Sanjay Lal

Phi 646

Mark Sagoff tells us in the first sentence of his book, The Economy of the Earth, that the book is about "social regulation" (p. 1). By "social regulation" Sagoff refers to "government programs, many of which were initiated in the United States in the 1960s and 1970s to protect the quality of the environment, reduce risks and hazards to the workplace, ensure the reliability and safety of consumer products, and provide equality of opportunity in housing and employment." (p. 1) Sagoff tells us that The Economy of the Earth argues for an "ethical, aesthetic, and cultural interpretation of the goals and purposes that underlie social legislation…" (p. 1) Sagoff, in other words, wants to get away from an economic interpretation of such goals and purposes, the conceptual vocabulary of which he contends, "has largely outlived its usefulness and has become a distraction and an important obstacle to progress." (p. 1)

Sagoff distinguishes economic regulations from social regulations by maintaining that the former refers to "federal programs that set prices, performance standards, entry requirements, schedules, and so on…in industries "thought to be ‘affected with a public interest’". (p. 2) Sagoff notes, that "Congress generally limits the jurisdiction of agencies that administer economic regulations…to specific industries." Moreover, according to Sagoff, "Congress also tends to make these agencies ‘independent’ which is to say, it insulates them in various ways from distinct control and oversight by the president." (p. 2)

In contrast, agencies that administer social regulation Sagoff notes "generally have jurisdiction over a large range of industries and are located in the executive branch of the government, where the president can exercise more control over what they do." (p. 2) These agencies, Sagoff tells us, were set up with ethical and social objectives in mind, not with problems about economic competition in mind (p. 2). Furthermore, it is possible for the president to take a "less than enthusiastic" attitude, Sagoff notes, toward the objectives of the agencies that administer social regulations; sometimes even going against the will of Congress and directing these agencies to pursue entirely different agendas than what Congress wants pursued and opening the way for courts to settle conflicts (p. 2).

Sagoff puts forth and considers the two principle values that he maintains are suggested by "many economists, policy analysts, and experts in public administration" to underlie and justify all regulation: (1) efficiency in the allocation of the resources necessary to produce wanted goods and services, and (2) equity in the distribution of the wealth necessary to purchase those goods and service (p.2). Sagoff writes, "This ‘efficiency and equity’ approach allows for a difference in emphasis between the goals of economic and of social regulation." (p. 3) Sagoff sees this to be the case because according to the efficiency and equity approach "The main concern of economic regulation…is to make industry competitive…." (p.3) Moreover, Sagoff maintains that on the efficiency and equity view social regulation serves "not only redistributive purposes but also attempts to ensure that all the things industry uses or produces…receives prices that reflect their positive or negative worth." (p.3) Hence, the approach of having efficiency and equity serve as the two principle values that underlie and justify all regulation, ultimately places all concern, Sagoff holds, exclusively on economic costs—an unsatisfying prospect from an environmental ethics standpoint.

Sagoff further explores the implications of placing efficiency and equity on the forefront of regulation by discussing the views of one Allen Kneese (pp. 3-7). "Kneese presents the familiar view that the primary business of government is to enforce rights to person and property so that individuals may bargain with one another to satisfy the interests they have as individuals." Sagoff writes (p. 5). Given such a view of the legitimate role of government the conclusion is hard to avoid, as Sagoff notes, that the cause and cure of environmental problems is related to the fact that "various resources such as air and water are unowned or owned in common; they are ‘common property’". (p. 5) In contrast to that kind of conclusion, Sagoff tells us that in The Economy of the Earth he argues environmental problems "are primarily moral, aesthetic, cultural, and political and that they must be addressed in those terms." (p. 6) Moreover, Sagoff says that he will demonstrate in his book that the ideas put forth by Kneese and others, "have become academic abstractions and serve today primarily to distract attention from the moral, cultural, aesthetic, and political purposes on which social regulation is properly based." (p. 7)

Sagoff puts forth four distinctions that he maintains his argument relies on (pp. 7-14): the citizen and the consumer, values and motives, public and private interests, and virtues and methodologies. Sagoff clarifies with regard to the first distinction put forth that "As a citizen, I am concerned with the public interest, rather than my own interest; with the good of the community rather than simply the well-being of my family." (p. 8) In contrast to that characterization, when I am in my role as consumer, "I concern myself with personal or self-regarding wants and interests; I pursue the goals that I have as an individual." (p.8) Sagoff tells us that he will argue in his book that social regulation should reflect the former and not the latter type of goals in the citizen and consumer distinction he puts forth.

Sagoff cites Gary Watson in explicating the distinction put forth between values and motives (p. 9). Watson writes, "The valuational system of an agent is that set of considerations which, when combined with factual beliefs...yields judgements of the form: the thing for me to do in these circumstances, all things considered is a...The motivational system of an agent is that set of considerations which move(s) him to actions." (P.9) In other words, our values account for our mental conclusions; our presumed knowledge of what is best to do in a given circumstance, whereas motivations account for our actual behavior. Markets, Sagoff notes, can measure the strength or intensity of values (which are a kind of preferences) "in terms of willingness to pay" but do not tell us anything substantive of about the merits of values (p. 10). Sagoff maintains that economic analysts commit a category mistake when they seek to find merit for values through the market. "They ask of objective convictions and beliefs a question that is appropriate only for subjective wants and desires." Sagoff writes (p. 10).

Sagoff uses a contrast Cass Sunstein draws between republican and pluralist conceptions of government to illustrate the distinction he puts forth between public and private interests (pp. 10-11). Under the pluralist view, Sunstein writes, "politics mediates the struggle among self-interested groups for scarce social resources...Preferences are not shaped through governance, but enter into the process as exogenous variables." (p. 11) Under the republican view, which is attributed to the framers of our constitution, "the business of the political process is to pursue the common or public interest of the community, which is determined by vote after suitable public discussion." (p. 11) In a large way, the distinction Sagoff puts forth between public and private interests is similar to the aforementioned distinction between citizen and consumer with the former distinction more applicable to how a government rather than an individual can be characterized. A publicly interested (republican) government places weight on what people need and not exclusively on what people want—a behavior more characteristic of a pluralist government.

In explicating the final distinction he puts forth (between virtues and methodologies), Sagoff draws from debates in the philosophy of science between pragmatists and those who insist that "scientific inquiry depends on adherence to a method or on criteria of success...that can be laid down in advance." (p. 12) The pragmatists, in contrast, maintain that such inquiry depends on scientific virtues, such as those mentioned by Rorty—"honesty, attention to detail, and unforced agreement" (p.12). The underlying issue in this debate is whether science has an ethical or epistemological basis (p. 12). Sagoff sees the nature of what he calls for in establishing social regulation to be more like what pragmatists see science to be based on—ordinary virtues of inquiry and deliberation—whereas the ideas of so many mainstream academic economists who influence government regulation policies are characterized as being more like what the scientific anti-pragmatists (or realists) say science is based on—correspondence with an impersonal reality (p. 13). As a result of this supposed situation, Sagoff doesn’t see a point in the analyses offered by such economists with regard to environmental issues as he indicates difficulty understanding "how they help us make progress, for instance, in protecting the ozone layer or in reducing acid rain." (p. 13) Sagoff proclaims:

"We have to get along without certainty; we have to solve practical not theoretical problems; and we must adjust the ends we pursue to the means available to accomplishing them. Otherwise, method becomes an obstacle to morality, dogma the foe of deliberation, and the ideals of society we aspire to in theory will become a formidable enemy of the good society we can achieve in fact." (p. 14)

Sagoff proceeds to offer both the negative and positive thesis his book will defend (p. 14-17). Simply put, Sagoff’s negative thesis is that market failure is not the basis of social regulation (p. 14). Sagoff contends that the resulting level of "death, misery, and disease" from ignoring this thesis (i.e. by allowing 16 hour workdays and child labor) "cannot be tolerated in any civilized nation." (p. 15) The positive thesis Sagoff defends is that "social regulation expresses what we believe, what we are, what we stand for as a nation, not simply what we wish to buy as individuals." In other words social regulation, Sagoff writes, "is not a question of what we want; it is not exactly a question of what we believe in; it is a question of what we are."(p. 17) To reiterate, in Sagoff’s view, it is the virtues of deliberation—open-mindedness, attention to detail, humor, and good sense—not methodology that can provide useful answers to the question of what we are that social regulation is a matter of (p. 17).

Sagoff concludes the introductory chapter of The Economy of the Earth by offering a brief history of the demise of "utopian capitalism"—or the idea that individualistic competition would bring about the best possible society (pp.17-22). Sagoff notes that from frontier times until the industrial revolution the belief was widely and uncritically accepted that capitalism "will bring about as utopian a social ideal as we might achieve" (p. 18). While the "horrors" of the industrial revolution challenged this belief, as Sagoff mentions, the belief was only modified—with the provision that government must play a role in achieving utopian capitalism—by such challenges (p. 18-19). It was after the Depression that a consensus finally developed that the "free markets would not on their own show us the utopian side of capitalism" and ideas such as the kinds put forth by Sagoff gained plausibility (p. 19).

A thorough summary. A bit more could be said about Sagoff's four fundamental distinctions. Here is a table that organizes what Sagoff has to say about them: