Banu Koçer
02/21/2001
Reading Summary: Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights
Chapter 3, pp. 82-120
In Chapter 3 Regan argues for animal welfare. He contends that, like human beings, mammalian animals fare well or ill during the course of their life and that human and animal welfare do not differ in kind.
In his analysis of the idea of animal welfare Regan first discusses questions about identity. He claims that despite all the changes Fido the dog undergoes in the course of his life he is yet the same dog today as he was yesterday and will likely be tomorrow. This, he contends, is because Fido retains his identity over time. Since animals like Fido are creatures with a sophisticated mental life, Regan argues, we can reasonably attribute identity to these animals. And this identity should be understood both on physical as well as psychological accounts, which Regan refers to as the "psychophysical identity".
Regan claims that animals, like individuals who retain their psychophysical identity over time, have a welfare that is related to their ability to act autonomously. This argument leads him to identify the grounds for ascribing autonomy to animals.
At this point Regan distinguishes between two different interpretations of autonomy. One is Kant’s view of autonomy. According to Kant individuals can be viewed autonomous only if they have the ability to think through and reflectively evaluate the merits of acting in one way or another and to make a decision based on their deliberations. So, Regan concludes, it is highly unlikely to regard any animal autonomous in the Kantian sense.
An alternative view is the preference autonomy. According to this view individuals are autonomous if they have preferences and if they are able to initiate action to satisfy these preferences. Since mammalian animals possess the cognitive prerequisites for having desires and goals, and are able to form and apply general beliefs, Regan contends that it is reasonable to view them as meeting the requirements for the possession of preference sense of autonomy.
Regan also points out to another distinction between the Kantian and preference view of autonomy that is significant as for its implication for our ascription of autonomy to animals. Kantian interpretation of autonomy sets a condition for an autonomous moral agent that is an individual who can be held morally accountable for the acts he performs or fails to perform. Unlike the preference view of autonomy Kantian view assumes that autonomous individuals can rise above thinking about their individual preferences and think about where their moral duty lies by bringing impartial reasons to bear on their deliberations.
Taking this distinction into consideration Regan reaches the same conclusion that mammalian animals cannot be reasonably viewed as moral agents as conditioned in the Kantian sense of autonomy, but they can be rightly viewed as autonomous in the preference sense.
Having laid the grounds for regarding animals as autonomous in the preference sense, Regan next explores interests, benefits and harms as crucial notions of welfare.
In his analysis of interests he distinguishes between preference interests and welfare interests. Preference interests are those things that individuals are interested in, whereas welfare interests are things that are in their interest. In the sense of welfare interests, a necessary condition of speaking of an individual as having an interest is that the individual have a well-being. Regan contends that we may speak of animals having both preference interests and welfare interests.
Considering that what is in an individual’s interest is a benefit to this individual Regan next examines "benefit" as a fundamental notion of welfare.
Benefits make possible, or increase opportunities for, individuals to attain the kind of good life within their capacity. There are some certain universal conditions for all humans and animals if they are to have a reasonable chance to live well. These conditions constitute their basic biological needs. Both human and animal individuals’ chances to live well, relative to the kind of good life within their reach, depend on the degree to which they have the opportunity to satisfy their desires harmoniously, that is in an integrated fashion, not occasionally but regularly and not just today but throughout the time they retain their psychophysical identity. Beyond their desires that are correlated with their basic biological needs human beings typically have other sophisticated desires, preferences and goals that constitute elements of the good life. Regan contends that some of these elements, such as psychological and social needs could be attributed to animal welfare as well.
He argues that psychological and social needs, like the need for companionship, security and liberty, are as much a part of animals’ nature as is true in the human case, because animals have an emotional life that includes affection and hate, fear and anger, security and loneliness. And to be situated in an environment that provides opportunities for the satisfaction of these needs is a welfare interest of these animals.
Yet, on the other hand, it is true both for humans and animals that there is no guarantee that the satisfaction of every desire will contribute to their welfare or be in their interest, because getting what an individual is interested in, may not always be in that individual’s interest and sometimes it may be the case that the individual is not the best judge of her welfare interests, that is what is in her interest, even if she is the best judge of her preference interests, that is what she’s interested in.
Having made this remark Regan contends that the fact that human beings are not always the best judge of their welfare interests does not entitle us to interfere paternalistically in their life just because we know their acts would be detrimental to their individual welfare.
As an argument against paternalistic intervention in the life of others Regan claims that allowing maximum personal liberty is itself a benefit that makes possible for those people the satisfaction of self-directedness.
He applies the same reasoning to animals as well and argues that they too are capable of taking satisfaction, not only in fulfilling their desires but also doing so by their own means. To illuminate this argument Regan gives the example of a captive wolf whose desire for food is regularly satisfied by his keeper. But, he contends, a wolf who finds his own food, satisfies not only his basic need for food but he also finds satisfaction in doing what needs to be done, in collaboration with other members of his pack, to have his desire for food satisfied.
Regan makes a distinction between benefits and satisfactions, which applies both to humans and animals. Benefits are what makes satisfactions possible. They increase the opportunity for satisfactions rather than being satisfactions themselves. Regan gives physical health as an example. Being a benefit for those individuals who possess it physical health contributes to their welfare. But the major contribution it makes is to be regarded in terms of what it makes possible, not in terms of the state or condition that it is. Healthy individuals can do more than sick individuals and because they can do more they have a greater range of possible sources of satisfaction.
Another notion of welfare applying both to humans and animals is "harm". Regan distinguishes two types of harm: inflictions and deprivations.
He gives acute or chronic physical or psychological suffering as the typical example of harm in the sense of infliction. At this point he elaborates on suffering and pain with regard to their implications for harm. He contends that suffering is not just pain. It involves prolonged pain of considerable intensity. Those who endure suffering in that sense are called "prima facie" harmed, which means that their welfare is diminished unless their suffering is directly causally related to a subsequent improvement in the quality of their life, that exceeds the quality, their life would have had, had they been spared suffering.
On the other hand, in some cases suffering marks the point from which individuals’ welfare steadily declines. In these cases suffering is not only "prima facie" harmful but it is genuinely harmful.
Based on the reasoning that animals have a welfare like humans Regan claims that suffering can be a harm for animals, as well.
He further contends that individuals can be harmed in ways that do not necessarily involve suffering. Such harms are deprivations or losses of those benefits that make possible or enlarge the sources of satisfaction in life. Individuals are harmed when benefits they have, are taken from them or when circumstances, or the acts of others, preclude their having some benefit that is necessary for their welfare. These individuals do not have to be aware of the harms they are subject to; neither do they need to suffer physically or psychologically as a result. A contented housewife and a happy domestic slave for example may have been harmed without their knowing it. Regan argues that sometimes the harm is greater precisely because those who have been harmed are unaware of the harm that has been done to them.
He points out to the implications of this argument for the assessment of our treatment of animals. For example, some claim that animals raised in unnatural conditions in factory farms cannot be harmed because they don’t know what they are missing since the only environments they ever see are the artificial ones in which they live and hence they cannot be worse off for having to forego an alternative environment. The argument here is that what individuals don’t know cannot harm them. Regan rejects this argument. He contends quite the contrary that part of the harm done to animals in factory farms is because they do not know this.
Regan claims that when we recognize that harms can take the form of deprivations we can understand why death is a harm to an individual.
Some argue that as long as animals are put to death painlessly we should not have any moral objection. Regan repels this argument on the grounds that it completely overlooks the deprivation type of harm assuming that the only harm that we can do to animals is to cause them to suffer. Yet, Regan contends, death is the ultimate, irreversible harm, independent of its being painless or agonizing, because it is the ultimate, irreversible loss of life itself, foreclosing every opportunity to find any satisfaction.
Regan next examines our paternalism with regard to animals. He brings up the view of Gert and Culver who deny that we can act paternalistically toward animals. According to Gert and Culver we can act paternalistically toward an individual only if we have reason to believe that this individual believes that he generally knows what is for his own good. Regan refers to this condition as the belief requirement. Since animals, as well as human infants, fail to satisfy this condition Gert and Culver conclude that we cannot act paternalistically toward them. Regan rejects this view on the grounds that the belief requirement is not a necessary condition for us to act paternalistically toward individuals. He argues that when we prevent animals or young children from doing what they want, because doing so would harm them, this means that we intervene in their life on their behalf out of concern for their welfare and hence we practice paternalism toward them.
One of our paternalistic actions toward individuals is the intentional termination of their life when this is in their interests. This leads Regan to examine the notion of euthanasia.
To euthanize an individual is to cause that individual’s good death either by active euthanasia, i.e. direct killing, or by passive euthanasia, i.e. letting die. The practice of euthanizing animals mostly involves active euthanasia.
For an act of killing an individual to qualify as a case of euthanasia Regan gives three criteria to be met: the individual must be killed by the least painful means available; the one who kills must believe and this belief must be true that the death of an individual is in that individual’s interests; the motivation of the one who ends the life of an individual must be other-regarding.
Regan distinguishes between voluntary and non-voluntary euthanasia. Cases of voluntary euthanasia are those where in addition to the mentioned three criteria satisfied the individual who is killed is competent, is going to die anyway and requests to die. Regan holds that such a request to die can only be made by those individuals who understand their own mortality and who have the means to express their desire for their life to be terminated. Hence, he contends, voluntary euthanasia is inapplicable to cases regarding animals.
This conclusion leads Regan to investigate non-voluntary euthanasia as for its applicability to animals. He contends that non-voluntary euthanasia occurs when the lives of irreversibly comatose, psychologically dead human beings who experience no preferences are terminated, either actively or passively. Based on the reasoning that animals, said to be euthanized, are psychologically alive and have preferences Regan concludes that non-voluntary euthanasia cannot be applied to cases with regard to animals.
Hence, Regan brings up two further forms of euthanasia that could be applied to animals. These are preference-respecting euthanasia and paternalistic euthanasia.
Preference-respecting euthanasia applies to cases when we know that an animal’s future will be characterized by constant, acute pain. To euthanize this animal would mean to do what has to be done if this animal’s present and foreseeable preferences are to be satisfied.
Paternalistic euthanasia on the other hand occurs when we kill an animal for its own good, as we conceive it, and in circumstances where their foreseeable future wouldn’t be characterized by constant suffering. Regan contends that many cases where animals are said to be euthanized are not cases of euthanasia, properly conceived, but acts of killing.
In the light of his arguments and analyses in the chapter Regan concludes that human and animal welfare does not differ in kind.
Comments by John Nolt
Banu correctly reports that Regan says that preference interests are those things that individuals are interested in, whereas welfare interests are things that are in their interest. This, however, is a bit of rhetoric or a mnemonic device on Regan's part and does not constitute a clear definition. The following are maybe a bit more accurate:
preference-interests of X—X's dispositions to like or dislike things.
welfare-interests of X—things that would benefit X, whether or
not X likes them.
Note Cigman's objection to Regan's view that to be killed is a misfortune pp. 101-3:
Banu writes, "Based on the reasoning that animals, said to be euthanized, are psychologically alive and have preferences Regan concludes that non-voluntary euthanasia cannot be applied to cases with regard to animals." I don't think this is his conclusion. What he says is, "To classify cases of euthanizing both these [unconscious] humans and these [conscious] animals is to conceal, rather than illuminate, this cruncial difference [between individuals which have and those which have not lost their psychological identities]." So his conclusion is not that the concept of nonvoluntary euthanasia cannot be applied to animals (it clearly can) but that it may be misleading to equate the killing of conscious animals with killing of nonconscious humans.
It is odd that Regan takes the trouble to distinguish preference-respecting euthanasia from paternalistic euthanasia when the point he seems to want to make is that killing at animal shelters is not euthanasia at all. To make that point it is sufficient to note that in most cases these deaths are not in the interests of the animals and so fail to meet a fundamental requirement of euthanasia.