The present article is devoted to an analysis of the scientific significance of the establishment by Wundt of the laboratory tradition in psychology. Wundt's achievement is discussed in the light of the scientific situation in 19th Century Germany and from the standpoint of a Naturalistic Science of Psychology. Two types of discipline exist, one is conventional or traditional psychology and the other psychology as a natural science. Wundt did much for conventional psychology by introducing an active observational and manipulative study. However, he did nothing for psychology as a natural science; he was dominated by the psychic traditions of psychology. Nothing but spiritistic presuppositions influenced Wundt to reduce organisms to processes of apperceptions and stimulus objects to sensations.
Intellectuals of every persuasion regard the year 1979 as an occasion for great and significant celebrations. Many scientists take note of the centenary of the birth of Einstein who has done so much for the advancement of physics and cosmology, as well as general scientific thinking. Psychologists celebrate the 100th anniversary of the formal institution by Wilhelm Wundt of laboratory study in psychology, as well as the tradition of experimentation in that discipline.
Both events provide occasions for reflection concerning scientific and philosophic problems. The advent of relativistic thinking in the so-called exact sciences signalizes a new and improved direction in both philosophical and scientific thinking, while psychologists must acclaim the breaking down of the barriers between the events of physics and biology on one side, and the psychological behavior of organisms on the other.
The present article is devoted to an analysis of the scientific significance of the establishment by Wundt of the laboratory tradition in psychology. Inquiry is made whether psychology has progressed to scientific status as a consequence of the introduction of laboratory work as part of its investigative methodology. No question exists but that Wundt's establishment of a psychological laboratory marks a striking change in the career of psychological study. No longer is psychology regarded as a purely esoteric domain. But the question remains whether Wundt's achievement has made psychology into a natural science. To analyze Wundt's achievement and to observe it in perspective not only adds to the comprehension of psychology as a science, but also contributes to an appreciation of the nature of science itself.
Throughout the period of the great burgeoning of the sciences in the 18th and 19th centuries, the problem arose whether psychology is or could be a science. The famous philosopher Kant argued against the possibility. Science, Kant thought, must be quantitative and of course psychical entities could not be classified or numbered. Furthermore psychic entities could in no wise be experimented upon. Herbart who was the successor of Kant in the chair of philosophy at the University of Königsburg agreed with Kant that no scientific experimentation of psychic phenomena is possible but he did insist that psychic processes could be numeralized. Accordingly he built up a psychological system which like the physics of mechanics included static and dynamic phases. By allotting definite mathematical weightings to the psychic elements or ideas, he developed a set of equations marking the quantities of psychic energy.
Herbart's work was published in 1816, about 44 years later Fechner developed a complex psychophysical and statistical system based upon the formula S = k log R. It is to be noted that the technique that Fechner employed consisted of presenting subjects with stimulus objects in the form of drawings and weights. Fechner's work produced a deep impression upon Wundt. Wundt too declared that "we cannot experiment on mind itself but only upon its outworks, the origins of sense and movement which are functionally related to mental processes."1 In due course Wundt followed Fechner and carried over the experimental techniques employed in physiology to the investigation of psychological reactions such as sensory discrimination, reaction time, and feelings called emotions. Wundt, however, regarded the psychological reactions as very different from physiological ones.
The introduction of the experimental method into psychology was originally due to the modes of procedure in physiology, especially in the physiology of the sense-organs and the nervous system. For this reason experimental psychology is also commonly called 'physiological psychology'; the works treating it under this title regularly contain those supplementary facts from the physiology of the nervous system and of the sense organs, which require special discussion with a view to the interests of psychology, though in themselves these facts belong to physiology alone. 'Physiological psychology' is, accordingly, an intermediate discipline which is, however, as the name indicates, primarily psychology, and is, apart from the supplementary physiological facts that it presents, essentially the same as 'experimental psychology' in the sense above defined.2
Wundt and the History of Psychology
With a full appreciation of the distinction between the traditions and the science of psychology, Wundt must be accorded the great merit of establishing or formulating a tremendous advance in the general history of psychology. Throughout his intellectual career Wundt was an admirer of scientific investigation, especially experimentation rather than the practice of any profession. Already a doctor of medicine and for a time an assistant in a medical clinic, he preferred to become a scientific worker. In his student days he was attracted by the work of the eminent chemist Bunsen and considered the possibility of turning chemist. However, in line with his equally great interest in physiology, and the influence of personal circumstances, he became a physiologist.3 But having also become immersed in philosophical problems, Wundt inclined more and more toward psychological interests which eventuated in his well-deserved fame for his achievements in the tradition of psychology.
That the present celebration of Wundt's great achievement is fully warranted is supported by a number of important considerations. The formal institutionalization of laboratory work in psychology and the shift of attitude by initiating an experimental tradition mark a change of extreme importance in the attempt to study the behavior of organisms by methods similar to those used in physics, chemistry, and biology. Moreover, Wundt's achievement in a unique way symbolizes a correction of the common view of psychological history that organismic behavior is not entirely naturalistic, nor does it detract from Wundt's achievement that the development of laboratory study in psychology seemed to occur as a matter of course.
Wundt's interest in experimentation and his ambition to establish it in psychology takes on an appearance of inevitability when one considers the scientific situation in Germany in the 19th century. Laboratories or works-hops generally called Institutes became established in the various sciences. Whereas university study had been traditionally a matter of listening to lectures, in the 19th century scientific institutes grew up apace.
Experimentation in general developed as a specimen circumstance in the progress of scientific work and reflection. To develop experimentation at all was to overcome the religious prejudice against interference with God's ordinances and creations. Interesting here is the concern of Comenius (1592-1670) who said:
Men must be instructed in wisdom so far as possible, not from books, but from the heavens, the earth, the oaks and the beeches; that is, they must learn and investigate the things themselves, and not merely the observations and testimonies of other persons concerning the things. Who is there, who teaches physics by observation and experiment, instead of by reading an Aristotelian or other text-book?4
Such have been the cultural circumstances in Europe that individual scientists nitiated experimentation in chemistry, but in their own homes. The laboratory of Berzelius (1779-1848) was in his own kitchen where it is said chemistry and cooking went on together. Individual physicists too managed to experiment though outside the premises of universities, and so the earliest experiments in physics were made in private laboratories; a tradition of this sort is exemplified by the light and optical work of Newton (1642-1727), Franklin's (1706-1790) electrical experiments, and Cavendish's (1731-1810) studies in various departments of physics.
Gradually occurred the transition from private to university laboratories. A most interesting example was the development of the private laboratory of H. G. Magnus to an integral part of the University of Berlin in 1863. The importance of this example is gauged by the fact that Magnus was the teacher of such eminent scientists as G. H. Wiedemann (1826-1899), Hermann von Helmholtz (1821-1894), and John Tyndall (1820-1893). The interest in this development of laboratories by universities is heightened when we recall that Helmholtz has been so influential in the scientific and psychological life of Wundt.
Helmholtz of course was not only a physicist but also a mathematician and a physiologist who made great strides in the development of physiology as a science. As a pupil of the eminent Johannes Mller (1801-1858) he strove to put physiology on a par with chemistry, anatomy, and physics. Physiology he hoped to establish on a firm scientific foundation of law as in the mechanics of motion. It is well to recall here the circle in which Helmholtz moved. We need only mention E. H. Weber (1795-1878), DuBois Reymond (1818-1896), and of course his teacher Johannes Mller.
Here it must not be overlooked that Helmholtz and others expanded physiology to include behavior classified as psychological, for example, visual and auditory responses to their respective stimulations as well as velocity of reaction. Here is the scientific link that bound Helmholtz and Wundt. As Wundt was technically a physiologist it was easy simply to establish an Institute primarily to study psychological activities.
Another relevant factor making for the development of a laboratory in psychology was the establishment by Fechner of his work designed for the demonstration of the interrelationship of spiritistic and physical phenomena. Fechner's Elements appeared 19 years before Wundt was inspired to establish his Institute. What is strongly suggested in Fechner's work is that even a religious mystic could resort to manipulatory measures for supporting gross metaphysical beliefs.
The psychological career of Wundt culminating in his establishment of a psychological laboratory brings prominently to the front problems of theory and investigative procedures in science especially in psychology. Consider that in the basic analysis scientists are persons acting in an immense environment consisting of innumerable objects and conditions. The adapting behavior performed is of two prominent types, one consisting of immediate movements and manipulations, the other the more subtle attitudes of belief and knowledge, hypothesis and assumption. The behavior of the second type, because it is more remote from things, may diverge from the former kind. Thus a scientist may believe he is concerned with and doing something else different from what is actually the case.
We are reminded here of the wise observation of Einstein who declared:
If you want to find out anything from the theoretical physicists about the methods they use, I advise you to stick closely to one principle: don't listen to their words, fix your attention on their deeds. To him who is a discoverer in this field the products of his imagination appear so necessary and natural that he regards them, and would like to have them regarded by others, not as creations of thought but as given realities.5
Psychology especially is vulnerable in the matter of confusing techniques and theory inasmuch as what is done in investigating psychological events has historically been misconstrued and the same errors continue to be made even today. And so Wundt could establish a laboratory and impose an experimental principle upon traditional dualistic psychology which obviously could never be matched by any technique of observation, description, and interpretation. The secret of this paradox is that while Wundt adhered to the technique of science he was at the same time immured in the historical structure of spiritistic philosophy.
As Wundt informs us in his autobiography he began his first reading of Kant's Critik der Reinen Vernunft in his early university career and was deeply impressed with what he encountered there.6 This situation could not be otherwise in the intellectual climate of Germany while Wundt was in his 26th year. What is to be noted especially is that Wundt's philosphy pervades his thinking thoroughly, and permanently. This was a time when the intellectual atmosphere of Germany was thoroughly interpenetrated with spiritistic or idealistic philosophy. Common was the expression that to the French belonged the earth, the sea to England, and the heavens with its clouds to Germany.
Wundt's philosophical absorption exemplifies the principle that the power of cultural institutions overrides the acquaintance with events. Throughout all of Wundt's observations and interpretations his idealistic or spiritistic views stand out prominently. Howsoever eminent his work and teachings are, they reflect the basic assumptions of traditional speculative thinking. It is interesting to note that writers on the history of experimental psychology even when they are disciples of Wundtian psychology point out that Wundt was much more a philosopher than a psychologist.
...In all this work his method resembles more the method of the philosopher than that of the scientist. At bottom his temperament seems to have been philosophical. It is not that he wrote philosophically and also on philosophy because he had come to hold a chair of philosophy instead of physiology; he was appointed as a philosopher because, even when a physiologist, his bent had been philosophical toward the theory of science.7
That Wundt's psychology was deeply philosophical was not a personal fault. Philosophy of some sort is a basic matrix for all thinking and speculation. The question is whether the philosophy adopted and employed is naturalistic or metaphysical. All psychology has been and still is philosophical. Despite the administrative separation of philosophy and psychology departments, the basic assumptions are still metaphysical. Wundt's philosophical attitudes belonged completely and finally to the type described as spiritistic monism. Wundt professed his ultimate conviction that a philosopher could entertain absolute and universal views about the universe. For him reality when it is relieved of the empirically observed appearances consisted of pure spirit.
Although Wundt uses such terms as scientific philosphy8 his philosophy stands in direct line of post-Greek metaphysics. His philosophy emphasizes the subjectivity, the spirituality, of knowledge and experience with a minimization of things known. From the standpoint of authentic scientific philosophy Wundt's philosophy consists basically of the verbalistic constructions of the Church Fathers and their succeeding religious thinkers. His fundamental reality is simply the verbal creationism which produced gods, angels, demons, powers, fairies, unicorns, and the other denizens of unadulterated fictionism.
To evaluate the psychology of Wundt it is essential to note that traditional spiritistic metaphysics has interpenetrated completely his thinking both as to general science and particularly psychology. This circumstance is satisfactorily attested by the following specimen items.
a. Psychophysical Parallelism. Wundt persistently maintains a modern version of the theological notion of spirit and flesh. The change of names to psychic and bodily does not change the dogma. The misinterpretation of the method and results of experimental procedures cannot conceal the inability of thinkers to give up the venerable constructions of spirits even in the face of their dealing with the behavior of subjects in the laboratory.
b. Mediate and Immediate Experience. Another witness to Wundt's adherence to spiritistic metaphysics in his psychological doctrines is his construction of immediate and mediate experience. Psychology is concerned with immediate experience while the natural sciences are complicated by mediation. As an idealistic monist Wundt regards psychology as the investigation of the entity of spirit or reality or experience. The natural sciences on the other hand are concerned only with the contents of consciousness or objects of experience thought of as independent of the subject. The mediation consists of the subtraction of the subject. Psychology as immediate experience in true metaphysical manner is more fundamental than physics, physiology, or any other science which is concerned with mediate contents of experience.9 Experience for Wundt is nothing more than metaphysical spirit as manifested in traditional philosophy. He takes no cognizance of the behavior of persons in their adaptations to the things and persons throughout their actual daily performances.
c. Psychology of Nature and Spirit. The spiritism of Wundt's psychology manifests itself also in his division of psychological sciences into Natur-und Geistes-wissenschaften. Such data as can be connected with individual organismic processes are natural but the so-called higher mentalities generated by social conditions are more directly connected with spiritual entities. No less does the spiritistic metaphysics show itself than by the fallacious argument that the mental and the physical are only viewpoints and not different entities.
d.Introspection, the Fundamental Method of Psychology. It is no accident that Wundt made introspection the primary method of psychological study and investigation. How else could one penetrate into the mysteries of mind or soul? In this connection it is informing that Wundt could not benefit from explanations in terms of his dualistic neural aspects. No. Explanations had to be purely psychic which derived exclusively from the spiritistic matrix of all things.
e. Arbitrary Analogism. Because of the metaphysical background of Wundt's psychology it permits free departure from observations and rational inference. This is readily observed in his summary volume entitled Grundriss der Psychologie of 1896.10 In general, the plan of the work was to imitate a chemical model but with only two fundamental elements, sensations and feelings. These were presumed to be compounded and complicated to produce complex psychic states. These two elements are of course purely verbal fabrications. Sensations, though they still are alive in the mystical tradition of psychology are obvious symbolic abstractions from things interacted with by organisms. Through some borrowings from physiological descriptions dualistic psychologists locate sensations in minds from which they are "projected" toward the stimulation process to form objects.
Feelings likewise according to Wundt and the psychic tradition are metaphysical processes created by abstracting from the affective behavior of individuals. By comparison with the so-called attributes of sensations, feelings are presumed to be the three polarized psychic qualities pleasantness-non-pleasantness, arousing-subduing, and straining-relaxing. Again verbal abstractions from the behavior of persons in specific affective situations.
Despite Wundt's sincere intention to be scientific in his psychology, it was impossible for him to observe that all investigators including Weber, Fechner, Helmholtz, and himself never did nor ever could work with anything else than interactions of subjects with other organisms, or objects and conditions. To assume some other means of study is to fly off the orbit of science to the vacuities of spiritistic metaphysics. It was only by virtue of working with subjects and stimulus objects that Wundt could be an experimentalist and a scientific psychologist at all.
The study of Wundt's contribution to the advancement of psychology must result in the conclusion that at least two types of discipline exist, one is conventional or traditional psychology, and the other psychology as a natural science. Without doubt Wilhelm Wundt is one of the great luminaries of conventional psychology. Within the purview of psychological history, he has redirected psychological study toward a novel dimension. He moved it from a primarily theoretical discipline to an active observational and manipulative study. Wundt profited greatly from the physiological base from which he started. He carried forward from the work done by physiologists like Weber, Ludwig, Mller and the incomparable Helmholtz as well as by the mystic Fechner. In an effective way Wundt negated the non-experimental phase of the psychological tradition. He showed that Kant and Herbart were wrong to declare that psychology is and must be a purely theoretical subject. This he did by establishing an experimental and laboratory psychology just as the physiologists did for their discipline.
But now the question arises what did Wundt achieve for the science of psychology, for psychology as a natural science? Here one must give a different answer. The melancholy reply is nothing. Actually, Wundt did not contradict Kant or Herbart. They were obviously right. As long as psychology is regarded as the study of mind, soul, or consciousness, there can only be assertions about such nonexistent entities. Only verbal models and analogies for such subjective or mathematical systems can be created but no science. What Wundt really accomplished was to change the situation to objective or behavioral conditions though without realizing that he did so.
So far was Wundt from authentic psychological science as not to respect the basic rule that science is an endeavor to discover the nature of confrontable events in their evolution and in their interaction with other events as conditions and variations. From a strictly scientific standpoint Wundt was not aware of the nature of a psychological datum. He was dominated by the psychic traditions of psychology and not by the obvious events that he really confronted. Instead of working with psychic sensations and feelings, he really achieved greatness by presenting organisms (subjects) with stimulus objects and recording their behavior whether movements, actions, or verbal reports. So powerful is Wundt's spiritistic philosophical presuppositions, that he overlooked that Fechner, and all his psychophysics, was based on organism-object interactions or fields. Only on such a basis could the work of physicists, and physiologists be successful. Nothing but spiritistic presuppositions influenced Wundt to reduce organisms to processes of apperception and stimulus objects to sensations.
Specifications for a Naturalistic Science of Psychology
Whatever fault one may find with the paucity of results from Wundtian experimental psychology, it must still be remembered that the shortcomings are not to be attributed to Wundt the philosopher and physiologist, rather it is a matter of the time and place in which he lived. Furthermore, it is well to consider that if Wundt and his followers had proceeded to build up a system of psychology on the basis of the laboratory method that they used, an authentic scientific psychology would have resulted.
We may well assume that the stimulation and responding factors of Wundt's experimental psychology could have been built up into a science of psychological fields with a total disregard of all of the fatuous experience, conciousness, and spiritism that actually was included in Wundt's psychological system.
Natural science invariably must proceed on the basis of a complete harmony between postulation and practice. As we have so often indicated, we can only admire Wundt's practice, especially since it was the beginning of objective research in the psychological domain. But his constructions, hypotheses, postulations, and interpretations are in no sense scientific, but rather metaphysical as is indicated in the following contrast between Wundt's assumptions and those basic to natural science.
| Wundt's Postulation | Naturalistic Postulation | ||||||||||||||||||||
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It is interesting to note that Wundt asserts that his psychology is free of metaphysical complications. But the fact remains that despite his development of laboratory techniques and the general notion of psychology following in the footsteps of physiology and physics, it is completely metaphysical. That is to say all of the objects of science are completely beyond space and time and as we have noticed in several places above the whole scheme is nothing but a series of assertions and in no sense based upon observations of the activities of organisms in connection with their surrounding objects and conditions. It is significant that throughout his book Outlines of Psychology Wundt contrasts psychology with the natural sciences. And so it is on the basis of his premises.
Metaphysical Philosophy and Scientific Philosophy
Wundt's philosophy and psychology are perfectly harmonious so that whatever failings are evident in his psychological thinking correspond to equal difficulties in his philosophy. Accordingly it is understandable that Wundtian psychology is thoroughly interpenetrated with spiritistic philosophy. It is in this type of philosophy that he finds basic postulation for scientific work especially in matters of description and interpretation. Since it must be granted that the total Wundtian psychology represents considerable progress, we must conclude that Wundt's spiritistic philosophy has no manner of contact with his laboratory work. Because Wundt regards spiritistic philosophy as basic and unquestionable, the relationship is analogous to the belief of the rich man that it is through God's grace that he has been appointed to control so much wealth.
A meticulous student of current philosophy can easily evaluate the doctrines in the philosophical succession and indicate their sources in the socio-economic circumstances from which they sprang. Thus he can analyze the difference between metaphysical and scientific philosophy. Metaphysical philosophy stems primarily from the distress of thinkers who wish to escape from bad human circumstances of poverty and mischance. They then imagine gardens of Eden and the greatest of happiness for the warriors slain in battle. In general, metaphysical thinking is absolutistic, universalistic, and transcendental, in great contrast to events available to human observation and understanding. Incidental to such thinking, inventions are made of souls to accompany bodies as also omnipotent powers and forces to fill out the imaginary world beyond the realm of actual human conditions. Metaphysical philosophy is escapist and salvatory, not related to erudition and wisdom.
The historical view that philosophy has no subject matter aside from God, Freedom, and Immortality is true only of metaphysical systems. Authentic scientific philosophy is intensively involved with concrete events both of everyday experience and the data, findings, and constructions of all the various sciences.
When the question is raised as to why spiritistic philosophy is so dominant and so influential, the answer is that cultural belief institutions count for much more than any observation. Whenever interbehavioral fields are observed the organism is at once divided into two sorts of entities, one psychic, and the other bodily. In the case of idealistic monism the bodily factors are also reduced to spirit. Critical reflection in both psychology and philosophy demonstrate that no autistic hypotheses need be entertained in either discipline. Organisms can be treated as to their origin, nature, and operation on the basis of cellular and biochemical constitution as well as interactional processes which constitute the works and ways of knowledge and existence.
Valid and valuable philosophizing has no place for any traditional absolutistic and universalistic pronunciations. It is limited to the analysis and description of events that are actually confronted by thinkers. It is only such philosophizing that is clearly and closely associated with a psychological viewpoint based on postulations directly derived from observations of events. It excludes every form of mind-body or soul-flesh constructions, but concerns itself entirely with the interbehavior of organisms with object or conditions usually named stimuli.
In the light of the points made above it is to be noticed that since Wundtian psychology is founded on a metaphysical system of philosophy, he cannot be credited with the advancement of scientific psychology, but still merits the acclaim of one who moved traditional psychology to a highly elevated position.
Boring, E.G., A History of Experimental Psychology, 2nd ci, New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1950, p.327.
Cajori, F., A history of Physics in its Elementavy Branches including the Evolution of Physical Laboratories, New York, Macmillan, 1909, pp.288-89.
Einstein, A., "0n the Method of Theoretical Physics," in Essays in Science. (A. Harris, trs.), Amsterdam, Querido, 1933.
Wundt, W., Erlebtes und Erkanntes, Kr”ner, Stuttgart, 1920. pp. 57, 71 ff.
Wundt, W., Lectures on Human and Animal Psychology (J. E. Creighton and E. B. Titchner, trs.), London, Allen and Company, 1912, p. 10.
Wundt, W., Outlines of Psychology (C. H. Judd, trs.), 3rd rev. Enghsh ed, Leipzig, Engelmnn, 1907, p. 27.
Wundt, W., System dev Philosophie, 3rd ed, 2 vols., Leipzig, Engelmann, 1907.
[footnotes]
1 Wundt, W., Lectures on Human and Animal Psychology (J. E. Creighton and E. B. Titchener, trs.), London, Allen and Company, 1912, p.10.
2 Wundt, W., Outlines of Psychology (C. H. Judd, trs.), 3rd rev. English ed., Leipzig, Engelmann, 1907. p. 27
3 Wundt, W., Erlebtes und Erkanntes, Kröner, Stuttgart, 1920, pp.71 f.
4 Cajori F., A History of Physics, in Elementary Branches including the Evolutionof Physical Laboratories, New York, Macmillan, 1909, pp.288-89.
5 Einstein, A., "On the Method of Theoretical Physics," in Essays in Science, (A. Harris, trs.), Amsterdam, Querido, 1933.
6 Wundt, W., Erlebtes und Erkanntes, p.57.
7 Boring, E.G.. A History of Experimental Psychology, 2nd ed., New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1950, p.327.
8 Wissenschaftliche Philosophie. Cf. Wundt, W., System der Philosophie, 3rd ed., 2 vols, Leipzig, Engelmann, 1907.