Taylor’s aim in "Respect for Nature" is to develop a theory of environmental ethics as an attempt to establish the rational grounds for a system of moral principles by which human treatment of natural ecosystems and their biotic communities ought to be guided. The subject of concern in this attempt is the place of human civilization in the natural world.

To clarify what a theory of environmental ethics is designed to do Taylor first talks about natural ecosystems and how the order of living things in these ecosystems is explained as the outcome of certain evolutionary processes and environmental conditions. He distinguishes two types of natural ecosystems. The first type includes those that have not been exploited by humans and not undergone any major changes due to human culture and technology. The second type comprises of areas that have undergone modification in the past due to certain human practices but currently maintain their existence without human interference. For both types of ecosystems it is the non-existence of human intervention that makes them ‘natural’.

Taylor contends that no sharp line can be drawn between natural ecosystems and those that are not natural. He suggests thinking of ecosystems as a continuum. Natural ecosystems belong at one end of this continuum that includes ecosystems similar to those that existed before human beings’ appearance on Earth. At the opposite end of the continuum there are ecosystems completely regulated, and even produced, by humans which Taylor terms as artificial ecosystems.

In contrast to those in artificial ecosystems the biota in natural ecosystems consist of organisms that have evolved independently of human interference in the course of nature. In a natural ecosystem the workings of natural selection at the level of individual organisms determine the structure of relationships among species-populations. This process, Taylor holds, is explained by reference to two factors: changes in environmental conditions and genetic variation. These factors affect the reproductive success of individual organisms and hence shape the order of the ecosystem as a whole. In each pattern of evolutionary process the outcome is defined by an organism’s ability to reproduce its own genes in future individuals.

Taylor argues that viewing ecosystems and their biotic communities in this way has a philosophical importance. He claims that we can no longer assume ‘the balance of nature’ as a basic norm of the natural world. The idea of the balance of nature reflects a holistic approach to the order of life on Earth. According to this approach all species in the Earth’s biosphere form an integrated system and the steady equilibrium of this system as a whole works to the mutual benefit of the individuals.

But, Taylor contends, to answer the question whether we ought to maintain or strengthen this equilibrium, which is a question central to the concerns of environmental ethics, we cannot appeal to the view that nature has already provided us with a guide to follow which is "to preserve the balance of nature and live in accordance with it". Instead, Taylor argues, we as moral agents must search for our own principles to guide us in determining how to live in right relation to the natural world which requires engaging in ethical inquiry.

As an attempt to lay the basis of his theory of environmental ethics Taylor argues that independent of our duties to our fellow humans, we are morally required to do or refrain from doing certain acts insofar as those acts bring benefit or harm to wild living things in the natural world. He further argues that these moral requirements have to be weighed against certain things valued by humans. Some human interests, he contends, may need to be sacrificed at times to fulfill the duties of environmental ethics.

Taylor makes a distinction between two types of environmental ethics. Anthropocentric (human-centered) and life centered (biocentric). According to anthropocentric theory of environmental ethics the moral duties we owe to the natural world are derived from our duties to each other as human beings. This theory views the whole system of standards and rules governing our conduct with regard to natural environment as grounded on human needs and interests alone.

Taylor refers to Passmore and Mc Closkey as representing the anthropocentric view. He also brings up the dispute in the anthropocentric view about our duties to future generations. Although future beings are not identifiable until they come into existence, he holds, their basic interests can be identified which is sufficient to make sense of the claim that they deserve our moral consideration. He refers to Annette Baier as a defender of this position, who argues in favor of future people’s rights independent of their ontological status. As opposed to Baier however Taylor includes plants and or non-conscious animals among those future beings to whom we owe obligations.

In contrast to the anthropocentric theory of environmental ethics the biocentric theory doesn’t view our duties to nature arising from the duties we owe to humans but from certain moral relations holding between ourselves and the natural world. According to the biocentric theory the natural world and its living creatures are not just objects to be exploited by us. Just the opposite, biotic communities of natural ecosystems deserve our moral concern because they have an inherent value.

In his theory of environmental ethics Taylor defends the biocentric point of view. He contends that in addition to our moral obligations toward our fellow humans we also owe duties to wild living things in their own right. At this point Taylor brings up Goodpaster’s distinction between the claims "all living things deserve moral consideration" and "all living things have rights". He agrees with Goodpaster’s argument that one can deny that non-humans have rights and yet hold that they are moral patients toward whom moral agents have duties and responsibilities.

Taylor next examines the distinction between anthropocentric and biocentric theories of environmental ethics as for their views of moral agents and moral subjects. For both anthropocentric and biocentric theory a moral agent is any being that possesses those capacities, by virtue of which it can act morally or immorally, can have duties and responsibilities and can be held accountable for what it does.

Moral subjects on the other hand are beings that can be treated rightly or wrongly and toward whom moral agents can have duties and responsibilities. Moral subjects are entities that can be harmed or benefited. Their conditions of existence can be made better or worse by the actions of moral agents.

Taylor contends that all moral agents are moral subjects but not all moral subjects are moral agents because a moral subject may lack the capacities of a moral agent but she has the status of being an entity to which moral agents owe duties.

The most ethically significant fact about moral subjects, Taylor argues, is that it is always possible for a moral agent to take a moral subject’s standpoint and make judgments from its standpoint about how it ought to be treated. The standard implied in such judgments is the furtherance or maintenance of the well-being of the subject, not of the one who does the judging.

Moral subjects are entities that have a good of their own. Since inanimate objects don’t have a good of their own and hence cannot be treated rightly or wrongly, they are not moral subjects. Following this reasoning, Taylor contends that, from a moral point of view, the purely physical conditions of a natural environment must be separated from the animals and plants that depend on those conditions to survive. For example, a river is not a moral subject itself. We don’t have duties to the river but we may have duties to the fish in it not to pollute the river. Although no direct obligations are owed to inanimate objects, actions of moral agents that will have an effect on inanimate objects may be necessary steps to be taken by moral agents in fulfilling their obligations to moral subjects. So, Taylor contends, the fact that inanimate objects in natural environment can be modified, destroyed or preserved by moral agents is a significant ethical consideration because such treatment of inanimate objects affects the well-being of moral subjects.

Distinguishing between the conceptual claim that "animals and plants can meaningfully be thought of as moral subjects" and the normative claim that "they are to be considered moral subjects" Taylor argues that if the conceptual claim is correct then we can treat animals and plants either rightly or wrongly. If the normative claim is correct then we ought to treat them rightly and refrain from treating them wrongly.

Biocentric theory of environmental ethics claims that both the conceptual and the normative claims are correct, whereas anthropocentric theory accepts the conceptual claim but rejects the normative claim. Taylor contends that the issue between anthropocentric and biocentric theories centers on the question whether the normative claim is correct or not.

He argues that the correctness of the normative claim can be shown and that moral dilemmas arising from conflicts between humans and non-humans are rationally resolvable.

In the case of conflict between the well-being of human and non-human organisms Taylor claims that a decision as for whose well-being is to be furthered at the expense of the other can be arrived at on the basis of priority principles governing the fair resolution of conflicts. He contends that a biocentric theory of environmental ethics and the normative assertion it favors transform any situation of conflict from a battle of opposing forces to an ethical problem requiring a fair resolution among competing moral claims. In such a case, each party to the conflict is recognized as making a legitimate demand for consideration, and settling the conflict becomes an ethical issue to be dealt with by appeal to objective moral principles.

As another morally significant point Taylor discusses whether our intuitive moral judgments can be used as rational grounds for a theory of environmental ethics. He contends that our moral intuitions regarding how we should treat the living things of the natural world depend on certain basic attitudes toward nature that we were imbued with in childhood. These attitudes reflect the particular outlook on animals and plants accepted by our social group. Taylor claims that since our intuitive judgments are strongly affected by our early moral conditioning and since different societies will imbue children with different attitudes about the treatment of animals and plants we cannot use moral intuitions as grounds for accepting or rejecting a theory of environmental ethics.

Taylor next sets forth the conditions that any rule or standard must satisfy in order to be included in a normative ethical system that is binding upon all moral agents. At this point he distinguishes between formal and material conditions. Formal conditions define what is meant by describing or classifying a rule, standard or principle as a certain type of moral norm. A condition is formal, Taylor holds, when a complete statement of it entails no description of the empirical properties of actions or character traits to which the rule or standard applies. From the formal conditions alone we could not know what sorts of actions are right or wrong, or what sorts of character traits are virtues or vices. This additional information must be supplied by the material conditions. Hence, Taylor concludes that both formal and material conditions are needed for the rules and standards to function as practical guides for moral agents which they will strive to fulfill in their choice and conduct. In the domain of environmental ethics respect for nature is the material condition for valid moral norms.

Taylor holds that for any rule and standard to constitute a valid normative ethical system there are five formal conditions to be met: generality in form; universal applicability to all moral agents; disinterested applicability independent of an agent’s particular ends; public adoption and overriding all nonmoral norms.

Taylor next examines the content of valid moral rules and standards in the domain of human ethics and contends that there is a structural symmetry between a theory of human ethics based on respect for persons and a biocentric theory of environmental ethics based on respect for nature. He claims that although the two systems of ethics differ from one another with regard to their normative content the internal ordering of their main components discloses significant parallels.

The theory of environmental ethics, like the theory of human ethics is made up of 3 components: a belief system; an ultimate moral attitude; and a set of moral rules and standards. These components are related to each other in the same way as the three components of human ethics are interrelated. The belief system supports and makes intelligible the adopting of the attitude, and the rules and standards give concrete expression to that attitude in practical life.

Taylor also talks about the logical gap between the is statements of the biological sciences and the ought statements of ethics. He contends that although it can correctly be said that moral principles governing our conduct in relation to nature are based on the modern biological account of living things this doesn’t mean that the findings of biological sciences function as premises from which it is possible validly to deduce moral conclusions. Taylor holds that the existence of this logical gap can be explained by considering the relation between two different but equally correct conceptions of human beings: as biological organisms and as moral agents. Taking the fundamental duality between these two conceptions into consideration Taylor raises the question: "What is the ethical significance of our being members of the Earth’s community of life?"

From biological point of view we perceive ourselves as sharing with other species a similar origin and an existential condition. It is evident for us that we are subject to the constraints of biological necessity and we see ourselves as an integral part of the natural world like non-human animals and plants. Yet, understanding ourselves as biological entities does not provide us with any particular directives as to how we should conduct our lives. Our role as moral agents is not deducible from the facts about our biological nature. Taylor contends that humans in their role of moral agents have the capacity to use biological knowledge for purposes of their own choosing. The question of how and for what purposes they should use this capacity is not a scientific but an ethical question.

Here, Taylor brings up the view defended by Aldo Leopold, inter alios. According to this view the science of ecology provides us with a model to follow in the domain of environmental ethics. Taylor rejects this way of thinking with the reasoning that it confuses fact and value, "is" and "ought". He argues that ecology discovers and explains the relations between ourselves and the natural world but it cannot answer the question of how human culture should fit into the order of nature, because this is a question confronting humans as moral agents, not as biological organisms.

Taylor finally makes a distinction between environmental ethics and ethics of the bioculture. He defines bioculture as a set of social institutions and practices including all organized activities in which humans make use of animals and plants to further human ends. Accordingly, ethics of the bioculture is concerned with the human treatment of animals and plants in artificially created environments that are completely under human control.

Looking at the practices that may be contained in a society’s bioculture from an ethical point of view two basic characteristics can be observed. First, they all depend on total human dominance over non-human living things and their environment. And second, they all involve treating non-human living things as means to human ends. It is the moral relevance of these characteristics, Taylor contends, that gives rise to the ethics of bioculture. All living organisms contained in a bioculture are entities that have a good of their own. They can be benefited or harmed. Thus it makes sense to inquire whether humans have any obligations and responsibilities towards them. Taylor holds that the fact that we have power over these non-human beings does not mean there are no moral constraints upon the exercise of that power.

A further ethical question in that respect is whether animals and plants in a society’s bioculture should be regarded as having a kind of value additional to and independent of their instrumental value. The affirmative answer to this question would imply that certain constraints on human’s treatment of these non-human beings would be imposed as moral requirements. These moral constraints could mean that proper treatment of living things in the bioculture involves some sacrifice of human interests. Taylor concludes that it’s a major responsibility of moral agents in the domain of biocultural ethics to work out a balance between effectiveness in producing human benefits on the one hand, and proper restraint in the treatment of living things in the bioculture, on the other.

More could usefully be said about the parallels Taylor sees between human ethics and environmental ethics (Section 5), because this illuminates Taylor's understanding of ethics in general.

To begin, note that just as the material condition of environmental ethics is respect for nature, the material condition for human ethics is respect for persons. (Later, in Chapter 5, Taylor adds that the material condition for priority principles is fairness.)

The three components of human ethics are these:

1. A belief-system within which each moral agent conceives of others as persons (subjective centers of conscience existence able to choose their own value systems and live self-directed lives).
2. The attitude of respect for persons. This attitude is moral (universalizable and disinterested) and ultimate (not derivable from any more fundamental attitude).
3. A system of rules and standards considered valid in the domain of human ethics, embodying the five formal conditions for valid moral principles, and meeting the material condition of respect for persons.

These three are related as follows:

The belief-system supports and makes intelligible the attitude of

respect for persons.

One who has this attitude will be willing to fulfill the rules and

standards (which is to show respect for persons); these

give concrete expression to the attitude in practical life.

They parallel the three components of environmental ethics:

1. A belief-system, the biocentric outlook on nature, in which one sees oneself as a member of Earth's Community of Life. This does not deny one's personhood. It implies seeing each organism as a teleological center of life, pursuing its good in its own unique way, and it implies a rejection of the idea of human superiority or of a natural hierarchy. (The biocentric outlook will be explained in detail in Ch. 3).
2. The ultimate moral attitude of respect for nature: regarding each organism as an end-in-itself, inherently valuable and worthy of equal moral consideration.
3. A system of rules and standards considered valid in the domain of environmental ethics, embodying the five formal conditions for valid moral principles, and meeting the material condition of respect for nature.

These are related in the same way as the three components of human ethics.

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