1. Why Vegetarianism is Obligatory

The Liberty Principle, stated by Regan is as follows:

"The liberty principle is derivable from the respect principle", according to Regan (p. 332). Since we are not mere receptacles, to deny one the freedom to pursue their own welfare is to not treat another with respect. Considering other results of actions, like the effect on the collective, is to violate individual inherent value. Farmers and meat eaters might claim that the liberty principle allows them to go on farming and eating (as not doing so would make them worse-off and to deny this liberty entails farmers and meat eaters are mere receptacles). Regan denies, however, that "raising animals to eat and eating them satisfies all the requirements of the liberty principle" (p, 333).

Punitive harms that may occur to humans from not maintaining things such as, taste preference, habit, and nutrition, and to the farm industry in particular, such as the economic interest, are considered not to fare well in justifying harm to others.

Taste and Culinary Challenge

Regan provides three reasons we are not justified in harming farm animals for the sake of taste and culinary challenge:

1. We have no right to eat something just because it tastes good or to cook it just because we enjoy preparing it. To say our rights are violated when we are stopped from doing so is to beg the question of whether we have rights in the first place.
2. There are other tasty dishes we could benefit from, so a meat dish isn’t necessary. If we are not deprived by not eating meat, which it doesn’t seem like we are, then we are not justifies in the harm we cause by eating meat.
3. Even if we were harmed, the harm to animals is far worse and the liberty principle would not allow our harming them.

1. What if we ate animals that were raised humanely? Regan says this overlooks the harm that death itself brings.
2. Perhaps the above reasons suggest that we just eat less meat. Regan gives the same response to this as he does to the first objection.
3. It isn’t just one human that will have to sacrifice, it is many. Regan’s RV reject this and any utilitarian considerations.

That meat is the only way to get essential amino acids for good health is false. Alternative sources for these nutrients exist, and since we can be healthy without meat, meat isn’t essential for the above reason.

Habit and Convenience

Our habits, or the conveniences of the group, tell us more about how people are, not whether certain acts are moral or just (Regan discusses how this is exemplifies by using Singers examples of the forms of ‘isms’ on p. 338).

Economic Considerations

Farmers are worse-off if we became vegetarians, as harm to the farmer would be worse than harm to animals if the farmers were not allowed to continue farming. Thus, "we owe it to the farmer" to eat meat, i.e., not make him worse-off (p. 338). But this is not adequate as it falls under the ‘special considerations’ clause involving "voluntary participation in activities wherein the participants waive their right not to be made worse-off as a result of participating in these activities", which includes "raising animals as a business venture" (p. 339).

No one has a duty to buy certain products in general, nor is it the business person’s due to have their products bought. While the respect clause still holds, the worse-off principle (hereafter WOP), is suspended for business ventures. It wouldn’t even matter if thousands of farmers were harmed as "numbers make no difference" according to the rights view (hereafter RV) (p. 340).

But what about the dependents of farmers, who have not chosen to be in the business. It doesn’t seem that they too have waived their right to be worse-off. Regan says it is not the consumers, but the volunteers in the industry’s responsibility to protect their dependents if their business failed, due to the acquired duties the volunteers have.

Another objection states that because the farmer causes the existence of these animals in his own economic interest, he ought to determine how they are treated. This assumes, says Regan, that an individual and his interests are sovereign over those he causes to exist, because the being owes his existence to his ‘creator’. But if the being becomes the "subject-of-a-life that fares better or worse for him" we need to treat him with respect to recognize his inherent value "as justice requires" (p. 342). Regan states that ones "motives and intentions" for bringing an animal into existence are irrelevant (p. 342).

Farmers have no more license to harm their animals than a parent has to harm her children. To think differently is just to be ignorant of these rights, and not that it does not show these rights don’t exist. But the farmer might still be operating within his rights, as he would be worse-off by not farming. Still, the farmer violates the respect proviso of the principle. The respect principle is further violated when beings with inherent value are treated as "renewable resources", as they are treated as a means to some end, i.e., values only insofar as they serve the interests of others.

Individual’s "value...is not reducible to, their utility relative to the interests of other", according to Regan (p. 344). Thus, any institution that does not recognize this distinct, independent value, is unjust. Regan emphasizes this non-recognition as the crucial reason why the acts are unjust (and the pain and suffering caused only compound the wrong). "The fundamental injustice endemic to the practice" remains even if animals were raised without maltreatment, or is this was the only way to achieve the "best aggregate consequences for all those affected by the outcome" (p. 344).

He summarizes this section by saying that "to treat farm animals as renewable resources is to fail to treat them with the respect they are due as possessors of inherent value" since we in fact do this in our farming industry, and the practice is unjust (p. 345).

Animals as Legal Property

But aren’t the animals the property of farmers and they thus should be able to do what the please to them? Regan provides two replies to this claim:

1. "Property rights are not absolute" if they might adversely affect others, which they do in the case of farm animals (p. 348).
2. The claim that animals are property ought to be disputed (makes an analogy with the pre-Civil Rights attitude).

Vegetarianism, Utilitarianism, and Animal Rights

He next explores the differences between RV and utilitarianism on the question ‘why be vegetarian?’ For utilitarianism, "if the aggregated consequences" of factory farming "turn out to be optimal, then the harm is justified" (p. 350). In order for utilitarians to properly assess this claim, says Regan, they would have to consider the consequences of us all being vegetarian over the consequences of our not, and considerations of the former are not accessible. Plus, it requires that a large number of people be vegetarian in order to make an impact.

The RV, however, does not depend on "how many others act similarly" to yield our duty to be vegetation; it is simply that "since this industry routinely violates the rights of these animals…it is wrong to purchase its products" (p. 351).

Life on the Lifeboat

Recalling the original lifeboat case in which the solution to eat the dog was a "function of the number and variety of opportunities for satisfaction…the obligation to be vegetarian can be justifiably overridden", an objection is raised that this case might undermine the RV "case against the current practice of animal agriculture" (pp. 351-2). Regan provides three reasons why this is not so:

1. We do not live in a lifeboat and thus have options to factory farming.

2. This exceptional case does not apply to "Big Mac attacks".

3. Allowances in exceptional circumstances does not entail the same in "unexceptional, ordinary circumstances" (p. 352).

He concludes this section by proving a call to action by saying that it is not enough to merely abstain in order to be said to be fulfilling our duty to not eat meat. We also need to "educate…forge the opinion…and bring the force of law" to promote our obligations (p. 353).

1. Why Hunting and Trapping Are Wrong

The idea that we hunt animals for population control in an effort to prevent starvation and thus suffering is humane, says one claim. The RV objects to this claim for the following reasons:

1. Death from being hunted isn’t always more humane than suffering from starvation (considering the amount of amateurs in the practice).
2. The establishment of the ‘maximum sustainable yield’ ensures the increase in the number of animals killed for sport annually, not a decrease in the total population.

The RV disapproves of any method of minimizing total harms if rights have to be violated. Hunting and trapping systematically ignores the rights of animals and those who participate in these activities are doing wrong. Animals in these cases are valued only for our interests in them, and thus their inherent value is ignored (i.e., not respected).

But what hunters do is no different from what animals do in the state of nature, says another proponent of hunting. Regan disagrees with this justification for two reasons:

1. Animals, as moral patients, do not have the moral agent duty to respect rights and thus cannot be said to be violating them.
2. To minimize suffering in the wild ought not be the goal of wildlife management; rather, protecting their rights should be the focus.

What about the control of natural predators, such as coyotes, who cause economic loss to farmers? RV rejects these programs as well, as the RV considers the very industry the control programs are designed to protect fundamentally unjust.

1. How to Worry about Endangered Species

Since "the rights view is a view about the moral rights of individuals" and not species, ones being a member of an endangered "species confers no further right on that animal", according to Regan (p. 359). It would seem that we should protect an endangered individual because by not doing so, we are violating its rights not to be harmed (e.g., destroying its natural habitat for economic profit). We do this not because it is part of an endangered species, but because all animals, endangered or not, have these rights.

The size of the population "makes no moral difference to the grounds for attributing rights" to animals. One ought not disregard the inherent value of animals regardless of their population size. The RV advocates a "let them be!" policy that entails "increased human intervention in human practices that threaten a rare species" (p. 361).

Rights and Environmental Ethics: An Aside

Regan asks whether the rights of individuals have a home in "the greater biotic good" view of Leopold. His answer is negative, and he considers Leopold’s view "environmental fascism", as he disagrees with the claim that man and wildflower are members of the same team and thus both ought to be considered equally as they both "attribute to the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community" (p. 362). Aggregate and group considerations, as stated before, are not recognized on the RV.

Ecological systems might have inherent value, but it is hard to see how to attribute moral rights to them, as the "paradigmatic right-holders are individuals", says Regan (p. 362). "If individual trees have inherent value" then their rights cannot be overridden by aggregate values of the many (p. 363). Environmentalists want a more holistic view but wouldn’t the community be preserved if all the individuals were preserved, asks Regan? It would seem so and thus RV is compatible with the goal of preservation, but not with the ideas of environmental ethics.

2. Against the Use of Animals in Science

The Use of Animals in Educational Settings

In this section, Regan’s focus is on "the dissection of live animals in high school and university lab sections" (p. 364). What knowledge is gained does not justify our viewing animals as "mere receptacles or renewable resources" (p. 364). Lab work is unnecessary because the knowledge already exists in texts. Three objections and replies to this claim are as follows:

1. The value of the experience of dissecting is needed. No justification for this, says Regan, as we are just not respecting inherent value of the animal being used.
2. These animals are not mammals, and are thus not covered under the RV. But Regan claims that they are still conscious and feel pain, and since "where one draws the line regarding the presence of consciousness" is not precise, policies must error on the side of caution, especially since there are other relevant characteristics of non-mammalian animals to mammals (like the central nervous system). The "pain caused…is morally too great" especially in light of this knowledge being attainable elsewhere. Further, we must treat these animals as if they were the subject-of-a-life, so giving them anesthetic is not enough either, as an "untimely death…harms the animal" in these (and any) cases (p. 367).
3. To disregard frogs as having no moral worth is to perpetuate the speciesist attitude that "nonhuman animals don’t count morally" (p. 368). Requiring dissecting encourages this attitude. Kids might develop a negative attitude towards all animals, if at an early age they are taught to disregard some.

The use of animals for either therapeutic (drugs) or nontherapeudic (products) testing of poisons is prohibited by the RV. These tests harm animals physically and "also because they deprive them of opportunities for obtaining the satisfactions their capacities make available to them" (p. 370). (Regan finds especially appalling the LD50 test (using Singer’s description of it) as it is used when it isn’t even mandated by the law.) We need to address the moral foundations of testing all together, says Regan.

Testing of New Products

Arguments have been made that we need to test on animals as the prima facie harm done on humans (without testing) would be worse than the aggregate harm to animals. Regan had two replies to this:

1. (To be discussed later as it applies to all testing, not just of new products.) He says here briefly that "the permissibility of placing animals at risk of harm, or harming them, in order to identify or reduce the risks that humans would run if they use something new" is unacceptable.
2. Justification for the testing of new products involves an appeal to what might happen after a new drug is introduced in the market, which does not justify testing in the first place.

Regan claims that we can test using other methods that are not harmful to animals and the RV encourages this development. But it "opposes…practices that violate the basic rights of individuals in the name of ‘the public interest’ "(p. 375). Even if animal testing is required for new products, the development of new products is not required by anyone.

Testing of New Drugs

Proponents of animal testing have claimed that we must test new drugs in this way for the betterment of human beings, to prevent them future harm and to ensure they are not worse-off by taking an untested drug. RV says that animals cannot be involuntarily subjected to testing for the sake of human beings (and he used the hand gliding helmet to exemplify this).

If I take voluntary risks, "others have no duty to volunteer to establish or minimize my risks for me" (p. 378). To suggest otherwise is to violate others rights. They are "coercively used to establish of minimize risks for others" and their utility is reduced to the interests of others (p. 378). Taking a new drug voluntarily is not any different from any other voluntary activity. Requiring they be tested on animals violates the "respect they are due as possessors of inherent value" (p. 378).

Regan does not encourage voluntary human participation. We must find alternatives other than moral agents or moral patients for the pre-testing of drugs:

1. That does not violate anyone’s rights;
2. That is not coercive; and,
3. That those who do take it can choose not to run the risks.

1. Rights must be respected over profits.
2. Costs could be cut from not having to maintain lab animals.
3. Though agencies require testing, they don’t require the production of any new drugs.
4. Laws requiring animal testing are unjust.

He next addresses the ‘human benefit argument’ for toxicity testing. But "benefits…are irrelevant…since tests violate the rights of individual animals" (p. 381).

Another objection is that animals cannot volunteer (give informed consent) so they cannot be coerced. But because they have preference-belief, "we can…give a perfectly clear sense to saying that they are being forced or coerce to do something they do not want to do" (p. 382).

Scientific Research

The RV objects to harming animals period. Gallistel thinks in order to advance knowledge in neurobiology, there ought to be unlimited animal testing, and his knowledge far outweighs "the suffering of a rat" (p. 383). Also, we cannot know with any certainly in advance, which experiments will be useless, so one cannot justify stopping them all. The RV replies saying that the above claims are just false as follows:

1. We can observe the behaviors of the injured to advance our knowledge, and thus we do have alternative methods.
2. It is indeed true that some experiments are clearly unnecessary.

Regan discusses another lifeboat example. RV says one cannot give medication to a dog for testing purposes, as it would "be treated as if" his "value" was "reducible merely to" his "possible utility relative to human interests" (p. 385).

Some would claim that the RV verdict is contrary or counter-intuitive to what most people think. RV replies:

1. Appealing to the pre-reflective intuitions of what most people think "is not decisive in…moral concepts" (p. 386).
2. Even if belief or intuition has been scrutinized, that it flies in the face of a valid moral principle indicates that perhaps it needs further revision or abandonment.
3. Just because an exceptional case, such as that of the lifeboat, may slip through the RV, doesn’t mean all typical cases should…this would lead to perfectionism, says Regan.

We do not have a right against natural diseases, as nature is merely a moral patient. But physicians have an acquired duty in their voluntary professions to fulfill our "right to fair treatment" of any of our maladies (p. 389). But there is no duty to override the rights of others (animals) for the sake of someone else (humans).

Regan brings up a contractarian objection to the above claim. The public has a contract with the medical profession (there is a right and thus a duty) and using animals is necessary to fulfill this. RV says just because some have entered into this contract, "moral validity" does not depend on merely respecting those who entered, but all those involved who will be affected. This contract "that science…routinely harms animals in pursuit of its goals is morally corrupt, because unjust at its core" and thus must be abandoned for a respect conscious contract. Regan mentions that veterinarians have an obligation to be amongst the first in this new contract.

The final objection rests on whether pre-subject-of-a-life mammals can be used for scientific purposes. RV says "this objection is half right" (p. 389). The question is at which point the animals can be properly said to have a subject-of-a-life. Since it is a gray area, we must error on the side of caution and not pursue policies that allow this research. He finds support in Kant for this, as using young animals in this way may "foster the attitude that animals are just ‘models’, just ‘tools’, just ‘resources’ " (p. 391). This attitude, that counters respect for animals, needs to be nipped at the bud.

RV has no protection for fetuses, but it does for the mother. It is unlikely that:

1. "The lab animals used to produce the fetuses are treated with the respect they are due", though it’s possible that,
2. "Reliance on mammalian fetuses does not foster beliefs and attitudes that encourage scientists to use mature mammalian animals for scientific purposes, including research" (p. 392).

Animals in Science, Utilitarianism, and Animal Rights

Utilitarians consider interests of all involved equally and need only the benefits to outweigh the harms in order to justify harmful experiments. One cannot justify a "lower" animal versus a "higher" one, if consequences for using the latter are better that using the former. Being treated as a receptacle is never justified.

Hi conclusion, then, is "those who accept the rights view, and who sign for animals, will not be satisfied with anything less than the total abolition of the harmful use of animals in science-in education, in toxic testing, in basic research" (p. 393).

Carie Shea, Callicott, Chapter 2, "Review of Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights", pp. 39-47.

Section I

Callicott beings by summarizing Regan’s key concepts, "before turning to" Regan’s discussion of issues involving "environmental and ecological concern—endangered species, the theoretical foundations of environmental ethics, and hunting and trapping" (p. 39). Regan claims, "only those animals who have ‘inherent value’ have rights" (as opposed to Singer’s view that all sentient beings require equal consideration) (p. 39). Callicott claims that for one to have inherent value, one must meet Regan’s ‘subject-of-a-life’ criterion. However, this is not what Regan says, as he claims some beings can have inherent value without being a subject-of-a-life, and the latter is a sufficient criterion for the former (see p. 246 in Regan). At any rate, the candidates for moral consideration include mammals aged one year or more. Callicott criticizes Regan for the misleading title of his work, as he makes his case for mammal, as opposed to animal, rights.

Section II

Callicott next criticizes Regan’s arguments regarding endangered species. Regan’s rights view (hereafter RV) is about individual rights and since species are not individuals, species are not covered under the RV. Callicott wonders why the RV cannot be extended to individual members of an endangered species, but Regan claims, "that an individual animal is among the last remaining members of a species confers no further right on that animal" (p. 41). Sacrifice of a 'rightless' species for a right endowed individual is a negative implication of Regan’s view, according to Callicott. "Species conservation" such protecting whales is only justified if we do so "because it prevents individual whales from being brutally harpooned and dying slow agonizing deaths" (p. 41). But the problem is that individuals in many endangered species, says Callicott, do not have RV rights as they are "plants and invertebrates" (p. 41). That Regan only accounts for "furry creatures" gets under Callicott’s skin.

Section III

Since Regan calls Leopold’s holistic land ethic ‘environmental fascism’, Callicott says Regan is, at this point, name-calling. Regan thinks it is far fetched to give rights to collections of things. Callicott thinks this is just mistaken as we attribute rights to wholes all the time (unions, corporations, nations, sports teams, states, species, and ecosystems, to name a few of his examples).

Further, one cannot focus on the preservation of individuals, as other individuals within the community would not be preserved (whitetail deer and plant example). Nature itself, says Sagoff, does not work this way.

Section IV

Regan neglects fishing and bird hunting in his hunting and trapping of mammals section. Regan says individual "rights trump utilitarian felicity ledgers" (p. 44). Callicott reviews Regan’s arguments against hunting (that it causes more suffering and it increases population). Regan concludes that wildlife management should protect rights of animals and be "spared…human predatation" (p. 44). Callicott asks about natural predators; aren’t they too violating rights? Regan says no because they are not moral agents and thus have no duties not to harm.

Callicott disagrees: natural predators are agents as they are subjects-of-a-life, and not just some force of nature, like a flood or tornado. Even though they may not be moral agents, "moral competency is a relevant consideration in redressing his or her offense, but it is not a relevant consideration in protecting a patient’s rights" (p. 45). Callicott makes an analogy with the mentally disabled, who we consider to be moral patients, and concludes that they can be said to violate rights when they do wrong, so why can’t animals be considered to violate rights as well?

Innocent threats to people, says Regan, provide a reason to override animal rights. But Regan’s RV turns on: 1) equal respect to equal inherent value, for both humans and animal, and 2) equal possession of moral rights. Thus, Callicott claims that Regan’s RV must imply that we ought to protect both humans and other animals rights not to be preyed upon by other humans or other animals. Callicott calls the RV a "predator policy" in this regard (p. 45).

‘Letting animals be’ is what Regan wants to conclude in his discussion of the proper role of wildlife management.

Callicott discusses Beston’s complaint that we are equating animals with human imbeciles (who are imperfect and incomplete humans). Callicott says Regan must subscribe to this, as he puts animals on the level of human beings. Midgely recognizes a mixed community of animals when considering domesticated ones, as these are animals that live in harmony with human communities. She says, "to extend rights to wild animals…would be to domesticate them" (p. 47). In an effort to reconcile the RV with environmental ethics, Callicott suggests from Midgely’s account that the divide not be on the subject-of-a-life criterion, but rather on the domestic-wild line, which would be based on the community concept. We would then have continuity between the views based on a sense of community.

Comments by John Nolt

Regan's overall argument in Section 6.1 ("Why Vegetarianism is Obligatory") seems to be as follows:

Animals have a direct prima facie right not to be harmed.

Consuming products of the meat industry harms animals.

All attempts to justify this harm fail.

So We are obligated not to consume the products of the meat

industry.

Most of the section is devoted to establishing the third premise. [Note that this does not, strictly speaking, imply vegetarianism, since it doesn't cover fish, shrimp, etc.]

Regan's derivation of the liberty principle from the respect principle (332) seems to run as follows:

1 We are to treat those individuals who have inherent value

in ways that respect their inherent value. (Respect

principle)

2 To deny me the liberty to do whatever is necessary

(within the moral constraints that apply to all moral

agents) to advance my welfare is not to respect my

inherent value.

3 The respectful treatment I have a right to is not

contingent on anyone else's interests.

So 4 Provided that all those involved are treated with respect,

and assuming that no special considerations obtain, any

innocent individual has the right to act to avoid being

made worse-off even if doing so harms other innocents.

(Liberty principle)

The reasoning here is quite loose. Obviously, not all the clauses and qualifications of the Liberty principle are directly derivable from the premises Regan actually states. It would take a good bit more work to elaborate this into a valid argument.

The argument in favor of factory farming on p. 342 might be more fully summarized as follows:

Those who bring about an individual's existence are sovereign

over that individual and the proper treatment of that

individual is determined by their interests.

Farm animals would not exist apart from the animal industry.

So The economic interests of the industry should determine how

farm animals are treated.

Factory farming serves the interests of the industry.
So Factory farming is justified.

Carrie writes of Regan's point on pp. 386-7 that "Just because an exceptional case, such as that of the lifeboat, may slip through the RV, doesn’t mean all typical cases should…this would lead to perfectionism, says Regan." This seems to miss Regan's point. Regan is objecting to generalizing on the basis of exceptional cases; his objection is not that this practice leads to perfectionism (though it does in the example he gives), but that it is almost always misleading.

Regan would not say, as Carrie asserts, that "nature is merely a moral patient." Something must be a subject-of-a-life in order to be a moral patient for Regan.

Carrie is right in criticizing Callicott for misrepresenting Regan as saying that being a subject-of-a-life is a necessary condition of intrinsic value. Good point!

It is worth mentioning Callicott's suggestion that the rights view might be adapted to species protection by the following analogy (affirmative action for species conservation!):

Minority rights devolve upon individuals by virtue of their

being members of minority groups.

Similarly, members of endangered species might thereby

have a right to special treatment.

Here is a more explicit version of the argument that Callicott thinks could be made from Regan's own principles for a policy of predator extermination:

We may (must?) kill animals who pose innocent threats to

humans to protect the humans' lives.

All who possess basic moral rights possess them equally.

Animals also pose innocent threats to other animals.

So We may (must?) kill animals who pose innocent threats to

other animals to protect these other animals' lives.