Sanjay Lal

Singer, Chapter 6

In chapter six of Animal Liberation ("Speciesism Today") Peter Singer discusses and responds to ten different objections critics of the animal liberation movement presently raised. Singer states his central mission of the chapter on p. 213, "In this final chapter I shall look at some of the ways in which speciesist practices are maintained and promoted today, and at the various arguments and excuses that are still used in defense of animal slavery...(T)his chapter provides an opportunity to answer some of the objections most often to the case for animal liberation...."

The first point that Singer considers in regard to the central mission of chapter six that I have identified is a response to an objection made by animal liberationists (p. 213-17). Singer offers a rejoinder to a rejoinder opponents of animal liberation offer. The objection made by animal liberationists concerns an inconsistency many see between the "sweetness and light" of how animals are depicted in today’s children’s stories and rhymes and how animals, Singer maintains, are actually treated in factory farms. Singer summarizes the rejoinder opponents of animal liberation offer to this alleged inconsistency to be, "The child’s affection for animals is directed toward animals not eaten...These are the animals that an urban or suburban child is most likely to see. Cuddly, stuffed toy animals are more likely to be bears or lions than pigs or cows." (p. 214-15) Singer characterizes this response as "simple evasion" (p. 214). As far as Singer is concerned, the inconsistency between how animals are depicted in today’s children’s stories and rhymes and how animals are actually treated in factory farms can only be successfully maintained by hiding what really takes place in such farms (pp. 215-217)

The next objection to animal liberation that Singer considers is the assumption that "human beings come first" (p. 219). Singer takes this objection to mean "any problems about animals cannot be comparable, as a serious moral or political issue, to problems about humans." (p. 219). Singer offers three points of reply to this objection (pp.219-22). First, Singer sees the objection itself as indicative of speciesism. Singer asks, "How can anyone who has not made a thorough study of the topic possibly know that the problem is less serious than problems of human suffering?" (p. 219)

Moreover, Singer notes that attempts have been made to prevent human problems like war, racism, poverty, and unemployment, and "now we have to admit that, for the most part we don’t really know how to do it. By comparison, the reduction of the suffering of non-human animals at the hands of humans will be relatively easy, once human beings set themselves to do it." (p. 220)

Singer’s final, and most compelling, point on the matter is that there is that human and non-human problems do not present us with incompatible alternatives (pp.220-222). Singer substantiates this point by citing the equal amount of time it takes be a vegetarian compared with being a meat-eater (thus arguing that vegetarianism leaves one with the same amount of time to deal with human problems), historical facts of animal liberationists playing significant roles in abolitionism, suffrage, and preventing child abuse, and ecological findings concerning the amount of grains (that could be used to feed starving humans) it takes to produce meat as well as the pollution meat production causes.

Next Singer considers "Our conceptions of the nature of non-human animals, and faulty reasoning about the implications that follow from our conception of nature." (p. 222) These conceptions not only lead to faulty reasoning, Singer maintains, but also "help to buttress our speciesist attitudes." (p. 222) In particular, these conceptions make it easier for us to classify humans as "humane" and animals as "beastly" and "brutal". While accepting such classifications, "we overlook our own savagery (and) exaggerate that of other animals." (p. 222) More specifically, "we ignore the extent to which other species exhibit a complex social life," writing off such complexities as "mere instinct" (p. 223). The problem that Singer sees for the speciesists when they attribute complex animal behavior to instinct is "these...people will ignore...the importance of simple instinctive patterns of behavior when it is convenient for them to do so." (p.223) It is clear to Singer that animals feel instinctual needs "to exercise, stretch their limbs or wings, groom themselves, and turn around" (p. 223) which they cannot have fulfilled because of present day speciesist attitudes permeating factory farms. Ultimately, Singer’s argument here seems to be that if people are going to acknowledge the reality of instinctual needs in accounting for non-human animal behavior, such needs should be sufficient for including animals in our moral codes when it comes to things like factory farms.

Singer proceeds by considering the argument that since animals kill for food, it is not morally wrong for humans to do the same (pp. 224-5). Citing William Paley as an ally, Singer’s first response to this argument is that "(most) other animals have no choice but to kill if they are to survive." (p. 224) Moreover, Singer notes that "It is odd how humans who normally consider themselves so far above other animals, will, if it seems to support their dietary preferences, use an argument that implies that we ought to look to other animals for moral inspiration and guidance." (p.224) Additionally, Singer argues that "non-human animals are not capable of considering the alternatives, or of reflecting morally on the rights and wrongs of killing for food; they just do it." (p. 224) Finally, Singer points out that there is a kind of is/ought fallacy latent in the reasoning of those who argue that since animals kill for food, it is not morally wrong for humans to do the same. "For all I know, war is ‘natural’ to human beings..."Singer states, "but I have no intention of going to war to make sure that I act in accordance with nature." (p. 225)

Next, Singer considers the speciesist justification that "bad as modern farm conditions are, they are no worse than conditions in the wild..." (p. 226). Singer points out that the defenders of slavery in America used a similar justification when comparing the practice they defended with conditions in Africa (pp.226-7). "(I)f the comparison has to be made surely the life of freedom is to be preferred." Singer comments (p.227). What’s more to Singer is that animals in farms "do not live for more than a fraction of their normal life span", are deprived of their most "basic natural activity, the search for food", and live a life of "utter boredom" (p. 227). These points make it difficult to accept the conclusion that animals in the wild are in no worse conditions than animals in farms. Singer’s most compelling point on this matter is "Abolishing factory farms would not mean returning animals inside them to the wild." (p.227) In other words, we are not presented with a choice between having animals live in factory farms or having them live in the wild. Since vegetarianism decreases the demand for factory farm animal products animals bred to live in such farms would not be born in the first place; not thrown back to the wild.

That final point on the fifth objection is a good lead in to the most philosophically abstract objection to animal liberation Singer considers: the desire to eat meat brings animals into existence who otherwise would not exist; thus if we assume to exist is better than to not exist animals who are eaten by humans are done a favor (p. 228). Singer’s best response to this philosophically abstract objection is that those who make it "rarely follow out its implications." (p. 230) More specifically, the notion that bringing beings into existence does beings a favor is not typically applied to human population policies. "Since more humans may be fed if we do not feed our grain to livestock," Singer points out "the upshot of the argument is, after all, that we ought to become vegetarians!" (p. 230) Hence, Singer shows that the sixth objection to animal liberation he considers can be used to support vegetarianism since vegetarianism allows for the existence of more people (who, according to speciesism, are presumably more important than humans).

The seventh and eighth objections that Singer considers are given brief replies to and thus will be given brief treatments by me here. The seventh objection concerns the charge of inconsistency speciesists direct toward animal liberationists (p. 230). It is frequently the case that opponents of speciesism eat meat, wear animal skin, use products tested on animals, etc. To Singer, this reality is an indication of how "widespread" and "pervasive" of an attitude speciesism is (p. 230), but gives "no logical support to the defenders of cruel (animal) practices." (p. 231) Citing Brigid Brophy and acknowledging the importance of being consistent in persuading others to accept your proclamations, Singer writes, "it remains true that it’s cruel to break people’s legs, even if the statement is made by someone in the habit of breaking people’s arms." (p. 231) In other words, the truth of a statement is not contingent on whether the speaker of that statement consistently adheres to the statement in his/her everyday practices. The eight objection Singer considers is the claim that there exists "clash of interests" (p. 233) between non-human and human animals. Singer cites instances of vegetable and grain crops planted for human consumption that "may be threatened by rabbits, mice, or other ‘pests.’"(p. 233), in acknowledging "that it is possible to think of more unusual cases in which there is a genuine clash of interests" (p. 233) Such cases, Singer maintains, should not keep us from acting in accordance with his "principle of equal consideration" that he discusses in chapter one (p. 233). According to Singer, it is possible to defend our essential food supplies while respecting the interests of animals who pose threats to those supplies by finding a solution to this problem "which...causes far less suffering than the present ‘solution.’" (p. 233) Instead, for instance, of poisoning animals that pose threats to our crop supplies or killing animals whose population growth threatens the habitat of other animals and thus causing them to suffer, Singer sees the practice of using sterilizing baits on such animals to "be an obvious improvement." (p. 233)

Next, Singer considers the objection that plants, as well as animals, suffer when we use them for food (p. 235). If such is the case, then it would be impossible to uphold Singer’s equal consideration principle since—unless one opts to starve to death—people inevitably would be violating the interests of some beings when they consume food. "(I)f it is impossible to live without violating the principle of equal consideration, we need not bother with it at all..."(p.235) this ninth objection goes. Singer calls this objection "weak in both fact and logic." (p.235) First, Singer declares, "There is no reliable evidence that plants are capable of feeling pleasure or pain." (p. 235) Singer argues that the "three distinct grounds" he gives in chapter one for believing that a non-human animal can feel pain (behavior, the nature of the animal’s nervous system, and the evolutionary usefulness of pain to the animals species) give us no reason to believe plants feel pain (p.235). Moreover, Singer pursues the logical implications of this objection and concludes that even if it were true that plants can feel pain, "It would still not follow that we may as well eat what we have always eaten." Singer reaches this conclusion by maintaining that if it were established that plants can feel pain they would either feel less pain than animals (thus eating them would be a lesser of evils) or that they would feel as much pain as animals and not eating meat (since meat production involves more plant consumption than vegetarianism does) would be a lesser of evils.

The final argument Singer considers he replies to by arguing from analogy (pp. 240-41). This speciesist argument attempts to undermine the foundation of animal liberationist perspectives by claiming "we should treat beings according to what is ‘normal for the species’ rather than according to their actual characteristics."(p. 240) Singer finds this claim to be "outrageous" (p. 240), as he directs us to consider if we would treat individual women any differently if future evidence supported the conclusion that it is normal for more females than males to stay at home and raise children instead of going to work (p. 240). "Would any philosopher then claim", Singer asks rhetorically, "that (the) exceptional women should be treated in accordance with what is ‘normal for the sex’—and therefore, say, not be admitted to medical school –rather than in accordance with their actual characteristics?" (p. 241)

Comments by John Nolt

Very thorough and accurate. But there are two objections to Singer's views that Sanjay doesn't mention. The first Singer discusses on pp. 225-6: if we take utilitarian animal liberation seriously, we might have to eliminate carnivorous animals (predators) from the wild, since that might be the way to minimize suffering. Singer's reply here is that such a policy would be ecologically irresponsible and would probably wind up doing more harm than good. This objection is often raised in discussions of the relation of animal ethics to environmental ethics. Singer's reply is dismissive, but the matter deserves more discussion.

Sanjay also misses this objection (pp. 228-9):
 

Singer's reply is that this is at best an argument for killing, not for practices that create suffering. Moreover, the second premise has an "air of peculiarity." He responds with this "practical" argument against killing animals for food (even if it is done painlessly):
 

Note also that with regard to the objection that animals raised in factory farms are benefited because otherwise they would not exist, Singer points out that to be caused to exist may not be a benefit if the resulting life is wholly miserable.

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