Chapter 1

The subject of chapter 1 might be summarized as an investigation into the question of the attribution of consciousness to animals. Regan begins by discussing Descartes, (henceforth referred to as D), who denies all consciousness to animals. The traditional interpretation of the behavior of animals on D’s view is that they are "automata", as they are no more than bodily organs that can be stimulated to act in certain ways. Animals do not have consciousness because they do not have a mind. Insofar as this is correct, animals cannot feel pain, and thus experimenters are absolved of cruelty to animals.

D says it is historical prejudice that yields the commonsense view that animals have consciousness. Insofar as it is a prejudice based on what "we all believe", it is unjustified (p. 5). D does not attribute consciousness to explain animal behavior, although he grants dogs, for example, can be excited. He merely interprets and explains this behavior differently.

If consciousness was strictly a human characteristic, as D thinks it is, then we are further guilty of anthropomorphism when we attribute it to non-human animals. How do we respond to these counterintuitive claims of D’s?

D accepts the principle of parsimony or "Occam’s razor" in which we appeal to the explanation of a phenomenon that makes the fewest assumptions, i.e., the simplest one (p. 7). Two alternatives are offered to explain animal behavior:

1. Mechanistic Alternative: animals are nature machines, alive, but like a clock; an explanation of behavior without consciousness and thus, without pain (p. 8).
2. Non-mechanistic Alternative: involves two assumptions: that animals are living machines and they are conscious (p. 9).

La Mettrie asks why we can’t explain human behavior this way as well. After all, if it is the simpler of the two, we ought to apply it to human cases. D responds by claiming that humans have immortal souls, and this is why they are conscious. Regan, however, says that this is irrelevant, as the attribution of consciousness does not entail immortality, and it violates the simplicity requirement.

D tries to respond again and claims that linguistic behavior is used to express thoughts and this capacity is unique to human beings. The capacity to use language entails consciousness. Therefore, consciousness exists for human beings and not to any other animal, as all animals fail this language test.

Regan asks whether this test is accurate. (He says that we cannot criticize D for failing to recognize the use of ASL in primates, as this hadn’t occurred during D’s time.) But in order to determine whether this capacity is limited to humans, we need to determine two things: 1) what a language is (is it limited to certain specific syntactical schemes, etc); and, 2) whether a chimpanzee, for example, is as competent as his human counterpart (p. 13). In light of the second consideration, cases indicate that the former cannot make elaborate utterances or sentences (that they seem to merely imitate), and that the latter are more likely to respond to conversation. However, both seem to have some acquisition ability, as it is premature at this point to say either way, according to Regan.

Even if we can attribute language ability to some animals, says Regan, D’s view would be too conservative, as it leaves out the vast majority of animals. He says that the test is further inadequate because infants would be excluded and we could not explain how they develop consciousness ‘all of a sudden’, when they do have or use a language, so, we cannot account for how children learn language. Potential to use a language isn’t sufficient for consciousness either, as there are some humans who lack this potential and we would still consider them conscious. There is a general problem with inferring from the potential to the actual, says Regan (pp. 15-17). A child would go from a potential language user, to a conscious, actual language user. Conscious reception in one’s ‘pre-language’ phase needs to be assumed. Consciousness, therefore, must be independent of one’s ability to use a language.

We must side with D and assume human beings have a mental life. (This assumption is necessary for moral philosophy; as otherwise, there is no point to ethical theory.) Given that human beings are conscious, the question remains whether other animals are. If it depends on D notion of the immortal soul or language acquisition, then they do not. But since these tests are inadequate, we can look to evolutionary theory, according to which it is unlikely that only human beings have consciousness. Reasons for this include comparable physiology between humans and other animals, the evolution from a simpler being to a more complex, and, especially, the "survival value of consciousness" (p. 19). This latter notion allows for adaptation, which other species demonstrate. (He adds here that consciousness is independent of ability to use a language. Language can just be considered a higher order cognitive capacity, and we could just say that animals just have a lower-order cognitive ability.)

Two criteria must be met, then for one to accept evolutionary theory over D’s view. The first is that it must be the most simple, and the second is that it must have the most explanatory power. The principle of parsimony seems upheld on Regan’s account. If human beings have a mental capacity, then it would be more complex to assume there is no such capacity with animals. Evolutionary theory is also advantageous, as mere behavioral indications won’t get us to consciousness, because it allows us to look at other signs to indicate the presence of consciousness.

The problem of "other minds" is the next of D’s assumptions that Regan sets out to discuss (p.21). In D’s dualism, reality is made up of the mind (non-physical, immaterial, and what does the job of thinking) and the body (extended, physical, and "dumb", i.e., non-mind or non-conscious) (p.21). Beings feel pain because of the mind, and not the body. As humans are the only beings with a mind, other animals don’t feel pain, regardless of the similarities in our physiology. Regan points out the problem of interaction between the mind and the body, and ponders how one affects the other. For example, how is it possible for one to step on a tack (which happens to the body) and for one to feel pain (which happens in the mind) as a result of this action. Also, how could the mental (thought, wishes, etc) cause the body to move (get out of bed in the morning)? (p.22). These events are causal and immediate, says Regan, and Descartes does not account for how this interaction takes place.

Thus, Descartes view fails in explanatory power. We can try to assume that the mind and the body do not interact, and D offers "occasionalism" to account for this (p. 23). This is the notion that the occasion arises for God to cause sensation, but it is still not clear how God interacts with the human mind and body. Unless "everything is immaterial", then the problem of interaction (in this case, between God and us) persists (p. 24). Insofar as this is a mystery, we have no explanatory power. Since God is a huge controversial assumption, dualism fails to be a simple theory. Evolutionary theory does not rely on dualism, so it avoids this criticism, as having minds does not equal to having "immaterial, immortal souls" (p. 25).

The commonsense view is that animal awareness exists. The burden of proof, says Regan, falls on those who reject it, and D has failed. Also, how we habitually use ordinary language indicates that animals have a mental life, and again, those who reject this habit must provide compelling reasons for why we all ought to do so. The question Regan thinks needs to be answered is whether our habit stands "in the way of clear and effective communication" (p. 26). Can and ought we to avoid this presumably anthropomorphic talk? Without these emotions and attitudes, says Regan, there is no meaning to our descriptions of animal behavior, and he sees no good reason to abandon this way of talking.

The argument for consciousness being unique to human beings must involve human beings and animals having different natures, but evolutionary theory runs contrary to this. Also, evolutionary theory says certain animals are conscious because we are, and a human beings mental life does not differ in kind from and animals. Regan provides us with a set of relevant reasons for "attributing consciousness or a mental life to animals" in the "Cumulative Arguments for animal consciousness" (henceforth CA)(pp. 27-8). Again, he claims it is up to those who deny these reasons to show its deficiency.

This account still leaves open the question of which animals are conscious. Even thought where we draw the line is not clear, the notion that some animals are conscious is not undermined. Regan goes back to this question at the end of Chapter two, but at this point he says that the CA accounts for at least all mammals. We have good reason to believe that our consciousness and physiology and anatomy are intimately connected, for example in cases of spinal cord damage or brain damage. Similarity between human beings and other mammals and the adaptive value of consciousness, together with the evolutionary idea that the more complex is evolved from the less complex, give us reason to attribute consciousness to mammals.

He concludes this chapter by saying that the attribution of consciousness to animals is not anthropomorphic. It is conceit that keeps us from seeing animal consciousness and it is chauvinistic to not attribute consciousness to animals (pp. 30-1).

Chapter 2

The CA can also be used to "defend the view that mammalian animals have beliefs and desires" and that their behavior is consistent with this claim (p. 34). Hence we have the subject of the second chapter.

Stich offers the "intuitive belief-desire theory" of animal behavior. Due to evolution, it would be unusual to have a theory that explained animal behavior but not human beings, and vice versa. As Stich’s theory, along with evolutionary theory and the CA applies to human beings and their behavior, it thus applies to animals. To show otherwise, one would have to demonstrate how it does not apply to animals while maintaining its application to human beings. One would have to show one of the following things: 1) that animals, unlike humans, do not have beliefs and desires; and, 2) animals may have beliefs, but we cannot know the content of such beliefs, and thus cannot explain behavior based on this (the unknown). Stich, as we will see below, will argue for 2 in this dichotomy. Regan considers Frey’s defense of 1 first.

Frey argues for 1 and says that though animals have needs, they do not have desires. He says that beliefs underlie desires so one cannot desire something without a corresponding belief. He says, "animals lack beliefs because what is believed (the object of belief) is that a given sentence is true" (p. 39). Though he grants that animals are conscious, like D he thinks that linguistic proficiency is required for the ascription of beliefs, and it is thus necessary to believe a sentence is true. One cannot challenge Frey, warns Regan, by claiming that animals do have a language. One must consider his crucial claim, which is quoted above.

All beliefs, says Frey, are beliefs that a certain sentence is true. Regan says this is just false (and, as was discussed in class, this notion is widely rejected by contemporary philosophers). The Portuguese speaker, for example, cannot believe any English sentences, but this doesn’t mean he doesn’t have any beliefs. But Frey could be arguing that one must believe the "equivalent sentence" is whatever language one speaks (p. 41). However, this shows that one does not have beliefs about particular sentences and what is actually believed, then, is unclear. Also, Frey would have to concede that one who was unable to comprehend a language could not have any beliefs. Regan says this is so because one could not believe any sentence to be true (or false). The traveler who is afraid of snakes exemplifies this counter-claim. It is behavior, along with the CA, and not linguistic ability, which yields our evidence for beliefs.

But Frey argues that Regan’s counter-examples are deviant cases and thus they show nothing. Frey claims that his view fits normal cases, i.e., those involving "adult human beings" who "happen to be able to use a language", and who "are able to express their beliefs linguistically" (p. 43). Regan objects to this point on three accounts:

1. The cases Frey calls deviant on his account, are not so for alternative views.
2. Frey’s account, if sound, is too conservative, if he thinks he need only consider normal cases at the expense of rejecting possible counter examples.
3. Unfortunate consequences of Frey’s account are that there are no beliefs without a language (children who do not yet have a language would not have any beliefs) and further, that "no one can learn a language". One needs a preverbal belief to connect a word and its object, as Regan shows in the Baby Jane case.

Regan next turns to Stich, who claims that we "cannot say what they believe and so cannot describe or explain their behavior by making reference to what they believe" and therefore their desires (p. 49). If we cannot know the content of a belief, then we can’t know what we are attributing to them. There are two different properties of beliefs, functional/psychological and propositional attitudes, the latter of which Stich claims animals cannot have.

Stich claims that Fido fails to grasp the concept of a bone or the set of beliefs that are included in the concept, so he is not able to get at the concept. But beliefs differ so this "undermines thinking that there is the concept of anything", says Regan (p. 51). So there must be some set of shared beliefs that Fido need adhere to in order to form "our concept" (p. 51). This applies to people and not just to animals that presumably lack this shared knowledge. Two possibilities arise: 1) either animals have their own concepts; or, 2) animals have our concept. Considering 2, animals cannot have our concepts because they don’t have our beliefs. Unless animals share our concepts, we cannot describe the content of their concepts.

There are two different views of concepts: the "all-or-nothing view" and the "more-or-less view" (pp. 53-4). On the former view, different beliefs would lead to different concepts. It implies that there are many concepts of one thing, and that one would go from not having the concept at all, to having it in full, which is not likely. The latter view allows for multiple beings to have the same concept, but they do in different degrees. This latter notion is rationally preferable, according to Regan, as it allows for an increase in understanding of a concept. (The case of Mitch demonstrates how this is favorable.)

If animals have a shared belief, then they have a grasp of the concept in a small degree. But there doesn’t seem to be any reason to think (at least by merely watching Fido recognize the bone) that animals understand our beliefs or the properties we attribute to things ("what Stich calls ‘the dilemma of animal belief’ ") (p. 57). But it does seem that Fido displays a preferred choice of actions when it comes to fulfilling his desires. And his recognizing this connection is a belief, namely, the preference belief. All one needs to do is watch the behavior of animals to see whether they have this belief. From the fact that he picks the bone, we can know something about the content of his concept. And, since preference-belief is a shared belief and part of our concept, he grasps our concept in some degree.

But one belief doesn’t seem to be enough for one to have a concept, even with the more-or-less view, so Fido appears to "lack enough of our beliefs" (p.57). Regan makes a distinction between two senses of lacking beliefs: denial and nondenial. Fido doesn’t deny the beliefs we attribute to bones; he just does not have them. We need to ensure that he doesn’t deny the beliefs (like the Boneheads) for us not to attribute the concept to him. But Fido cannot deny them if he can’t even understand them. We don’t know other beliefs but since he has one shared, and none denied, this is sufficient for us to say that Fido grasps the concept.

Another objection is then raised. Since we don’t know "what it is like to have" Fido’s experiences, we can’t attribute preference-belief to him (p. 63). Regan considers three arguments for, and his responses to, this objection:

1. The language argument – In short, it is the inability to express in our method, via language, what Fido is experiencing. This implies that we "cannot know…any description of anything that lacks a language" (p. 63). This is absurd, says Regan, as we can express in language things about non-language users (exemplified by the coin example).
2. The imagination argument – This states that one can’t imagine life via Fido’s eyes, thus we cannot know what it is like for him to have experience. Regan responds that this would apply in cases of other human beings as well, since it is impossible to see things through another’s eyes. But since we can indeed know what it’s like for other human beings to have certain experiences, we cannot use this argument to reject animal experience.
3. The species argument – This says we can only relate to what members of our own species experience. Regan contends that it is highly unlikely that there are no common experiences across species; most likely experiences are not dramatically different. To claim Fido is having a similar experience is consistent with the behavior we see. Both practical (behavioral) and theoretical (the CA) reasons for this (in addition to simplicity).

A further objection is raised which asks whether we can really "specify the content of their beliefs, on the basis of observed behavior" (p. 67). Stich and Frey both say no, and as we’ve already discussed Stich’s reasons, let’s take a look at Frey’s. Frey wonders how one belief is tied exclusively to one behavior, when a particular behavior can be applied to several instances (such as the various times his dog wags his tail, for example, like when he hears his master’s footsteps, when he sees food, etc). Regan says we cannot look at merely one particular behavior to determine another’s beliefs, the atomistic view, but we rather need to look at a whole set of behaviors, the holistic view. One cannot say anything based on one, isolated behavior. Given a significant amount of background information including past behavior, and the behavior of similar animal in like situations, we can reasonably attribute expectations to animals.

Regan says on pp. 69-71:

• belief is confirmed if future behavior is consistent (including pre & post action behavior)
• intentional behavior can be attributed to animals (see the Coke bottle example)
• preference-belief is based on behavior as a result of expectations

In conclusion, the question of "where to draw the lime between those animals that are, and those that are not, conscious or aware" is once again discussed by Regan (p. 76). The closer they are (anatomically and physiologically) to humans, the stronger our reasons are for attributing consciousness to them. This applies to all human and animal mammals "aged one year or more" who are not sufficiently mentally defective (p. 78). It should be noted that this leaves open the possibility that some animals are not conscious.

Just because some conscious animals have a complex mental life, does not mean that they all do, says Regan. The more complex the organism (and thus similar to humans), the more complex their mental life. We have reason to believe the animal categories stated above are conscious and "have beliefs, desires, memory, a sense of the suture, self-awareness, and an emotional life, and can act intentionally" (p. 77).

Comments by John Nolt

Carrie refers to "the traditional interpretation of the behavior of animals on D’s view." This, I think, needs to be qualified. Descartes' view was influential, of course, but it has always been a minority view and hence not really traditional.

Here is a more complete rendering of Descartes' argument (p. 10) that animals are not conscious based on the fact that they lack immortal souls:

Whatever is conscious has an immortal soul.
If some animals had immortal souls, then all would.
Oysters and sponges are animals too imperfect to have immortal souls.
So No animals are conscious.

Only language-users are conscious.
Animals are not language-users.
So Animals are not conscious.

Carrie writes, "Given that human beings are conscious, the question remains whether other animals are. If it depends on D notion of the immortal soul or language acquisition, then they do not." The second statement seems too strong to me. Descartes does not really show that humans have immortal souls (he tries but his arguments are unsound) nor that nonhuman animals lack them; nor does he show that nonhumans cannot use language.

Carrie characterizes the problem of other minds as one of Descartes' assumptions. It is not an assumption for Descartes but rather a problem to which his methodological doubt gives rise.

Note that occasionalism is not Descartes' view but a view proposed by some of his followers.

Carrie says, "Also, evolutionary theory says certain animals are conscious because we are … ." Evolutionary theory doesn't say this, but it does provide evidence for the claim that consciousness is not unique to humans.

Specifically, the cumulative argument for animal consciousness which Carrie mentions is this:

• we have a large store of beliefs and desires
• desires often arise from deprivation or painful stimuli
• interaction of beliefs and desires generates further desires
• desires can cause behavior
• beliefs have many causes, most prominently perception and inference
• beliefs may be inferred from other beliefs

1 To believe is to believe that a given sentence is true.
2 Animals cannot believe that a given sentence is true.
So 3 Animals cannot have beliefs. (2,3)
4 Only those individuals who have beliefs can have desires.
So 5 Animals cannot have beliefs or desires. (3,4)

1 To believe is to believe that a given sentence is true. (reductio assumption)
2 To believe a sentence, we must understand it.
So 3 Those who do not understand sentences can't believe anything. (1,2)
4 Young children do not understand sentences.
So 5 Young children can't believe anything. (3,4)
6 Those who can't believe anything can't learn a language.
So 7 Young children can't learn a language (5,6)

Note that the preference-belief is this proposition: bones are to be chosen in order to satisfy desires Fido has for a certain flavor.