Singer, Chapters 4-5
Chapter four of Singer’s Animal Liberation is concerned with demonstrating that there are no good reasons to continue to eat animal flesh, but rather good reasons not to do so, and chapter five then provides a brief historical explanation as to why we hold non-human animals in such little regard. I will summarize these chapters in turn.
Vegetarianism; The Ultimate Boycott
First, those persons who are convinced that factory farming causes a great deal of suffering can help reduce the demand for meat by refusing to eat it. Indeed, as Singer makes clear, this form of boycott has a direct, albeit small, effect on the meat producers and distributors. If more and more people take up this form of boycott, then there will be ones less steer, one less pig, and one less chicken on death row. Second, he points out that by becoming a vegetarian one has a firm foundation on which to speak out against other (more obvious, at least to the general public) forms of animal cruelty such as bullfighting, seal-clubbing, and Korean dog-munching. By refusing to eat meat one cannot be accused of hypocrisy in championing causes such as these. Immediately, however, a question arises—one that Singer addresses at the end of chapter four: Which animals, if any, can one eat with impunity? Singer asks: "where do we draw the line"(p.170)? The short answer to this question is simply that we not eat anything that has interests, where "interests" means a being’s capacity to experience both pain/misery/suffering and pleasure/happiness. This can be determined, Singer claims, by (a) noting whether the non-human animal exhibits pain behavior or (b) seeing if its nervous system is roughly similar to our own, or both. Singer draws the line between shrimp (crustaceans) and oysters (mollusks, save for the octopus); shrimp having interests and oysters being appetizers. Singer, however, errs on the side of caution and leaves the mollusks alone. Having shown that Singer’s method (see footnote) for "drawing the line" works quite well, we need to consider how Singer responds to those persons who think that producing and eating meat is a necessary evil.
Debunking Meat Myths
Singer considers all of the typical ‘reasons’ people usually give concerning why meat consumption is so essential to their lives. In chapter four he provides evidence that such suffering is needless. First, he considers the position that meat is needed to feed the hungry. Indeed, Singer argues that raising cattle or pigs as a solution to the hunger problem is more of a problem than a solution. Second, many people believe that meat is necessary as a source of protein. Both of these myths are related. The claim that meat is an essential and irreplaceable form of protein is patently false. Certain vegetables contain plenty of protein. Also, certain vegetables taken together create more complex proteins than if taken separately. This is known as "protein complementarity". One can get a diet rich in protein without eating meat. Moreover, the amount of protein gotten from animal farming is far less than the amount of protein that crops would yield. For example, one acre of land producing, say, beans, yields between 300-500lbs. of protein, whereas that same acre, if used to grow sub-standard crops for animal feed, would yield only 35-40lbs. of protein per acre (pp. 165-167). It requires an enormous amount of resources to raise animals, either by free-range method or the feed-lot method. Huge amounts of resources such as grain, land, and water are required to raise animals for slaughter. These resources would be far better used to produce crops for the worlds’ hungry. Singer notes that in 1974 a scientist concluded that if we were to reduce the consumption of meat in the U.S. by just 10%, there would be enough grain to feed 60 million people! (And that’s in 1974). Hence, farming crops rather than butchering animals makes more sense in terms of amount of protein yielded, conserving resources, and feeding the worlds’ hungry.
Environmental Effects of Animal Farming
The results of factory farming are deleterious to the environment. Singer notes that the destruction of our forests is a major problem for two reasons. First, clearing forests to provide land for animals greatly disrupts the delicate ecosystem. Animals indigenous to the forest become extinct, as do other organisms. Clearing land causes erosion of the soil, and increased runoff leads to flooding. Second, the destruction of our forests is a major contributor to the "green-house effect". Forests capture carbon from the environment. Carbon is produced by, among other things, the burning of fossil fuels. When trees and plants are cleared away this carbon is released into the atmosphere in the form of carbon dioxide. Excessive amounts of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere increases the temperature of the planet and brings about droughts. Also, the warmer climate causes the extinction of many species and the melting of the polar icecaps. The melting of the icecaps could eventually raise the sea level to the point where certain island civilizations may disappear (quite literally—under the sea!) [p.169]. Third, large-scale farming has caused pollution due to the massive amounts of manure. For example, in Britain, there were more than 3,500 cases of pollution caused by animal farming in 1985. In just one incident a tank containing one quarter of a million tons of pig excrement burst and spilled into the river Perry (p.168). Once again, it is clear that nothing good comes from animal farming save for perhaps the flavor of meat and the huge profits reaped by meat manufacturers ("manufacturer" is another one of those neutral and innocuous phrases that hides wholesale slaughter. For clearly, meat is not ‘manufactured’, but hacked from a dead or, in some cases, still dying animal) and distributors.
The History of Man’s Subjugation Over Non-Human Animals
In chapter five Singer is primarily concerned with how human beings have come to view animals as simply not having any interests; as falling outside the penumbra of legitimate moral concern. We have, since the dawn of time, done just what we want to animals. Why? How did we acquire this mindset? He examines three historical periods in answering this question: (1) the pre-Christian period, (2) the Christian period, and (3) the enlightenment period. Singer concludes that there has really been little overall improvement in our attitude toward non-human animals in the last 3,500 years (or thereabouts). Judaism was not a good time for "brutes" and "beasts" and things that "crept" on the land. We had, straight from God almighty, permission to do what we wanted with animals. Human beings had dominion over the fish, the birds, and the beasts. This doesn’t entail that we can torture animals, but it leaves it open. At any rate, we can eat them without worrying. God told Mosses that he could eat the non-human animals.
Singer moves on to an examination of the place that non-human animals occupied in ancient Greece. The situation here is not much better. Save for perhaps Pythagoras and his followers no one was really concerned about animals. And even Pythagoras’s reasoning for not eating animals had nothing to do with the interests of the animals per se, but instead everything to do with not wanting to eat one’s uncle, whose soul might well have transmigrated to your next door neighbor’s pig. Hence, the pain and suffering of the animals wasn’t really an issue. This is even more evident in the writings of Aristotle. His view is simply that we have no reason to refrain from eating animals since they are not capable of reasoning. The fact that animals do not have the capacity to reason excludes them from any moral consideration. Also, animals, in the Aristotelian scheme of things, exist primarily as food for human beings. This is what they are "for"; they exist "for the sake" of our eating them.
In the Christian period animals were affirmed to be outside the umbrella of moral consideration in an even more striking way. Singer notes that although Christianity improved the lot of other human beings such as slaves and other "humans" in name only, it only reinforced the "otherness" of non-human animals. In Rome, Christianity brought the message that all human beings were equally important in the eyes of God. We humans are special; we have a dignified position that all other animals do not have. Non-human animals are not made "in the image of God" and so do not warrant much consideration. So while the early Christian period stopped the gladiatorial matches and other barbarous events involving only humans, it did nothing for the abuses aimed at animals. Animals were still slaughtered for amusement in contests and competitions. Singer also notes that Jesus did not seem particularly concerned with animals, as is evinced by his sending 200 demon-possessed swine over a cliff and into the sea (p.192, passage from Augustine). Why send demons into 200 swine in the first place? Why not just send them back to hell? Anyway, it wasn’t a good time to be a pig, much less a possessed one! In the early Medieval period we see Aquinas marrying Aristotelian logic with Christianity. Here we see a similar attitude toward animals taken by Aristotle, save for at least one difference. The similarity is seen in Aquinas’s great chain of being. The less perfect animals are "for" the more perfect one’s. As rational and en-souled animals we human beings can do what we want will these lesser beings. One of the differences is that we do have some reason to be kind toward animals. According to Aquinas, although there is nothing immoral about treating animals with complete indifference, the truly just person will take pity on beasts because this attitude will engender compassion for other human beings. Of course, if one could learn to be compassionate to all human beings without practicing pity on beasts, then there is no reason to view the pain of animals as worthy of our attention. (Aquinas doesn’t make this claim, but it is a consequence of his view). Hence, there is still no argument for taking account of the suffering of animals for the sake of the animals. Finally, as singer writes, "the absolute nadir was still to came" (p.200). It came in the form of the Cartesian mechanistic view of animals as mere automata. This absurd view is rather simple: (1) Animals are soulless and (2) only those beings that have souls have consciousness. Hence, (3) animals do not have consciousness. (4) But any being that lacks consciousness cannot feel pain. Thus, (5) animals cannot feel pain. This view lead to out and out torture of animals. ‘Scientists’ experimented on animals without providing any anesthetic, and vivisection was carried out with great alacrity and amusement (witness the nailing up of dogs, p.201). Such a view is made possible when one assumes that the Christian soul is the criterion both for determining which beings feel pain and which are the object of moral concern.
The Enlightenment period saw some improvements, but not much real headway. The philosophe, Voltaire, was extremely critical of Descartes’ mechanistic view of animals. His criticism of such barbarous experiments was indicative of a changing attitude toward animals; but only an attitude. In terms of real reform there was very little. Hume, for example, believed that we could use animals as we pleased, but we should do so "gently"(p.202). Kant’s position toward animals is similar to Aristotle’s in that the former thought that we could use animals as means to our own ends because they cannot reason. Singer goes on to mention that the really groundbreaking view came from Bentham. Bentham held that the real heart of the matter was not whether an animal can reason or whether an animal has a soul, but whether they can "suffer" (p.201). In fact, Singer’s entire book is based on the fact that since animals can suffer, we have an obligation to take an interest in them.
One would think that Darwin’s work on evolutionary theory would have had a dramatic effect on our attitude towards animals in that the theory clearly places us in the same category as "other" animals. We do not have the special status that Christianity claims we have. We human animals are not the alpha and the omega, and we are not made in God’s image (whatever that might mean). The confirmation of evolution had little effect. As Singer makes abundantly clear excuses for eating animals abounded. Each ‘justification’ for consuming animal flesh was based more on prejudice than sound reasoning. One excuse (made by Lord Chesterfield) is simply that it is a universal principle that the weak are "preyed" upon by the strong---so throw a steak on the grill! But principles of nature hardly justify the rightness or wrongness of some practice (save for the rule that "ought implies can", but that’s not relevant here anyway). Moreover, animals cannot reason and reflect on the practice of eating meat (on preying on the weak), but we non-human animals can. The other silly arguments are mostly tied to scripture in an unthinking and dismissive way. The feedlots abound; more animals are slaughtered in a barbarous manner today than ever before. The sacrificial lamb of the early Christian period was much better off than the millions of battery chickens, steers, pigs, and turkeys that die at the hands of factory farmers.
At the end of the day, the real ‘reasons’ why the prevailing attitude toward animals is much the same as it was 3,500 years ago is not that we have discovered that we really are justified in doing what we want with animals. The arguments now are just as weak as they were then. We simply do not want to give up our lifestyle as meat eaters; it is too inconvenient. Also, pork chops and chicken breasts taste good. The majority of people are still, through and through, speciesist. The moral arguments for not eating meat are pretty damn good. The fact that so many refuse to see this is more evidence or our unreflective attitude toward the interests of animals. I’d like to see a decent argument for why it’s morally permissible for us to eat animal flesh. A rather stupid but telling joke regarding "meat eating" shows both our attitudes toward non-human animals as well as our belief that no real justification is necessary: "If God didn’t want us to eat animals, then how come He made them taste so good"?
Comments by John Nolt
Sam has covered this material pretty well. I have only a little to add:
Singer thinks that we can only be effective in encouraging boycott of factory farms and other forms of cruelty to animals by example—that is by changing our own eating habits.
Singer thinks it is reasonable to be opposed to suffering and yet condone painless killing (the question of killing vs. suffering again). But he thinks most current meat-eating is nevertheless proscribed, since it is not practically possible to rear animals for food on a large scale without considerable suffering. (159-60)
Singer distinguishes these successively more stringent forms or stages of vegetarianism (each, presumably, more acceptable by utilitarian standards than the previous ones):