Phil 646

02/05/2001

Reading Summary: Avner de-Shalit, Why Posterity Matters

Chapter 5-6 , pp. 112-137

In Chapter 5 de Shalit talks about the rights-based approach to intergenerational justice theory. He starts with the claim that basing the distribution of goods between contemporaries and future generations on the rights of future people raises some controversial questions. Then he elaborates on these questions by displaying and criticizing the views of the supporters of this approach.

Among those who argue that future people certainly have rights de Shalit mentions Annette Baier. Opposing the view that regards future generations inferior due to their non-existence Baier claims that it is not the ontological status of future generations that is inferior but our knowledge about them.

De Shalit brings up Pletcher’s view as another rights-based argument. Pletcher implies that our obligations to future generations are analogous to our obligations to clean up a camping site for the next person who’s going to camp at the same place after us. De Shalit disregards this analogy on the grounds that the people who will benefit from this act already exist in present. So, he argues, it’s not a parallel case to our obligations to future generations.

Having discarded Pletcher’s rights-based view de Shalit regards Steiner’s opposite position problematic as well. Steiner claims that future people cannot be said to have rights because they cannot exercise the kind of choices that rights entail. De Shalit agrees with Goodin’s opposition to this argument based on the reasoning that the fact that they cannot exercise choices doesn’t logically disqualify future generations from having rights. Goodin’s example to support his opposition is court-appointed guardians exercising the rights of infants and idiots who are not able to exercise choices themselves, just as the case with future generations.

Another opponent of rights-based view is Richard de George. He denies rights to future people on the grounds that these people do not exist in present. De Shalit criticizes de George’s view as being a weak contention with the reasoning that it doesn’t take into account the idea that future people will have rights if and when they exist. And if this is the case we should take some steps now not to violate these eventual rights.

Another approach – termed as potential interests - is put forward by Joel Feinberg and Robert Elliot. Feinberg and Elliot claim that the rights that future people enjoy vis-à-vis contemporaries are contingent upon their existence. These are the interests, they contend, that future people are sure to have when they come into existence. Their identity is obscure in present but it is obvious that they will have their own interests when they do eventually come to exist. Based on the potential interests claim Elliot suggests that the present non-existence of future people should not preclude our basing of obligations to future generations on rights.

Having accepted Elliot’s contention de Shalit asks next what these rights oblige us to do. He distinguishes between human rights defined as rights protecting individuals against interference by other individuals, institutions or the state as well as preserving their autonomous lives, and welfare rights defined as rights which assume state’s intervention.

De Shalit discusses different interpretations of these rights as for their implications on intergenerational justice. He brings up James Sterba’s broad interpretation of rights – termed as right to life. According to Sterba’s interpretation right to life applied to future generations implies that future people should receive all the goods and resources necessary to satisfy their basic needs. Sterba argues that this interpretation can justify our obligations to future people. With regard to Sterba’s interpretation de Shalit questions the extent to which these rights can justify our obligations to posterity. He argues that in the intergenerational context we think of the distribution of products that not only consist of essential goods but also include non-essential ones, like access to the enjoyment of aesthetically pleasing landscapes. Hence, he concludes, that our obligations to future generations go beyond those that derive from human rights.

De Shalit also criticizes the claim put forward by liberals that the most fundamental human right is the right to equal respect and concern, which is based on the assumption of neutrality. This view implies that people choose among several alternatives what is good for themselves and plan their own lives, which further implies that the state should not promote any idea of the good life. However, de Shalit argues, that our decisions regarding future generations are not based on neutrality but on what we believe is good and beneficial for them. Hence, he claims that obligations to future generations related to the conservation of environment cannot be based on the human right of equal concern in its liberal interpretation as a right reflecting neutrality.

As for the welfare rights of future generations de Shalit argues that the main difficulty here lies in the fact that unlike human rights, welfare rights cannot be based on individuals in the abstract. Rather, he contends, they must be based on individuals in their social contexts because welfare rights emphasize social relations of people who stand in an institutional relationship and share a common institutional life. Hence, according to de Shalit, welfare rights in general make sense only in the context of a community. He concludes that welfare rights in that sense are no longer primary because they derive from our understanding of a community, and refers to his conception of transgenerational community as the fundamental concept of linking future generations with the contemporaries in the sense of intergenerational justice.

In the last chapter de Shalit makes six arguments in favor of his communitarian theory of intergenerational justice, and compares it with the other theories – utilitarian, contractarian and rights-based - he criticizes.

First he claims that in the communitarian theory obligations to future generations have their source in the present existing individuals and that this theory takes full responsibility for the state of the environment. He criticizes the other theories – especially the contractarian theory – in this respect. He claims that the contractarian theory reduces the question of intergenerational justice to relations between one generation and its direct successor but while doing so de Shalit fails to explain how his communitarian theory responds to the problem of distributive justice extending to more remote generations.

Second, de Shalit puts forward the argument that, unlike utilitarian, contractarian and rights-based theories, the communitarian theory does not depend on impossible information and does not claim or aim to neutral. He argues that with respect to what constitutes "the good for a society" neutrality is impossible in the intergenerational context. At this point he distinguishes between the forum approach of the communitarian theory - where one tries to persuade others in the society with a rational argument to act in a certain way and while doing so regards her ideas and beliefs as part of herself - and the market approach of the contractarian and rights-based theories – where in case of conflicting claims the society remains neutral between them and the contradicting sides are expected to compromise; de Shalit refers to this situation as a ‘market’ where ideas become like objects of trade and hence external to ourselves.

Third, de Shalit contends that the communitarian theory does not depend on the ontological issue of potential versus actual persons. Unlike the other three theories, he argues, the communitarian theory doesn’t need to identify actual future people because it ties the obligations to future generations and their sources to the present generation. According to de Shalit the questions affecting the content of these obligations, which the communitarian theory leaves unresolved, are not essential problems but practical ones relating to the application of the theory.

As his fourth argument de Shalit claims that communitarian theory has the advantage of not being atomistic. He argues that all the three theories he criticizes hold individuals prior to society. According to de Shalit they regard society as an aggregation of individuals where each individual seeks to increase her own interests unconcerned about those of the society in general. He argues that this leads to alienation in the sense that the individualist self in the utilitarian, contractarian and rights-based theories is alienated in relation to the past and future and lives only in the present, lacking a sense of belonging anything larger than its own private sphere. Here, de Shalit doesn’t seem to be aware of (or wishes to step aside from) a legitimate question that can be raised as for the merits of his criticism when the same argument can be put forward against his communitarian theory according to which each community would seek to increase its own interests.

Fifth, de Shalit contends that the communitarian theory is time neutral. He argues that when distributing goods it does not discriminate against future people simply on the grounds of temporal distance between present and future generations.

In his sixth and final argument de Shalit claims that the communitarian theory is helpful in identifying the content of our obligations to future generations. He argues that, unlike the utilitarian and contractarian approaches, the communitarian theory does not need to know the preferences of future people at all, but can decide what to leave to future generations on the basis of present generations’ own values. At this point de Shalit seems to contradict with his criticism directed to Utilitarians on the grounds that they impose their own conception of the good on future generations. (p.127)

Having put forward these arguments de Shalit next poses the questions that are still left unresolved within the context of his communitarian theory. He examines these questions in three categories as those concerning economy, political science and international relations.

The economic question asks what’s the rate of progress or development that would both guarantee the fulfilment of obligations to future generations and improve the welfare of contemporaries. One extreme view as an attempt to answer this question is held by dark Greens or deep ecologists. They argue that the world is a finite pie so what we exhaust is not available to future people and the more we deplete the poorer they will be. Deep ecologists regard any technological solutions to problems as delusive on the grounds that they would just postpone the need for drastic political or environmental action. They claim that as a consequence people might remain indifferent instead of taking steps towards real solutions to the problems. Extremists among them tend to idealize pre-industrial societies.

The other extreme view on the other end is held by the developers and the growth proponents. They claim that the world is an unlimited pie and global productivity must be raised rapidly to meet the challenge of feeding the growing population. They favor utilizing technology, capital and science, including economics. They argue that all problems can be solved either by people, by technology or else by politics.

Others think that the truth lies somewhere in between these two extreme views. The holders of this view call themselves pale Greens. They think that a middle way should be found as a realistic approach to the issue. Pale Greens believe that development provides the opportunity for creativity and improvement but according to them the other side of development must be conservation. They argue in favor of managing the economy and the environment by modifying and controlling industrial growth, and simultaneously providing all the other requirements of modern society. The notion sustainable development is used to describe such an attitude.

Sustainable development is more than just a quantitative rise in economic indicators. It emphasizes quality of life, moderate and responsible progress that includes environmental factors. Besides short-term effects it also takes into account the long-term effects of policies and thus considers the welfare of contemporaries as well as that of future generations.

The second question posed by de Shalit asks what sort of political and economic system can best tackle the issue of environment. There are two views in that respect. One argues in favor of free market with minimum state intervention and the other favors strong state intervention.

According to the market model, all we need to do is to value the environment and natural resources. In this way their usage will automatically become more limited. Critics of the market model on the other hand claim that managing the environment is a very complicated task that cannot be dealt with market solutions alone. So they argue the state must intervene and environmental issues must be solved by planning and the enforcement of laws and policies.

The third question deals with the international aspect of the management of environmental problems. Both common property resources, like parts of the ocean that are open to a few nations’ fleets, and global open access resources, like the atmosphere, run the risk of over-use. As these are public goods they are provided to everyone and to all nations. Hence, de Shalit concludes, beside a theory of intergenerational justice we also need international cooperation.

Comments by John Nolt

This is a very thorough and accurate summary. I can see only two minor omissions. These are indicated below:

First, Banu's summary omits mention of de-Shalit's argument that rights theory is inadequate (p. 115):

1 Only people who will exist have rights.

So 2 If all people decided to have no more children, then no

rights would be violated, since no one would exist. (1)

3 A rights theory can condemn a decision only if it violates

someone's rights (implicit)

So 4 A rights theory can't condemn a universal decision to

have no more children (2,3)

De-shalit assumes that the conclusion 4 makes the absurdity of rights theory obvious.

Second, I see de-Shalit as making 5 major points against rights theory at the end of Chapter 5; some of these Banu mentions and some she does not:

Objection 1 (117)

Welfare rights conflict in intergenerational context. For example, if we feed everyone, the population will explode (lifeboat ethics).

Objection 2 (118)

Rights theories usually operate on principles of sufficiency (everyone has a right to basic meeds) ; therefore, when all have been provided for, they allow great unjustified inequalities.

Objection 3 (118-19)

Most rights theories deeply value autonomy; therefore they do not permit the government to impose a notion of the good life; this makes it difficult to justify conservation as opposed to material progress.

Objection 4 (119-20)

Rising expectations constantly expand what we regard as necessary and hence as a welfare right; this makes intergenerational considerations difficult

Objection 5 (120)

Welfare rights make sense only in the context of a community. We do not have obligations to supply everyone with necessities. This pushes us back toward de-Shalit’s communitarian view.