously cannot make restitution to that community; one should either further the good of another ecosystem of the same type, where possible, or failing that benefit some other wild region of nature. This happens when, for example, when a forest is cut down to build a resort community. It’s rather interesting that Taylor here, as well as in his discussion of the Rule of Noninterference, defends the good of species populations and biotic communities. In his criticism of Leopold’s land ethic, he had argued that any system which does not give a role to individual rights was indefensible. Yet here he seems to be trying to sneak some of those ideas in the back door. He even allows for violations of noninterference duties to capture a few members of an endangered species for breeding purposes; since when does the good of the species outweigh the good of the individual?

After introducing his four rules of ethical conduct toward nature, Taylor then considers potential conflicts between the rules. He first points out that since the Rule of Nonmaleficence and the Rule of Noninterference both involve only negative duties, they cannot conflict. In conflicts with the Rule of Fidelity and the Rule of Restitutive Justice, however, the Rule of Nonmaleficence always takes precedence. When the Rule of Noninterference conflicts with the Rule of Fidelity, neither rule always win. One may have to violate fidelity to aid a sick or injured animal (when a moral agent has caused the harm), but it may also be justifiable to manage the species populations in a wildlife refuge (a duty of trust having been created when the refuge was formed). This also holds for conflicts between the Rule of Noninterference and the Rule of Restitutive Justice; interfering may be necessary to provide aid. As an example of this, Taylor says it is justifiable to sedate and remove a grizzly bear that has wandered into a populated area. It is unclear, however, when a duty of restitutive justice was created in such a situation. If humans have never harmed the bear (assume the town is not infringing on the bear’s former habitat), no duty of restitutive justice applies here. On Taylor’s view, we cannot act simply for the bear’s own good, either; it is questionable whether we have any justification for interfering with the bear’s travels in such a case. Finally, in cases of conflict between the Rule of Fidelity and the Rule of Restitutive Justice, the Rule of Restitutive Justice takes priority (ex: aiding animal victims of an oil spill).

Taylor follows his discussion of the rules of conduct that express the attitude of respect for nature with a discussion of standards of character that convey such an attitude. On Taylor’s view, character has two aspects: deliberative, which is the disposition to think rationally and clearly, and practical, which is the disposition and power of will or resolve to carry out decisions. The many virtues which have a place in Taylor’s system are divided into two categories. General virtues, he says, are qualities of character that help a person act morally in any type of situation, while what he calls special virtues are associated specifically with the four moral principles of his system of environmental ethics.

The general virtues undergird and support two traits of character: moral strength and moral concern. Moral strength, as the name implies, is the strength needed to live an ethical life no matter how difficult it might be to perform our duties. It is the developed capacity to give order to our thoughts and actions; it thus applies to both aspects of character, deliberative and practical. The constituent virtues of moral strength, according to Taylor, are: conscientiousness, integrity, patience, courage, temperance or self-control, disinterestedness, perseverance, and steadfastness-in-duty. Moral concern, on the other hand, is the ability and disposition to take the standpoint of animals or plants and look at the world from the perspective of their good. Developing this breadth of concern allows us to transcend our anthropocentric bias. Moral concern’s constituent virtues are: benevolence, compassion, sympathy, and caring. These are the virtues which involve developing one’s feelings and emotions in a particular way. Moral concern provides the emotive and valuational background for actions expressing the attitude of respect for nature, Taylor argues. It seemed somewhat inconsistent to me that, after all his emphasis on dispassionate performance of duty and disregard for our own personal feelings and biases, Taylor attempts to include feelings in his moral theory; it seemed like trying to have his cake and eat it, too. Other members of the class, however, saw no inconsistency in Taylor’s call for moral agents to cultivate their emotions in such a way as to keep them from interfering with, if not supporting, one’s performance of one’s duty.

Six special virtues specifically apply to the four moral rules in Taylor’s system of environmental ethics. The Rule of Nonmaleficence is supported by the virtue of considerateness (being attentive and solicitous to individuals’ well-being). The Rule of Noninterference is supported by both regard (the disposition to give due recognition to things worthy of respect) and impartiality (the disposition to be free of bias toward other species). The Rule of Fidelity is bolstered by the virtue of trustworthiness, and the Rule of Restitutive Justice is aided by the virtues of fairness (the disposition to want to restore the balance of justice) and equity (having a sense of the proportionate weight that should be given to the different claims of justice). One who cultivates these virtues will be better able to express the attitude of respect for nature, according to Taylor. The connection between these virtues and the attitude of respect for nature is simply assumed, rather than argued for. In fact, no real argument is given that shows how the rules of conduct can be derived from the attitude of respect for nature or the biocentric outlook, either. This chapter is simply explication rather than defense of the four principles.

Taylor ends the chapter with a section on whether or not cultivating the general and special virtues is obligatory. He argues that such cultivation is indeed obligatory for two reasons. First, the virtues have instrumental value; those that develop them are better able to act morally, that is, to perform the right action in the right circumstances for the right reason. This is simply a contingent psychological fact, however. The second reason for cultivating virtue is non-contingent. Taylor thinks that we each have a duty to strive to become fully moral beings by making our inner motivational and affective lives congruent with our outer lives of action and reasons for action. This is the noblest exercise of our distinctly human powers of self-direction and self-governance, Taylor believes. Thus we should all strive to become more virtuous people.

Concerning the Principle of Fidelity, Lara writes, "This is a principle which I found rather redundant; no acts are forbidden here that would not be forbidden by one or both of the first two rules [Nonmaleficence and Noninterference]. It seems to be inserted here only to provide an excuse to discuss the wrongness of hunting and fishing." I think this is largely but not entirely true. The Principle of Fidelity seems to rule out some behavior that would not be forbidden by Nonmaleficence or Noninterference. For example, some people attract birds or animals for harmless observation by imitating their calls. This presumably deceives these creatures and so violates the rule of Fidelity, but it is not maleficent and maybe it doesn't constrain the animals' freedom and in such a way as to constitute interference in Taylor's sense.

I agree with Lara's criticism of Taylor's efforts to promote the good of biotic communities or species populations—especially by means of the Principle of Restitutive Justice. Taylor provides no justification for such efforts; indeed, his individualism seems to preclude them.

Lara writes, "When the Rule of Noninterference conflicts with the Rule of Fidelity, neither rule always wins." But Taylor says on 195-6 that if fidelity and noninterference conflict, fidelity takes precedence, provided that:

1. no serious harm is done by the interference
2. a great good is brought about by sustaining the trust
3. there is no way to sustain the trust without interfering.
4. interference is minimal, given these conditions

Moreover, says Taylor, if any of these conditions are not met, then interference is not justified at all. From this it follows, contrary to what Lara says, that fidelity always trumps noninterference.

Similarly, Lara also seems to suggest (though this is not clear) that the Rule of Noninterference and the Rule of Restitutive Justice may each sometimes override the other. But on 196-7 Taylor says only that Restitutive Justice overrides Noninterference when a great good is done and no serious harm comes to a creature we have deceived. Nothing follows about Noninterference overriding Restitutive Justice, and I don't see that Taylor ever says that it does.

Though Taylor himself is not especially clear on this, I see nothing in Section 2 that is inconsistent with the following linear ranking of the rules (from highest priority to lowest):