Taylor2

Chapter 2: The Attitude of Respect for Nature

Summary by John Nolt

1. Introduction

This and the next two chapters elaborate the three components of environmental ethics:

the attitude of respect for nature,
its supporting belief system (the biocentric outlook) and
the system of rules and standards which give concrete expression to the attitude.

Preliminary Explanations of Main Concepts (culled from the whole chapter): The idea of the good of a being (an is-statement: the thing itself can be benefited or harmed) is logically independent of the idea of its inherent worth (an ought-statement: its good ought to be respected).

To adopt the attitude of respect toward a being believed to have a good of its own is to see it as having inherent worth.

2. The Concept of the Good of a Being

A thing has a good of its own iff it makes sense to speak of what is good or bad for that thing.

A pile of sand has no good of its own. Concerning a pile of wet sand, it is neither true nor false that keeping it dry furthers its good.

We must distinguish between something being in the interests of X and X having an interest in it:

A thing has interests iff it has ends and consciously seeks means to achieve them.

X is in the interests of Y iff X promotes or protects the good of Y

Unconscious living things have goods of their own, and things can be in their interests but they have no interests.

What we have an interest in may not be in our overall interests.

For people, this distinction takes the following form:

The Human Good—what is in fact good for human beings (in their interests): human flourishing, self-actualization, true happiness; the kind of life in which one would place value if one were fully rational, autonomous and enlightened.

human values—whatever people value subjectively (have interests in)

The theory of respect for nature assumes that all animals and plants are beings that have a good of their own.

The good of an organism is species-specific.

The more we know about an organism, the better we are able to make sound judgments about what is in its interests. This is what it means to take the standpoint of the organism.

A species-population has no good of its own, independently of the individual goods of its members, its good (insofar as we can define such a thing) is just the median distribution point of the goods of the individual members.

[Note: this does not correspond to the biological notion of species or population robustness or health, which includes, for example, ample numbers and genetic diversity.]

An entire biotic community has a statistical good in the same sense. Harm to individuals is not necessarily harm to the community, as for example when a predator kills its prey.

3. The Concept of Inherent Worth

The fundamental value presupposition of the attitude of respect for nature is that organisms have inherent worth.

We should distinguish:

inherent worth (Regan's "inherent value")—the possession of a good of one's own whose attainment or partial attainment is good independently of the valuing of any other being, and which all moral agents have a prima facie duty to preserve and promote as an end in itself. (75)

inherent value—non-commmerical, non-practical value that we place on a thing esteemed simply because of what it is (ex.: monuments, works of art, historical places).

intrinsic value—value that human beings ascribe to experiences desired for their own sake (as opposed to instrumental value).

Inherent worth is independent of merit (achievement or ability)

In human ethics, the idea that all people have inherent worth is taken to imply:

all are inherently (regardless of merits) equal
no one is to be treated as a mere means to another's end
promotion and protection of each individual's good is accepted as an ultimate end
the good of all people is to be promoted and protected as a matter of moral principle.

Likewise, in environmental ethics, the idea that all living organisms have inherent worth implies:

all are equally deserving of moral consideration
none is ever to be treated as a mere means to human ends
promotion and protection of each organism's good is accepted as an ultimate end
the good of all organisms is to be promoted and protected as a matter of moral principle.

How do we know that an entity has inherent worth?

Only by regarding each organism as having inherent worth can

we consistently maintain the biocentric outlook.

The biocentric outlook is well-grounded (see next chapter).

So We should regard each organism as having inherent worth.

4. Having and Expressing the Attitude of Respect for Nature

Central Tenet of environmental ethics—Actions are right and character traits good to the extent that they express or embody respect for nature.

To have the attitude of respect for nature is to have a set of four different types of dispositions:

valuational—the disposition to regard all wild living things possessing inherent worth
conative—the disposition to avoid harming or interfering with wild things and to preserve their existence
practical—the disposition to find the effective ways to do this
affective—the disposition to feel good about the furtherance of life and displeased about any harm to any living thing

To express or embody the attitude of respect for nature in conduct is to act or decline to act out of consideration and concern for the good of wild living things, as a matter of moral principle, not merely from inclination. (85)

The attitude of respect for nature can also be embodied in character and in moral rules.

A valid system of environmental ethics is one that must be followed by agents who respect the inherent worth of all wild things. (89)

5. Respect for Nature as an Ultimate Attitude

Respect for nature is a moral attitude in that:

it is not a matter of personal affection or caring (so that our concern for the well-being of organisms is not dependent upon how appealing they are to us).
it involves making a commitment to living by the norms that express it
it is seen as binding on all moral agents (90-2)

Respect for nature is ultimate in the sense that no other attitude (e.g. scientific curiosity, lust for adventure) supercedes or overrides it (92)

Some moral attitudes are derivative from others: e.g., our disapproval of pollution follows from and is explained by our higher-level attitude of respect for nature.

Respect for nature is also ultimate in that it is not derivative but is the most fundamental kind of moral commitment one can make. (90)

We cannot justify the attitude of respect for nature by giving moral reasons for it, but only by showing that the whole system of principles which it embodies is valid.

We do this by showing that the belief-system that underlies and supports system of principles is acceptable to sensitive, rational folk.

[Note that this is different from verifying the consequences of the principle intuitively; Taylor would reject such an intuitive hypothetico-deductive procedure because he mistrusts intuition.]

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