In chapter 2 of Animal Liberation ("Tools for Research") Peter Singer takes up the question of experimentation using animals. Although he takes a number of pages to detail the rather disgusting ways in which animals are used in research, Singer is not simply out to arouse disgust; he intends for readers to see these as calculated acts of speciesism and oppression of an other (that is, we would not approve of the same experiments using members of our own "group"). In this then, Singer is consistently applying the utilitarian principles he endorsed in the first chapter.

Singer’s experimentation standard

After extended consideration of what actually does go on in the realm of animal experimentation today, Singer suggests that the reader may want to argue for an absolute ban. But Singer himself resists this. Instead, he proposes a standard which reveals his continued commitment to the utilitarian principle of equal consideration of interests. Singer’s standard is that we ought not consider an experiment worthy of performing on an animal "unless the experiment is so important that the use of a brain-damaged human would also be justifiable" (85) [because a brain-damaged infant that would not develop beyond the maturity of, say, 6 months would have not greater interests than perhaps a dog or a rat]. This type of experimentation is not entirely inconceivable in Singer’s mind, and this suggests that he employs something like the Greatest Happiness Principle in addition to the principle of equal consideration of interests. Singer argues that just as we would allow the torture of someone who knew the location of a nuclear bomb in New York City on the grounds that the greater good would be served by such an act, we ought similarly to allow the use of a brain-damaged human should an experiment prove beneficial for the greater good. While Singer has been explicit in chapter 1 about his intention to use the principle of equality, he was less clear about intending to use the Greatest Happiness Principle. He hints on page 15 that there might be a good reason to inflict pain, says on page 20 that all lives are not of equal worth (as a utilitarian he rejects the notion of rights, including a right to life), and states on page 21 that the conclusions he comes to in the book derive "from the principle of minimizing suffering." So Singer’s invocation of the Greatest Happiness Principle is a reasonable, but not explicitly stated move, given his comments in the first chapter. But clearly the GHP is important for Singer to be able to defend a position short of absolutely banning animal experimentation.

Had he not tacitly invoked the GHP, I think Singer would have had to endorse an absolute ban. If equivalent interests on the part of all kinds of animals are to receive equal moral consideration, then there would be no reason to perform experiments on some animals whose interests could not be counted for less than those of any other animals. But Singer seems too to resist an absolute ban for political reasons, suspecting that such a hard-line stance would not be well received by the wider public. It is not always clear whether Singer is simply following out the implications of his premises or shaping arguments to support previously identified positions. I find his "style" funny and less than transparent in that regard.

Broad themes from the current practice of animal experimentation

A number of broad themes arise out of Singer’s extended consideration of the state of animal experimentation today. Perhaps the most prominent is his questioning of the utility of the information gained from these experiments. Indeed, even if Singer will acknowledge that in some cases there is good information to be gained (and it ought to be so important to us that we would consider using a brain-damaged human to gain it), he presses home the point that much of what is learned is trivial or could be gained by other means. This theme is connected to Singer’s implied questioning of the nature of the scientific establishment today (with issues such as grant funds, tenure, and prestige wrapped up in this theme). The huge amount of money involved in the use of animals for experiments comes up repeatedly (as does the sheer number of animals involved). Also of importance to Singer is the amount of suffering inflicted in the course of the experiments. These themes are recurrent throughout his discussion of the various types of animal experimentation.

Singer observes that the worst animal suffering seems to come out of psychology experiments. Ironically, all of these psychological studies are shrouded in a dilemma for experimenters: either the animals are not sufficiently like humans in which case there would be no reason to do them, or the animals are significantly like humans in which case we ought not do them (52). For Singer, of course, the latter is more true; other animals share with human animals sentience--they can all feel pain. Nevertheless, these experiments persist. Often they yield results that are "trivial, obvious, or meaningless" (49). Implicit in Singer’s account is the sense that this knowledge is deemed more "true" by the wider public if science confirms it. Meanwhile, scientists are eager to keep grant money flowing in and published reports going out to bolster their reputations whether or not the results yield anything of real value (Singer notes with disdain how often articles are tagged with the line, "more study is needed."). Indeed, the scientific establishment seems well suited to self-preservation.

Another realm of animal experiments centers around the testing of various substances for their poisonous effects. Often these tests assess substances introduced for commercial/market-driven reasons rather that genuine innovation. Many new substances simply overlap with existing ones but must be tested anyway to ensure safety. LD50 and Draize eye irritancy tests are among the most well-known. But Singer points out how questionable it is to extrapolate from one species to another with the results of these tests. He quotes an emergency room physician who knew of nobody actually using the tests to treat patients (56).

Lastly, Singer looks at medical research which he recognizes might be the most justifiable in the public’s view. Yet, Singer warns that we ought to distinguish between valid medical research and research carried on to satisfy intellectual curiosity. Such curiosity, notes Singer, is easily gratified using animal experiments once experimenters acquire the conditioned ethical blindness that seems to be part of their initiation into the medical science field. By the phrase "conditioned ethical blindness," Singer means that these experimenters are trained to ignore the ethical issues raised by their work where animals are concerned (71). Blindness or not, Singer points out that only 3.5% of the lowering of overall death rates can be attributed to medical intervention of which information gained from animal experimentation is only a small percentage itself. Ironically, the same government that will fund animal research to study lung cancer using animals will subsidize the tobacco industry (88-89).

Singer details how resistant scientists are to restrictions being placed on their work. Various other interest groups (such as the industry that supplies labs with animals and equipment) join with scientists and their national bodies in resisting the imposition of even the most modest restrictions. Currently, the Animal Welfare Act does little to actually protect animals against needless suffering, and it is rarely enforced in many labs. Singer notes that other countries do somewhat better in the realm of restrictions, but even these are far from adequate.

Concluding thoughts

I have suggested that we might criticize Singer for not being entirely transparent in his arguments. This would be ironic given the eagerness Singer clearly has to be straightforward and reasonable in arguing for an extension of consideration to animals. His tacit invocation of the GHP is not really controversial (given his clear commitment to utilitarianism), but it does get introduced after the purportedly "theoretical" chapter which might make us wonder what else he will introduce later in the game. Indeed, even the structure of the chapter under consideration here is perhaps not what we would have expected given the shape of the first. After a chapter (1) seeming to promise a rational, coolly deduced position on the treatment of animals, one wonders whether Singer needed to use 70 pages to make his case against animal experimentation. In 25 pages he probably could have established the implications for animal experimentation of chapter 1. Singer suggests (as do the endorsements on the back of his book) that he is above bald appeals to sentimentality, yet he seems to indulge in some particularly poignant and rhetorically-charged descriptions in making his case. This is not to say that he has misled his readers outright, but it does make one wonder why he could not be more upfront about his intentions.

Comments by John Nolt

This is a fair and helpful summary.

I share Bill's impression that Singer has not been entirely transparent in his arguments in this chapter, but I want to elaborate on this a bit.

For those who don't recall, the greatest happiness principle (GHP) is the notion that an action is right to the extent that it maximizes utility, i.e., brings about a greater balance of happiness over suffering, without regard for whose happiness or suffering it is. Singer's principle of equality is, by contrast, the weaker and more plausible view that the interests of every being affected by an action are to be taken into account and given the same weight as like interests of any other being. The principle of equality does not require us to maximize utility but only to treat like cases alike. Singer needs the greatest happiness principle, for example, to get the conclusion that it is sometimes right to torture someone for the sake of a greater good—e.g. saving New York from nuclear attack (not all would agree that this is a greater good, but let that pass). But Singer needs only the principle of equality, not the greatest happiness principle, to establish, for example, that it is permissible to perform experiments on sentient nonhuman animals only if it is permissible to perform the same experiments on permanently brain-damaged orphaned humans under 6 months. (81-3)

Yet, contrary to what he himself says, it seems to be the greatest happiness principle, not the principle of equality, that Singer actually uses to establish Chapter Two's main thesis—namely that much of the animal research currently performed ought not to be done. For he seems to reason as follows:

Still, I don't follow Bill's reasoning when he writes, "Had he not invoked the GHP, I think Singer would have had to endorse an absolute ban [on animal research]. If equivalent interests on the part of all kinds of animals are to receive equal moral consideration, then there would be no reason to perform experiments on some animals whose interests could not be counted for less than those of any other animals." The principle of equal consideration of interests, together with the fact that much animal research would be wrong if performed on humans is enough to show (as in the argument above) that some animal research is wrong, but it does not imply that all of it is. Singer could consistently maintain this principle and oppose (or remain neutral with regard to) an absolute ban.

Singer's dilemma for the animal researcher (either animals are unlike us and hence the experiments provide no useful data or they are like us, in which case the experiments shouldn't be done, p. 52) can be seen to be sometimes false when we consider more carefully the respects of the likeness or unlikeness. In some cases, animals might be like us in physiological traits relevant to an experiment but unlike us in the suffering they would incur from that experiment (if, for example, the potential suffering were mainly mental). In such cases, the animals would be unlike us in a way that doesn't negate the value of the data and like us in a way that doesn't render the experiment immoral.